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This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to 
understand the significance of, the most important judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue 
Service and Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months—and 
sometimes a little farther back in time if we find the item particularly 
humorous or outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so 
complex that they cannot be discussed in detail, and, anyway, only a devout 
masochist would read them all the way through; just the basic topic and 
fundamental principles are highlighted—unless one of us decides to go nuts 
and spend several pages writing one up. This is the reason that the outline is 
getting to be as long as it is. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code 
generally are not discussed except to the extent that (1) they are of major 
significance, (2) they have led to administrative rulings and regulations, (3) 
they have affected previously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered 
by the outline, or (4) they provide an opportunity to mock our elected 
representatives; again, sometimes at least one of us goes nuts and writes up 
the most trivial of legislative changes. The outline focuses primarily on topics 
of broad general interest (to us, at least)—income tax accounting rules, 
determination of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment  of  capital 
gains and losses, corporate and partnership taxation, exempt organizations, 
and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with qualified pension and 
profit sharing plans, and generally does not deal with international taxation 
or specialized industries, such as banking, insurance, and financial services. 
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I. ACCOUNTING 
 
A. Accounting  Methods 
 
1. The Tax Court sides with the taxpayer on application 
of the completed contact method of accounting to development of 
planned residential communities. Shea Homes Inc. v. Commissioner, 142 
T.C. 60 (2/12/14). The taxpayer was a home builder using the completed 
contract method allowed by § 460(e) (which provides an exception to the 
percentage-of-completion method otherwise required); the taxpayer 
developed large, planned residential communities. The question was 
whether the subject matter of the contracts consisted only of the houses and 
the lots on which the houses are built, as argued by the IRS, or the home as 
well as the larger development, including amenities and other common 
improvements, as argued by the taxpayer. The contracts were home 
construction contracts under § 460(e)(6) because Reg. § 1.460–3(b)(2)(iii) 
provides the cost of the dwelling units includes “their allocable share of the 
cost that the taxpayer reasonably expects to incur for any common 
improvements (e.g., sewers, roads, clubhouses) that benefit the dwelling 
units and that the taxpayer is contractually obligated, or required by law, to 
construct within the tract or tracts of land that contain the dwelling units.” 
More specifically, the taxpayer’s position was that the contracts were 
completed when they meet the test under Reg. § 1.460–1(c)(3)(i)(A) that the 
property was used by the customer for its intended purpose and 95 percent 
of the costs of the development had been incurred. Under this argument, final 
completion and acceptance pursuant to Reg. § 1.460–1(c)(3)(B) did not 
occur (excluding secondary items, if any, pursuant to Reg. § 1.460– 
1(c)(3)(B)(ii)) until the last road was paved and the final bond was released. 
The Tax Court (Judge Wherry), upheld the taxpayer’s position. He rejected 
the IRS’s argument that the common improvements were “secondary items.” 
A key element in the holding was that the taxpayer was required by the 
contracts and by state law to complete common improvements, and that 
obligation was secured by “hefty performance bonds.” 
• The decision might be narrower than it 
appears on its face. Footnote 24 of the opinion states as follows: 
We are cognizant that our Opinion today could lead taxpayers 
to believe that large developments may qualify for extremely 
long, almost unlimited deferral periods. We would caution 
those taxpayers a determination of the subject matter of the 
contract is based on all the facts and circumstances. If 
Vistancia, for example, attempted to apply the contract 
completion tests by looking at all contemplated phases, it is 
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unlikely  that  the  subject  matter  as  contemplated  by  the 
135 
 contracting parties could be stretched that far. Further, sec. 
1.460–1(c)(3)(iv)(A),   Income   Tax   Regs.,   may   prohibit 
 
 taxpayers  from  inserting  language  in  their  contracts  that  
 would  unreasonably  delay  completion  until  such  a  super  
development is completed. 
 
a. And the Ninth Circuit says the Tax Court was 
correct in holding that homebuyers value amenities. Shea Homes, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 834 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 8/24/16). In an opinion by Judge 
Fernandez, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision on the ground 
that the only issue on which the Tax Court’s decision rested was a question of 
fact—what was the subject matter of the taxpayers’ home construction 
contracts, that is, what were the taxpayers obligated to provide to the buyers— 
and that the Tax Court’s fact finding was not clearly erroneous. The IRS’s 
argument in the Tax Court was limited to “a dispute about the subject matter 
content of the contracts” and the IRS “took the very crabbed view that the 
subject matter was limited to the house and the lot.” The Tax Court, however, 
“determined that, as a matter of fact, the subject matter included the house, the 
lot, ‘the development ... and its common improvements and amenities.’” The 
Court of Appeals observed that “[t]his was not a simple case of buyers 
purchasing homes and having no substantial interest in whether the 
development would be and remain the kind of development that they wished 
to live in for some time in the future,” adding that “[e]ach person in the planned 
community would, indeed, have an interest in the use of other property in the 
development, and that would include not only the common amenities but also 
the use that others in the development made of their own properties.” Thus, 
the IRS’s argument that “a buyer's contract cannot encompass more than the 
house and lot or, as a fall-back position, more than the house, the lot, and the 
common improvements” was rejected. 
 
2. An attempt to transmute ordinary income to capital 
gain founders on the accounting method change rules. Greiner v. United 
States, 122 Fed. Cl. 139 (7/22/15). The taxpayer received a stream of 
contingent payments from an acquiring corporation in exchange for 
surrendering his compensatory stock options in the target. After reporting the 
payments as ordinary income under the open transaction doctrine for six years, 
he sought to change to the closed transaction method, reporting as ordinary 
income the estimated fair market value of the income stream in the year of the 
exchange, followed by a return of capital and long-term capital gains as 
payments were received. The Court of Federal Claims (Judge  Campbell- 
Smith)  agreed  with  the  government  that  the  refund  was  properly  denied 
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because the change of reporting method from open transaction to closed 
transaction was a change of accounting method for which permission had not 
been sought under § 446(e). Regardless of which method was used, the amount 
of total income reported over the years was the same, but the amount (as well 
as the character) of the income reported in each year differed. 
 
a. Affirmed without opinion. Greiner v. United 
States, 651 Fed. Appx. 1000 (Fed. Cir. 6/9/16). Without issuing an opinion, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims. 
 
3. It doesn’t have to be a valid method of accounting to 
be a method of accounting a change of which requires the IRS’s consent.  
Nebeker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-155 (8/16/16). The taxpayer 
operated a cash method sole proprietorship that began in 1995. He included 
payments made by clients in the year payment was received but from 2004 
through 2009 deducted the expenses associated with generating that revenue 
in the year payment was received even if the expenses had been incurred in a 
prior year. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the taxpayer’s method of 
deferring  deductions  was  erroneous  for  a  cash  method  taxpayer,  see  Reg. 
§ 1.466-1(c)(1)(iv)(a), but it nevertheless was a method of accounting that he 
consistently used. Thus, the IRS’s adjustment to that item for tax years 2006 
and 2009 constituted a change in his accounting method, which, because the 
IRS’s consent was not secured under § 446(e), triggered the application of 
§ 481. 
 
B. Inventories 
 
1. If you find yourself waking up at night worrying about 
the establishment of dollar-value LIFO inventory pools by  taxpayers 
using IPIC pooling methods, you will want to read these proposed 
regulations. REG-125946-10, Dollar-Value LIFO Regulations: Inventory 
Price Index Computation (IPIC) Method Pools, 81 F.R.  85450  (11/28/16). 
These proposed regulations provide rules regarding the proper pooling of 
manufactured or processed goods and wholesale or retail (resale) goods by 
taxpayers that establish dollar-value last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory pools 
and use the inventory price index computation (IPIC) pooling method. The 
proposed regulations amend the IPIC pooling rules to clarify that those rules 
are applied consistently with the general LIFO pooling rule that manufactured 
or processed goods and resale goods may not be included in the same dollar- 
value LIFO pool. Thus, an IPIC-method taxpayer who elects the IPIC pooling 
method described in Reg. § 1.472–8(b)(4) or (c)(2) and whose trade or 
business  consists  of  both  manufacturing  or  processing  activity  and  resale 
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activity may not commingle the manufactured or processed goods and the 
resale goods within the same IPIC pool. The Treasury Department and the IRS 
have specifically requested comments on the requirement that a taxpayer 
engaged in both manufacturing and resale activities within the same trade or 
business is required to use IPIC pooling for both activities. These amendments 
of the regulations will apply for taxable years ending on or after the date final 
regulations are published in the Federal Register. 
 
C. Installment  Method 
 
1. Can an installment sale between related parties ever 
not have the proscribed tax avoidance purpose requisite for denying 
installment reporting? Vest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.  2016-187 
(10/6/16). The taxpayers owned 85 percent of Truebeginnings, LLC, which 
was an accrual basis partnership for federal tax purposes. According to the 
reported opinion, Truebeginnings in turn owned 100 percent interests in two 
other partnerships, H.D. Vest Advanced Systems, LLC (VAS), and Metric, 
LLC (Metric). (We do not understand how a 100 percent owned LLC can be 
a partnership rather than a disregarded entity or a corporation, but the opinion 
says they were partnerships and the issue could not have arisen if they were 
disregarded entities.) In consideration of 10-year promissory notes, 
Truebeginnings sold computer equipment to VAS and Metric and sold zero- 
basis intangible assets with an appraised value of $2,885,175 to VAS. 
Truebeginnings reported over $3 million of gain on the § 453 installment 
method. The Tax Court (Judge Lauber) upheld the IRS’s conclusion that the 
sales did not qualify for installment sale treatment pursuant to § 453(g)(1), 
which disallows installment reporting for installment sales of depreciable 
property between related persons unless “it is established to the satisfaction of 
the Secretary that the disposition did not have as one of its principal purposes 
the avoidance of Federal income tax.” I.R.C. § 453(g)(2).  TB,  VAS,  and 
Metric were clearly “related persons,” and the computer equipment and 
intangible assets that TB sold to VAS and Metric were “depreciable property.” 
The taxpayer failed to carry the burden of proof that tax avoidance “was not 
among the principal purposes of the asset sale transaction.” Judge Lauber 
reasoned that § 453(g)(2) “resembles other Code sections providing  that 
certain tax treatment will be available only if the taxpayer establishes that the 
plan or transaction did not have ‘as one of its principal purposes the avoidance 
of Federal income tax,’ and that” Tax Court precedent establishes that “a 
taxpayer in such cases can satisfy his burden of proof only by submitting 
‘evidence [that] clearly negate[s] an income-tax-avoidance plan.’” Tecumseh 
Corrugated Box Co. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 360,  381-382  (1990) 
(addressing § 453(e)(7)), aff'd, 932 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1991). The taxpayer’s 
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burden in such cases is “a heavy one.” Pescosolido v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 
52, 56 (1988) (addressing § 306(b)(4)), aff'd, 883 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1989). In 
ascertaining the true purpose of the transaction, Judge Lauber stated, the Tax 
Court accords “more weight to objective facts than to the taxpayer’s ‘mere 
denial of tax motivation.’” The enhanced depreciation deductions available to 
the related buyer is relevant in deciding whether the seller had a principal 
purpose of avoiding tax. Guenther v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-280. 
In this case, the court stated, “[t]he substance of the transaction at issue clearly 
reveals a principal purpose of tax avoidance.” 
Notwithstanding the asset sale, petitioner through TB retained 
full control over the ad-optimization business. By use of 
installment reporting, TB aimed to defer for 10 years virtually 
all the tax on its $3.2 million gain, while VAS and Metric 
would receive stepped-up bases in, and be able to claim 
correspondingly large depreciation or  amortization 
deductions on, the assets transferred. ... This tax-avoidance 
purpose is particularly clear with respect to the  intangible 
assets sold to VAS. Those assets had a zero cost basis in TB's 
hands, thus yielding zero amortization deductions to it. But 
VAS   claimed   a   stepped-up   basis   in   those   assets   of 
$2,885,175, yielding amortization deductions of $192,345 
annually. The enhanced amortization deductions claimed by 
VAS and Metric, totaling $644,772 for 2008-2010 alone, 
dwarf the $29,798 gain that TB reported for 2008. 
 
D. Year of Inclusion or Deduction 
 
1. This Eagle’s wings got clipped by the Tax Court. Giant 
Eagle, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-146 (7/23/14). The taxpayer 
owned and operated supermarkets and gas stations. It offered  a  customer 
loyalty program by which customers making qualifying purchases at the 
supermarket could earn “fuelperks!” that were redeemable for a discount 
against the purchase price of gas at the gas stations. The taxpayer, which used 
the accrual method, claimed deductions for certain unredeemed fuelperks! for 
the years at issue. The Tax Court (Judge Haines) disallowed the deductions 
because the “all events” test of § 461 had not been satisfied. The redemption 
of fuelperks! was structured as a discount against the purchase price of gas, 
and the purchase of gas was necessarily a condition precedent to the 
redemption of fuelperks! The court declined to analogize the fuelperks! to 
trading stamps  or  premium coupons “redeemable in merchandise, cash, or 
other property” issued by a retailer which under Reg. § 1.451–4(a)(1) can 
offset income in the year issued, applying Rev. Rul. 78-212, 1978-1 C.B. 139, 
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in which the IRS ruled that a taxpayer using the accrual method of accounting 
and that with the sale of products issued coupons that could be redeemed for a 
discount on the sale prices of products purchased in the future could not apply 
Reg. § 1.451–4(a)(1); those coupons were not “redeemable in merchandise, 
cash, or other property” because the redemption of the coupons was 
conditioned on an additional purchase of the retailer’s product by the 
consumer. 
 
a. But the Eagle soars in the Third Circuit. Giant 
Eagle, Inc. v. Commissioner, 822 F.3d 666 (3d Cir. 5/6/16) ); nonacq., AOD 
2016-40 I.R.B. (10/3/16). The Third Circuit, in an opinion (2-1) by Judge 
Roth, reversed the Tax Court and allowed a current deduction in the year the 
“fuelperks!” were issued. The Court of Appeals looked to the Pennsylvania 
common law of unilateral contracts and concluded  that  the  evidence 
established “the existence—as of year’s end—of both an absolute liability and 
a near-certainty that the liability would soon be discharged by payment.” 
Accrued fuelperks! were not expressly permitted to be, and never had been, 
retracted by Giant Eagle. Relying on Lukins Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 442 
F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1971), the court concluded that “it is irrelevant that neither 
the total amount of Giant Eagle’s anticipated liability nor the identity of all the 
customers who eventually applied discounts toward gasoline purchases could 
be conclusively identified at year’s end.” 
• Judge Hardiman dissented. He 
concluded that Giant Eagle’s liabilities accrued under its fuelperks! program 
were not absolute; the fuelperks! had an expiration date. Therefore, the “all 
events” test had not been satisfied. “[T]he question for our resolution  is 
whether Giant Eagle’s liability to any individual shopper with accrued-but- 
not-yet-redeemed fuelperks! was certain to continue under the rules applicable 
to that liability until it was paid. Because one of those rules allowed for the 
expiration of each shopper’s fuelperks! (and Giant Eagle’s corresponding 
liability to that shopper), the answer is plainly ‘no.’ While Giant Eagle became 
liable to a shopper at checkout, it did not become absolutely liable to that 
shopper unless and until the shopper redeemed fuelperks! prior to their 
expiration.” 
 
2. The duty of consistency required the taxpayer to 
include in income for 2009 gross receipts properly reportable in 2008.  
Squeri v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-116 (6/15/16). In four 
consolidated cases, the taxpayers were shareholders of a cash-basis subchapter 
S corporation. The S corporation determined the gross receipts that it reported 
on Form 1120S using the deposits made into its bank accounts during the 
calendar year. For example, it determined its gross receipts for 2010 with 
reference to amounts deposited in its bank account in 2010, even though some 
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of the checks deposited in January 2010 had been received in 2009, and even 
though some checks received in late 2010 were not deposited until January 
2011. The IRS issued a notice of deficiency in which it determined that the S 
corporation had improperly computed its gross receipts. For the years 2010 
and 2011, the IRS adjusted the gross receipts by excluding deposited amounts 
that had been received in the prior year and including amounts that had been 
received during the year but deposited in the following year. For example, the 
IRS reduced 2010 gross receipts by excluding amounts deposited in January 
2010 that had been received in 2009, and increased 2010 gross receipts by 
including amounts that had been received in 2010 but deposited in January 
2011. However, for 2009, the IRS did not make any adjustments. The 
taxpayers argued that 2009 gross receipts should be reduced by amounts 
deposited in January 2009 that had been received in 2008. The year 2008 was 
not before the court and the period of limitations on assessment for 2008 had 
expired. The Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan) held that, although the gross receipts 
received in  2008  and  deposited  in  2009 were  properly  reportable  as  gross 
receipts for 2008, the duty of consistency required the taxpayer to report the 
gross receipts in 2009. The duty of consistency is an equitable doctrine that 
prevents a taxpayer from benefiting in a later year from an error or omission 
in an earlier year that cannot be corrected because the limitations period for 
the earlier year has expired. As applied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, to which this decision is appealable, the duty of consistency has 
three elements: (1) a representation or report by the taxpayer, (2) reliance by 
the IRS, and (3) an attempt by the taxpayer after the statute of limitations has 
run to change the previous representation or to recharacterize the situation in 
such a way as to harm the IRS. These elements, the court held, were satisfied 
by the taxpayer’s filing of Form 1120S reporting the gross receipts for 2009, 
the IRS’s acceptance of the 2008 return that did not reflect the gross receipts, 
and the expiration of the period of limitations on assessment for 2008. 
 
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS 
 
A. Income 
 
1. Oops, an old revenue ruling is discovered no longer to 
get it right in light of subsequent legislation. Revenue Ruling 2016-15, 2016-
26 I.R.B. 1060 (6/10/16). This revenue ruling clarifies when a real estate 
developer may exclude COD income under the qualified real property 
business indebtedness (QRPBI) exclusion in § 108(a)(1)(D). Indebtedness 
incurred or assumed in connection with property held by a real estate 
developer  as  rental  property  qualifies  as  QRPBI  because  the  property  is 
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depreciable. But because property held for sale to customers is not depreciable, 
indebtedness incurred or assumed in connection with property held for sale to 
customers is not QRPBI, and thus any cancellation of debt with respect to such 
property is not excludable under § 108. Rev. Rul. 76-86, 1976-1 C.B. 37, 
which relied on prior law under §§ 108 and 1017 to conclude that a taxpayer 
could exclude income arising from the cancellation of debt incurred to 
purchase merchandise for resale, is obsoleted. 
 
2. Transparent insolvency for disregarded entities, and 
a push by the IRS to encourage partners to file for bankruptcy along with 
their partnership. T.D. 9771, Guidance under Section 108(a) Concerning the 
Exclusion of Section 61(a)(12) Discharge of Indebtedness Income of a Grantor 
Trust or a Disregarded Entity, 81 F.R. 37504 (6/10/16). The Treasury 
Department and IRS have finalized Reg. § 1.108–9, proposed in REG-154159- 
09, Guidance Under Section 108(a) Concerning the Exclusion of Section 
61(a)(12) Discharge of Indebtedness Income of a Grantor Trust or a 
Disregarded Entity, 76 F.R. 20593 (4/13/11). Reg. § 1.108–9(a) provides that, 
for purposes of applying § 108(a)(1)(A) and (B), the bankruptcy and 
insolvency exclusions, to discharge of indebtedness income of a grantor trust 
or a disregarded entity, the term “taxpayer,” as used in § 108(a)(1) and (d)(1) 
through (3), refers to the owner(s) of the grantor trust or disregarded entity. 
Reg. § 1.108-9(a)(2), which was not in the proposed regulations, but which 
was added in the final regulations, specifically provides that the bankruptcy 
and insolvency exclusions (I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) and (B)) are applied at the 
partner and not the partnership level, and Reg. § 1.108–9(c)(4), through a cross 
reference to 11 U.S.C. § 101(13), provides that “The term ‘debtor’ means 
person or municipality concerning which a case under this title has been 
commenced.” Thus, the owner of the grantor trust or disregarded entity must 
itself be under the jurisdiction of the court in a title 11 case as the title 11 
debtor to qualify for the bankruptcy exclusion. 
• The   preamble   emphasizes   the   IRS’s 
nonacquiescence, AOD 2015-01, in the Gracia Cases  (Gracia  v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-147; Mirarchi v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2004-148; Price v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-149; Estate of 
Martinez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-150 (collectively)) in which the 
Tax Court held that partners who as a result of being general partners were 
under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court as part of the proceedings 
regarding the partnership, but who were not debtors, could take advantage of 
the bankruptcy exclusion in §108(a)(1)(A). Together Reg. § 1.108–9(a)(2) and 
(c)(4) prevent a partner who was not a debtor in bankruptcy in his individual 
capacity to claim an exclusion for his share of the partnership COD income 
under § 108(a)(1)(A). 
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• Even though the issue is not addressed in 
the regulations, the preamble states that the Treasury and the IRS “are of the 
view that indebtedness of a grantor trust or a disregarded entity is indebtedness 
of the owner for purposes of section 108(d)(1); assuming the owner has not 
guaranteed the indebtedness and is not otherwise liable for the indebtedness 
under applicable law, such indebtedness should generally be treated as 
nonrecourse indebtedness for purposes of applying the section 108(a)(1)(B) 
insolvency exclusion.” The principles of Rev. Rul. 92-53, 1992-2 C.B. 48 
apply to determine the extent to which the debt is taken into account in 
determining the owner’s insolvency under § 108(d)(3). 
 
3. Dying is not inconsistent with deducting. Estate of 
Backemeyer v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. No. 17 (12/8/16). The  Tax  Court 
(Judge Laro) held that the tax benefit rule did not require the recapture of 
deductions claimed by a taxpayer on his 2010 return for farm supplies property 
that remained on-hand upon his death in 2011 and the value of which was 
deducted as an expense by his surviving spouse, who acquired the farm 
supplies by inheritance, when the supplies were used in 2011. “[N]either Mr. 
Backemeyer’s death nor the distribution of the farm inputs to and their use by 
Mrs. Backemeyer was fundamentally inconsistent with the premises on which 
the initial ... deduction for the 2010 tax year was based.” 
 
B. Deductible Expenses Versus Capitalization 
 
1. The long reach of the uniform capitalization rules. 
Wasco Real Properties I, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-224 
(12/13/16). The Tax Court (Judge Buch) held that real estate taxes on land on 
which commercial almond trees were planted were subject to capitalization as 
indirect costs under § 263A: 
Although WRP I deducted its property taxes, those taxes 
directly benefit the growing of the almond trees and are 
allocable to the produced property (the almond trees) that will 
produce income in the future. Allowing a current deduction 
of the property taxes would distort WRP I’s actual income for 
the subject years and would otherwise allow WRP I to offset 
its unrelated income. This is precisely the mismatch of 
expenses and revenues that section 263A was enacted to 
prevent. 
In addition, interest on a loan to acquire the land on which the commercial 
almond trees were planted was subject to capitalization under § 263A(f). “The 
land does not have to be the property that is being produced to bring interest 
on a financing of the land within the reach of section 263A. Rather, pursuant 
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to the command of section 263A(f)(2)(A)(i), the interest that the entities paid 
on their financing of their land must be capitalized as a cost of their almond 
trees if the cost of the land is a production expenditure with respect to the 
almond trees.” Capitalized interest is added to the basis of the almond trees, 
not the land. 
 
C. Reasonable  Compensation 
 
1. It’s not as easy as you think to legitimately zero out 
the income on a large professional services corporation. Brinks Gilson & 
Lione A Professional Corporation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-20 
(2/10/16). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) upheld accuracy-related penalties 
imposed on an incorporated law firm for mischaracterizing, as compensation 
for services, dividends paid to shareholder-attorneys on the ground that the 
taxpayer lacked substantial authority for its treatment of payments as 
compensation and failed to show reasonable cause and that it acted in good 
faith. The analysis of the substantial authority issue  and  reasonable  cause 
issues is a mini-treatise on “reasonable compensation” analysis with respect to 
incorporated service businesses. The corporation zeroed-out its taxable 
income with bonuses to the shareholder employees. For at least 10 years before 
and including the years in issue, the taxpayer had not paid a dividend. The IRS 
and the taxpayer stipulated to the amount of the underpayment relating to 
amounts the corporation deducted as officer compensation that were 
recharacterized as nondeductible dividends. The firm employed about 150 
attorneys, of whom only about 65 were shareholders. It also employed a non- 
attorney staff of about 270. The firm had invested capital, measured by the 
book value of its shareholders’ equity, of about $8 million at the end of 2007 
and about $9.3 million at the end of 2008. The court noted that the taxpayer’s 
expert witness “admitted that a firm’s reputation and customer lists could be 
valuable entity-level assets, even though determining their  precise  worth 
might be difficult.” The firm’s tax returns were prepared by McGladrey, but 
the firm did not seek or receive advice from McGladrey regarding whether the 
full amount of the year-end bonuses it paid to shareholder attorneys properly 
was deductible as compensation for services. Perhaps because the case is 
appealable to the Seventh Circuit, the court applied the  hypothetical 
independent investor test first articulated in Exacto Spring Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’g Heitz v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 1998-220. 
Regardless of the possibility that petitioner  might  own 
valuable intangible assets, it had invested capital, measured 
by the book value of  its shareholders’  equity, of about $8 
million at the end of 2007 and about $9.3 million at the end 
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of 2008. Invested capital of this magnitude cannot be 
disregarded in determining whether ostensible compensation 
paid to shareholder employees is really a distribution of 
earnings. We do not believe that petitioner’s shareholder 
attorneys, were they not also employees, would have forgone 
any return on invested capital that at least approached, if it did 
not exceed $10 million. Thus, petitioner’s practice of paying 
out year-end bonuses to its shareholder attorneys that 
eliminated its book income fails the independent investor test. 
The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the hypothetical independent 
investor test was inapposite because the shareholder-employees were required 
to sell their stock back to the corporation at book value upon termination of 
employment and book value thus did not reflect fair market value. The court 
further rejected the taxpayer’s argument that Law Offices—Richard Ashare, 
P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-282, supported the proposition that 
an incorporated law firm with significant capital can pay out compensation 
that eliminates book income. The court found Ashare distinguishable because 
the taxpayer in that case did not consistently pay compensation that eliminated 
book income. Furthermore, in Ashare the firm had minimal capital—its sole 
shareholder had invested only $1,000 in the corporation. Accordingly, the 
authorities that supported the taxpayer’s deduction of the full amount of the 
year-end bonuses it paid to shareholder attorneys are not substantial when 
weighed against the contrary authorities. Finally, the firm did not rely in good 
faith on McGladrey’s preparation of its returns for the years in issue. It had 
“provided McGladrey with inaccurate information.” The taxpayer 
“consistently followed a system of computing year-end bonuses that 
disregarded the value of its shareholder attorneys’ interests in the capital of the 
firm and inappropriately treated as compensation amounts that eliminated the 
firm’s book income.” There was no evidence that the firm based that practice 
on McGladrey’s advice or the advice of any other qualified tax professional. 
 
2. Shareholder-employees    apparently    can    rake    off 
economic rents as reasonable comp. H. W. Johnson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2016-95 (5/11/16). In this reasonable compensation case, the IRS, 
among other arguments, advanced the proposition that because the 
corporation’s return on equity, after deducting compensation paid to the two 
shareholder-employees, fell below the industry averages in the years in 
question, the two shareholder-employees were unreasonably compensated in 
those years. According to the IRS, an independent investor would have 
demanded a return more commensurate with the corporation’s superior 
performance. The Tax Court (Judge Gale) agreed with the taxpayer’s 
argument that its return on equity was in line with the industry average and 
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therefore would have satisfied an independent investor. The IRS cited no 
authority for the proposition that the required return on equity for purposes of 
the independent investor test must significantly exceed the industry average 
when the subject company has been especially successful, and the court found 
none in the case law. The IRS conceded that the two shareholder-employees 
“were absolutely integral to  petitioner’s  successful  performance,  a 
performance that included remarkable growth in revenues, assets, and gross 
profit margins during those years.” The Tax Court concluded that in applying 
the independent investor test courts have typically found that a return on equity 
of at least 10 percent tends to indicate that an independent investor would be 
satisfied and thus payment of compensation that leaves that rate of return for 
the investor is reasonable. That standard was met on the facts of this case. The 
IRS effectively conceded the other four factors of Elliotts, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983)—(1) the employee’s role in the 
company; (2) a comparison of compensation paid by similar companies for 
similar services; (3) the character and condition of the company; (4) potential 
conflicts of interest; and (5) the internal consistency of compensation 
arrangements—which controlled because an appeal would lie to the Ninth 
Circuit. In analyzing the fourth factor, the Ninth Circuit emphasizes evaluating 
the reasonableness of compensation payments from the perspective of a 
hypothetical independent investor, focusing on whether the investor would 
receive a reasonable return on equity after payment of the compensation. 
Accordingly, the Tax Court allowed the deduction. 
 
D. Miscellaneous  Deductions 
 
1. Seventy months in the slammer, a $19 million fine, and 
a $44 million forfeiture for insider trading was penalty enough. Nacchio 
v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 195 (3/12/14). The taxpayer was the CEO of 
Qwest Communications International when he realized profits of 
approximately $44 million trading Qwest stock. He was convicted of insider 
trading, paid a fine of $19 million, and forfeited $44 million that was paid over 
to victims of his securities fraud scheme. (He also was sentenced to 70 months 
in prison.) On a motion for summary judgment, the Court of Claims (Judge 
Williams) held that the $44 million forfeiture was deductible under § 165. 
Because the forfeiture served to compensate victims of the taxpayer’s 
securities fraud, the payment was not a “fine or similar penalty” that is not 
deductible pursuant to § 162(f). The court rejected the government’s argument 
that allowing a deduction under § 165 would frustrate public policy, reasoning 
that “[a]llowing the deduction would not increase the odds in favor of insider 
trading or destroy the effectiveness of the securities laws.” Furthermore, 
“[d]isallowing the deduction would result in a ‘double sting’ by requiring the 
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taxpayers to both make restitution and pay taxes on income  they  did  not 
retain.” However, whether § 1341 applied required further proceedings 
because there was a material question of fact whether Nacchio, who did not 
plead guilty, believed that he had an unrestricted right to the profits in the year 
he realized them. 
 
a. On appeal, no tax deduction for the $44 
million forfeiture made the penalty even tougher. Nacchio v. United States, 
824 F.3d.  1370 (Fed.  Cir. 6/10/16), rev’g  115 Fed.  Cl.  195 (3/12/14). On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge O’Malley, saw things 
differently and reversed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the forfeiture 
was a “fine or similar penalty” within the meaning of § 162(f). First, 
examining the language of the statute under which the amount of the forfeiture 
was calculated in the criminal proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(B), rather 
than 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A), the court concluded that “the plain language of 
the statutory provision under which the amount Nacchio forfeited was 
calculated supports the view that Congress intended the forfeiture to be paid 
with after-tax dollars.” Second, “Treasury Regulation § 1.162–21(b)(1) 
defines ‘fine or similar penalty’ for the purposes of § 162(f) as including, inter 
alia, ‘an amount — (i) Paid pursuant to conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere for a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in a criminal proceeding.’ ... 
Nacchio’s    criminal    forfeiture    was    imposed    pursuant    to    18    U.S.C. 
§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), as part of his sentence in a criminal 
case.” Thus, the forfeiture was punitive, not compensatory, and “[t]he 
Attorney General’s post-hoc decision to use the forfeited funds for remission 
did not transform the character of the forfeiture so that it was no longer a ‘fine 
or similar penalty’ under § 162(f). The decision to use the forfeited funds to 
compensate the victims was discretionary.” Finally, because establishing 
deductibility under a section allowing a deduction is a prerequisite to claiming 
§ 1341 relief, Nacchio was not entitled to § 1341 relief. Judgment was entered 
in favor of the government. 
 
2. Would Ralph Lauren agree that his  clothing  is 
suitable for “general wear”? Barnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-79 
(4/27/16). The taxpayer worked as a salesman for Ralph Lauren Corp., which 
required all employees who worked in corporate sales positions to wear Ralph 
Lauren apparel while representing the company. The taxpayer  purchased 
Ralph Lauren shirts, pants, ties, and suits, the costs of which he deducted as 
unreimbursed employee expenses on Schedule A. The cost of clothing is 
deductible as a business expense only if it meets the following three-part test: 
(1) the clothing is required or essential in the taxpayer’s employment; (2) the 
clothing is not suitable for general or personal wear; and (3) the clothing is not 
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so worn. Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1266 (1980); see also Pevsner v. 
Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980). The Tax Court (Judge Paris) held 
that the taxpayer could not deduct the cost of his clothing because, although 
he was required  by his employer to  wear it, the  clothing  was suitable  for 
general or personal wear. 
 
3. Is the Tax Court backing off on Altera? Santos v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-100 (5/17/16). The Tax Court (Judge 
Morrison) held pursuant to Reg. § 1.162-5(b) that an accountant could not 
deduct law school tuition; it qualified him for a new trade or business. The 
taxpayer argued that the court should reconsider its decision in Weiszmann v. 
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1106 (1969), aff’d, 443 F2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971), 
upholding the validity of Reg. § 1.162–5(b), in light of Altera Corp. & 
Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 91 (2015), which, relying on Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers. Association of United States v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), held that a regulation under 
§ 482 was invalid because, in promulgating the regulation, the Treasury did 
not “adequately respond to commentators.” The court declined to reexamine 
the validity of the regulation. 
Altera is distinguishable. Altera held that the validity of the 
regulation in the particular circumstances of that case hinged 
on an “empirical determination” and “in no way depends on 
*** [Treasury's] interpretation of section 482 or any other 
statute.” Altera Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. at 
__ (slip op. at 46). By contrast, the education-expenses 
regulation is an interpretation of sections 162 and 262. See 
Taubman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. at 817. Second, Santos 
did not raise his theories that the regulation was invalid until 
after trial. As a result, neither the trial record nor the court 
papers in this case contain any information regarding the 
public’s comments to the regulation in question. Without 
knowing what the public comments were, it seems difficult, 
if not impossible, for the Court to evaluate the adequacy of 
the Treasury Department’s response to the public comments 
when it promulgated section 1.162–5, Income Tax Regs. 
• Is this an invitation for FOIA requests for 
comments on regulations issued nearly 50 years ago? What if there are none? 
There was no preamble either for T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63 (4/3/58), 
promulgating Reg. § 1.162–5, or for the proposed regulations, 21 F.R. 5091 
(6/10/56), but the publication of the proposed regulation states, “Prior to the 
final adoption of such regulations, consideration will be given to any data, 
views, or arguments pertaining thereto which are submitted in writing ... .” 
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4. Standard mileage rates for 2017. Notice 2016-79, 2016- 
52 I.R.B. 918 (12/13/16). The standard mileage rate for business miles in 2017 
goes down to 53.5 cents per mile (from 54 cents in 2016) and the 
medical/moving rate goes down to 17 cents per mile (from 19 cents in 2016). 
The charitable mileage rate remains fixed by § 170(i) at 14 cents. The portion 
of the business standard mileage rate treated as depreciation is 25 cents per 
mile for 2017 (increased from 24 cents in 2016). 
 
E. Depreciation and Amortization 
 
1. Section 280F 2016 depreciation tables for business 
autos, light trucks, and vans. Rev. Proc. 2016-23, 2016-16 I.R.B. 581 
(4/1/16). The IRS has published depreciation tables with the 2016 depreciation 
limits for business use of small vehicles: 
2016 Passenger Automobiles with § 168(k) first year recovery: 
1st Tax Year $11,160 
2nd Tax Year $  5,100 
3rd Tax Year $  3,050 
Each Succeeding Year $  1,875 
 
2016 Trucks and Vans with § 168(k) first year recovery: 
1st Tax Year $11,560 
2nd Tax Year $  5,700 
3rd Tax Year $  3,350 
Each Succeeding Year $  2,075 
 
2016 Passenger Automobiles (no § 168(k) first year recovery): 
1st Tax Year $  3,160 
2nd Tax Year $  5,100 
3rd Tax Year $  3,050 
Each Succeeding Year $  1,875 
 
2016 Trucks and Vans (no § 168(k) first year recovery): 
1st Tax Year $  3,560 
2nd Tax Year $  5,700 
3rd Tax Year $  3,350 
Each Succeeding Year $  2,075 
 
2. Perhaps he should have played an antique violin.  
Kilpatrick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-166 (8/29/16). The taxpayer, a 
CPA, claimed deductions, as “office expenses” or “supplies” for the cost of 
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certain antiques—oak armchairs, a desk, a number of paintings, two soup 
tureens, a chandelier, a lamp, a clock—used in his home office, which the IRS 
conceded qualified for business deductions under § 280A. He did not elect on 
his return to deduct the cost under § 179. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) held 
that the costs were not § 162 ordinary and necessary business expenses but 
rather were capital expenditures. Furthermore, the taxpayer was not allowed 
to take depreciation deductions with respect to the antiques. A depreciation 
deduction under § 167 is not allowable “‘for an asset the value of which is not 
reduced by the passage of time or by use’” (quoting Hawkins v. Commissioner, 
713 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1983)), and while some antiques might lose their value 
through use or through the passage of time, the taxpayer failed to prove that 
his antiques would do so. The court therefore held that his furnishings would 
retain their value. 
 
F. Credits 
 
1. Employers can claim the Work Opportunity Tax 
Credit for eligible individuals who begin work on or before August 31, 
2016 by submitting the appropriate forms by September 28, 2016. Notice 
2016-40, 2016-27 I.R.B. 4 (6/17/16). The 2015 PATH Act extended the § 51 
Work Opportunity Credit (WOTC) through taxable years beginning  before 
1/1/20 and, effective as of 1/1/16, expanded the “targeted groups” of 
individuals, the employment of whom may qualify an employer for a credit, 
to  include  qualified  long-term  unemployment  recipients  (as  defined  in 
§ 51(d)(15)). An employer must obtain certification that an individual is a 
member of a targeted group before the employer may claim the WOTC by 
submitting to a designated local agency IRS Form 8850, Pre-Screening Notice 
and Certification  Request for the Work  Opportunity Credit, and  also must 
submit Department of Labor Form 9061 (Individual Characteristics Form) or 
9062 (Conditional Certification). Form 8850 generally must be submitted 
within 28 days after an individual begins work. The Notice provides that, for 
members of a targeted group other than qualified long-term unemployment 
recipients who begin work on or after 1/1/15 and on or before 8/31/16, and for 
long-term unemployment recipients who begin work on or after 1/1/16 and on 
or before 8/31/16, Form 8850 will be timely filed if it is submitted no later 
than 9/28/16. The Notice extends by three months the transition relief 
previously granted by Notice 2016-22, 2016-13 I.R.B. 488 (3/7/16). 
 
2. Nearly fifteen years after the issuance of proposed 
regulations, Treasury has issued final regulations defining “internal use 
software.” T.D. 9786, Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 81  F.R. 
68299 (10/4/16). The Treasury and the IRS have finalized, with only minor 
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changes, proposed amendments (REG-153656-03, Credit for Increasing 
Research   Activities,  80   F.R.   2624   (1/20/15))  to   the   regulations  under 
§ 41(d)(4)(E) that define internal use software. Section 41(d) defines the term 
“qualified research” for purposes of the § 41 research credit. Section 
41(d)(4)(E) generally excludes from the definition of “qualified research” all 
“research with respect to computer software which is developed by (or for the 
benefit of) the taxpayer primarily for internal use by the taxpayer,” unless the 
software is for use in either an activity that constitutes qualified research or a 
production process with respect to which the requirements of § 41(d)(1) 
(defining   qualified   research)   are   met.   The   1986   legislative   history   of 
§ 41(d)(4)(E) provides that the regulations should make the costs of new or 
improved internal use software eligible for the credit only if the research 
satisfies, in addition to the general requirements for credit eligibility, an 
additional three-part high threshold of innovation test: (1) that the software is 
innovative, (2) that the software development involves significant economic 
risk, and (3) that the software is not commercially available for use by the 
taxpayer. Final regulations on internal use software were issued in 2001 (T.D. 
8930, Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 66 F.R. 280 (01/03/01)). In 
response to concerns expressed about the final regulations, the Treasury and 
the IRS subsequently issued proposed regulations (REG-112991-01, Credit for 
Increasing Research Activities, 66 F.R. 66362 (12/26/01)) that never were 
finalized. Instead, the Treasury and the IRS issued an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking (REG-153656-03, Credit for Increasing Research 
Activities, 69 F.R. 43 (01/02/04)) in which they solicited comments on the 
definition of internal use software. The 2015 proposed regulations responded 
to those comments and have now been made final. 
• Reg.   §   1.41–4(c)(6)(iii)   provides   that 
“software is developed by (or for the benefit of) the taxpayer primarily for the 
taxpayer’s internal use if the software is developed for use in general and 
administrative functions that facilitate or support the conduct of the taxpayer’s 
trade or business.” For this purpose, general and administrative functions are 
financial management functions (including functions such as accounts payable 
and receivable, inventory management, and strategic business planning), 
human resources management functions (including functions such as 
recruiting, hiring, payroll and benefits), and support services (including data 
processing, janitorial and other facility services, marketing, legal services, and 
government compliance). Software that a taxpayer develops primarily for the 
internal use of a related party (as defined in § 41(f)) is considered internal use 
software. Conversely, under Reg. § 1.41–4(c)(6)(iv), software  is  not 
developed primarily for the taxpayer’s internal use if it is not developed for 
use in general and administrative functions that facilitate or support the 
conduct of the taxpayer’s trade or business, such as: (1) “[s]oftware developed 
to  be  commercially  sold,  leased,  licensed,  or  otherwise  marketed  to  third 
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parties,” or (2) “[s]oftware developed to enable a taxpayer to interact with third 
parties or to allow third parties to initiate functions or review data on the 
taxpayer’s system.” 
• Under Reg. § 1.41–4(c)(6)(i), research 
with respect to computer software that is developed by (or for the benefit of) 
the taxpayer primarily for the taxpayer’s internal use is eligible for the research 
credit only if: (1) the software satisfies the requirements of § 41(d)(1) (defining 
qualified research), (2) the software is not otherwise excluded from the 
definition of “qualified research” under § 41(d)(4), and (3) the software 
satisfies the high threshold of innovation test (set forth in Reg. § 1.41– 
4(c)(6)(vii)). The final regulations clarify that the internal use software rules 
of Reg. § 1.41–4(c)(6) do not apply to (1) software developed for use in an 
activity that constitutes qualified research, (2) software developed for use in a 
production process to which the requirements of § 41(d)(1) are met, and (3) a 
new or improved package of software and hardware developed together by the 
taxpayer as a single product. Thus, the high threshold of innovation test does 
not apply to software in these three categories. The final regulations provide a 
number of examples. 
• The final version of Reg. § 1.41–4(c)(6) 
applies to tax years ending on or after 10/4/16. However, for tax years ending 
on or after 1/20/15 (the date the 2015 proposed regulations were published in 
the Federal Register) and beginning before 10/4/16, the IRS will not challenge 
return positions consistent with all of the provisions of either the final or the 
2015 proposed version of Reg. § 1.41–4(c)(6). For tax years ending before 
1/20/15, taxpayers can choose to follow all of the provisions of § 1.41–4(c)(6) 
as set forth in either the 2001 final regulations (T.D. 8930, Credit for 
Increasing Research Activities, 66 F.R. 280 (01/03/01)) or the 2001 proposed 
regulations (REG-112991-01, Credit for Increasing  Research  Activities,  66 
F.R. 66362 (12/26/01)). 
 
G. Natural Resources Deductions and Credits 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
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I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses 
 
1. The statute and regulations clearly said to the 
taxpayer, “you lose,” but she took it all the way to the Ninth Circuit 
anyway. Gragg v. United States, 831 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 8/4/16). In an opinion 
by Judge Christen, the Ninth Circuit held that although a taxpayer who 
qualifies as a real estate professional under § 469(c)(7) is not subject to the 
§ 469(c)(2) per se rule that rental losses are passive, the taxpayer nevertheless 
must materially participate in real estate rental activities in order to deduct 
rental losses against nonpassive income. Because the taxpayer, who  did 
qualify as a real estate professional, did not materially participate in the rental 
activity, the losses were disallowed. Based on the statutory language and Reg. 
§ 1.469–9(e)(1), the court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that, by virtue of 
her status as a real estate professional, the rental losses were automatically 
nonpassive and she did not need to prove material participation. 
 
III. INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME 
 
A. Gains and Losses 
 
1. Another case illustrating that you really need to stop 
developing the property in order to claim successfully that the property 
is not held primarily for sale to customers. Boree v. Commissioner, 837 
F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 9/12/16), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2014-85 (5/12/14). The 
taxpayers, a married couple, held land through a limited liability company, 
Glen Forest, LLC. (The LLC had been formed by the husband, Gregory Boree, 
a former logger, and another individual, but the other individual later sold his 
interest to Mr. Boree, after which Mr. Boree and his wife were the  sole 
members of the LLC.) The LLC acquired 1,892 acres of vacant real property 
in Baker County, Florida. In early 2003, the LLC submitted a proposal with 
respect to the property to the Baker County Planning and Zoning Department 
for a planned residential development that would consist of more than one 
hundred 10-acre lots, to be developed and sold in multiple consecutive phases. 
From 2003 through 2004, the LLC engaged in various development-related 
activities, such as seeking exemptions from certain requirements, forming a 
homeowners’ association and providing for representation of the LLC on the 
association’s board, obtaining county approval of the first three phases of 
development of the community, applying for an environmental resource 
permit, and constructing an unpaved road on the property. The LLC sold 15 
lots in 2003, 26 lots in 2004, 8 lots in 2005, and none in 2006. From late 2004 
through early  2005, the Baker County Board of Commissioners adopted a 
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series of land-use restrictions that affected the LLC’s development, including 
a moratorium on development and a requirement that all roads within 
subdivisions be paved. To comply with the paving requirement would have 
cost the LLC approximately $7 million. To make development  more 
economical, Mr. Boree developed and submitted for approval a higher-density 
development plan featuring residential, commercial and recreational areas, but 
following the county’s adoption in 2006 of a requirement that developers pave 
certain roads leading to developments, the Borees sold the remaining lots to a 
developer and realized a gain of approximately $8.5 million. The taxpayers 
reported their gain as long-term capital gain. In an opinion by U.S. District 
Judge Coogler (sitting by designation), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
conclusion of the Tax Court (Judge Foley) that the taxpayers’ gain  was 
ordinary income. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
taxpayers’ argument that their purpose in holding the property had changed 
when the land use restrictions adopted by the county in 2005 and 2006 made 
development of the property prohibitively expensive, and that the Tax Court 
therefore had erred in considering their purpose in holding the property during 
periods of time prior to its sale in 2007. Considering the taxpayer’s purpose in 
holding property in the years leading up to its sale, the court reasoned, is 
consistent with prior decisions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, including 
Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1980)  and 
Sanders v. United States, 740 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1984). Further, the court 
concluded, the taxpayers’ attempts to respond to the land use restrictions by 
proposing a higher density development and taking other actions are “evidence 
of strategic and thorough involvement in pursuit of developing the property 
[that] indicates that the Borees were holding the property for sale in  the 
ordinary course of business right up until they sold it.” The court similarly 
rejected other arguments raised by the taxpayer. 
• Although  it  affirmed  the  Tax  Court’s 
conclusion that the taxpayers held the property primarily for sale to customers, 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s imposition of a 20 percent 
accuracy-related penalty for substantial understatement of income tax under 
§ 6662(b)(2). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the taxpayers  had 
successfully established a reasonable cause, good faith defense to the penalty 
by relying on their accountant, whom the court described as someone who 
enjoyed a good reputation in the community, in part because he served “as a 
tax professor at the University of Florida Levin College of Law.” 
 
2. There’s now a statutory income tax cost for low- 
balling estate tax valuation. The Surface Transportation and Veterans Health 
Care Choice Improvement Act of 2015, § 2004(a), added § 1014(f), which 
requires that the basis of any property taking a § 1014 date-of-death-value shall 
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not exceed the final value as determined for estate tax purposes, or, if the value 
of the property has not been finally determined for estate tax purposes, the 
value stated in a statement (required by new § 6035(a) to be provided by the 
executor of any estate required to file an estate tax return) identifying the value 
of the property. Section 1014(f)(2) provides that the consistency rule applies 
only to property the inclusion of which in the decedent’s estate increased the 
estate tax liability (reduced by allowable credits). Thus, if the total value of 
the decedent’s estate, as correctly determined, is less than  the  decedent’s 
unified credit exemption, it appears that the consistency requirement does not 
apply or if the taxable estate is reduced to no more than the exclusion amount 
by the estate tax marital deduction or the estate tax charitable deduction. Also, 
an estate tax return filed solely to enable a surviving spouse to  claim  a 
deceased spouse’s unused unified credit under the portability rules would not 
invoke the consistency requirement. The basis has been finally determined for 
estate tax purposes only if (1) the value of the property as shown on the estate 
tax return was not contested by the IRS before the statute  of  limitations 
expired, (2) the value is specified by the IRS on audit and was not timely 
contested by the executor of the estate, or (3) the value is determined by a court 
or pursuant to a settlement with the IRS. 
• Act § 2004(b) also added Code § 6035, 
which requires the executor of any estate required to file an estate tax return 
to report to the IRS and each beneficiary acquiring any interest in property 
included in the decedent’s gross estate a statement identifying the value of 
each interest in such property as reported on such return and any other 
information as the Treasury and IRS may prescribe. New Code § 6035(b) 
directs the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations  as  necessary  to 
carry out the new provision, including regulations relating to (1) the 
application of § 6035 to property with regard to which no estate tax return is 
required to be filed, and (2) situations in which the surviving joint tenant or 
other recipient may have better information than the executor regarding the 
basis or fair market value of the property. 
• Act § 2004(c) added new Code 
§ 6662(b)(8) to extend the 20 percent accuracy related penalty to “any 
inconsistent estate basis,” which is defined in new § 6662(k) as a basis claimed 
on an income tax return that exceeds the basis determined under § 1014(f). 
• These provisions apply to property with 
respect to which an estate tax return is filed after 7/31/15. 
 
a. Despite the effective date of the  new 
legislation, the statements required by new § 6035(a)(1) and (a)(2) are not 
due before February 29, 2016. Notice 2015-57, 2015-36 I.R.B. 294 
(8/21/15). Section 6035(a)(3)(A) provides that each statement required to be 
furnished under § 6035(a)(1) or (a)(2) shall be furnished at such time as the 
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IRS prescribes, but no later than the earlier of (i) 30 days after the due date of 
the estate tax return (including any extensions) or (ii) 30 days after the date 
the estate tax return is filed. The new legislation applies to estate tax returns 
filed after 7/31/15 and therefore, absent further guidance, the statements 
required by § 6035(a) could be due as early as 8/31/15. This notice provides 
that, for statements required under § 6035(a) to be filed with the IRS or 
furnished to a beneficiary before 2/29/16, the due date under § 6035(a)(3) is 
delayed to 2/29/16. According to the notice, this delay is to allow Treasury 
and the IRS to issue guidance implementing the reporting requirements of 
§ 6035. The  notice directs  executors and  other persons  required to  file or 
furnish a statement under § 6035(a) not to do so until the Treasury and the IRS 
issue forms or further guidance. The notice is effective on 8/21/15 and applies 
to executors of estates and to other persons who are required under § 6018(a) 
or (b) to file a return if that return is filed after 7/31/15. 
 
b. The IRS has issued the final version of Form 
8971, on which estate executors must report pursuant to § 6035(a)(1) and 
(a)(2) the value of property included in the decedent’s gross estate. On 
1/29/16, the IRS issued the final version of Form 8971, Information Regarding 
Beneficiaries Acquiring Property From a Decedent. An executor required to 
file Form 8971 must send Schedule A of the Form to each beneficiary 
receiving property included on the estate tax return. At the time the estate tax 
return is filed, the estate may not have made distributions and may not have 
identified the specific property that a beneficiary will receive. To account for 
this situation, the instructions to Form 8971 indicate that the Schedule A issued 
to a beneficiary should report “all items of property that could be used, in 
whole or in part, to fund the beneficiary’s distribution on that beneficiary’s 
Schedule A.” When the estate later distributes property to the beneficiary, the 
executor must file a supplemental Form 8971 and issue a corresponding 
Schedule A. 
 
c. A further delay: the statements required  by 
new § 6035(a)(1) and (a)(2) are not due before March 31, 2016. Notice 
2016-19, 2016-9 I.R.B. 362 (2/11/16). This notice provides that, for statements 
required under § 6035(a) to be filed with the IRS or furnished to a beneficiary 
before 3/31/16, the due date under § 6035(a)(3) is delayed to 3/31/16. 
According to the notice, this delay is to provide executors and others with a 
filing obligation the opportunity to review proposed regulations to be issued 
shortly under §§ 1014(f) and 6035 before preparing a Form 8971 and any 
Schedule A. The notice recommends that executors and other persons required 
to file or furnish a statement under § 6035(a) not do so until the proposed 
regulations  are  issued.  The  notice  is  effective  on  2/11/16  and  applies  to 
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executors of estates and to other persons who are required under § 6018(a) or 
(b) to file a return if that return is filed after 7/31/15. 
 
d. The IRS issues proposed and temporary 
regulations. Consistent Basis Reporting Between Estate and Person 
Acquiring Property from Decedent, REG-127923-15, 81 F.R. 11486 (3/4/16); 
T.D. 9757, 81 F.R. 11431 (3/4/16). The Treasury and the IRS have issued 
proposed and temporary regulations regarding (1) the requirement of § 1014(f) 
that a recipient’s basis in certain property acquired from a decedent be 
consistent with the value of the property as finally determined for federal estate 
tax purposes, and (2) the reporting requirements of § 6035 for executors or 
other persons required to file federal estate tax returns. The proposed 
regulations clearly state that if, after taking into account all available credits 
other than the credit for prepayment of tax, no estate tax is payable, no property 
is subject to the basis consistency requirements. Prop. Reg. § 1.1014–10(b)(3). 
See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 2015, 27 (JCS-1-16, March 
2016). However, for a taxable estate, the basis consistency rules do not apply 
to (1) property qualifying for the estate tax charitable or marital deductions, 
and (2) tangible personal property for which an appraisal is not required under 
Reg. § 20.2031–6(b), which requires an appraisal for “household and personal 
effects articles having marked artistic or intrinsic value of a total value in 
excess of $3,000.” Prop. Reg. § 1.1014–10(b)(2). Until the final value of 
property subject to the consistency rule has been determined, the recipient may 
use as his unadjusted basis the amount reported to him by the executor, Prop. 
Reg. § 1.1014–10(c)(2) (the amount reported on Form 8971 as required by 
§ 6035), but if final value is later determined to be different, the beneficiary 
may be subject to deficiency procedures. “[A]fter discovered or omitted 
property” not reported on the initial estate tax return or a supplemental return 
prior to the expiration of the assessment period has a zero basis, as does all 
property in an estate if no estate tax return has been filed by an estate that is 
required to file, until either a return is filed or a final value determined by the 
IRS. Prop. Reg. § 1.1014–10(c)(3). 
Prop. Reg. § 1.6035–1 provides very detailed guidance—far more 
detailed than is noted here—regarding the procedures under new § 6035 
requiring the executor of any estate required to file an estate tax return to 
furnish to the IRS and to each beneficiary acquiring any interest in property 
included in the gross estate a statement identifying the value of each interest 
in such property as reported on such return and any other information that the 
IRS may prescribe. The reporting requirement does not apply if a return is not 
required to be filed but was filed for the purpose of making a generation 
skipping tax allocation, a portability election, or any protective filing to avoid 
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penalties if value is later determined to cause a return to be required. Prop. 
Reg. § 1.6035–1(a)(2). An executor must file a supplemental statement when 
“any change [occurs] to the information required to be reported on the 
Information Return or Statement that causes the information as reported to be 
incorrect or incomplete.” Prop. Reg. § 1.6035–1(e)(1) and (2). The proposed 
regulations make it clear that § 6035 applies more broadly than the basis 
consistency rule of § 1014(f), which applies only to that property included in 
the gross estate that causes an increase in federal estate tax liability; § 6035 
requires reporting of “the value of property included on a required Federal 
estate tax return,” which includes, for example, an estate that is not taxable 
due to marital or charitable deductions that reduce the amount of tax otherwise 
due to less than the allowable unified credit. 
Upon publication of final regulations in the Federal Register, the 
proposed regulations will apply to property acquired from a decedent (or by 
reason of the death of the decedent) whose return required by section 6018 is 
filed after 7/31/15. Taxpayers can rely on the proposed regulations prior to the 
issuance of final regulations. 
 
e. Another reprieve  for  executors:  the 
statements required by new § 6035(a)(1) and (a)(2) are not due before 
June 30, 2016. Notice 2016-27, 2016-15 I.R.B. 576 (3/24/16). This notice 
provides that, for statements required under § 6035(a) to be filed with the IRS 
or furnished to a beneficiary before 6/30/16, the due date under § 6035(a)(3) 
is delayed to 6/30/16. According to the notice, this delay is in response to 
numerous comments received by the Treasury and the IRS indicating “that 
executors and other persons have not had sufficient time to adopt the systemic 
changes that would enable the filing of an accurate and complete Form 8971 
and Schedule A.” The notice is effective on 3/23/16 and applies to executors 
of estates and to other persons who are required under § 6018(a) or (b) to file 
a return if that return is filed after 7/31/15. 
 
f. Final regulations confirm that the statements 
required by new § 6035(a)(1) and (a)(2) are not due before June 30, 2016. 
T.D. 9797, Consistent Basis Reporting Between Estate and Person Acquiring 
Property From Decedent, 81 F.R. 86953 (12/2/16). The Treasury Department 
and the IRS have issued final regulations that merely reiterate the guidance in 
Notice 2016-27, 2016-15 I.R.B. 576 (3/24/16), and provide that executors or 
other persons required to file or furnish a statement under § 6035(a)(1) or (2) 
before 6/30/16 need not have done so until 6/30/16. 
• The    government    issued    these    final 
regulations to avoid an issue about the retroactive application of regulations. 
Under § 7805(b)(1), proposed, temporary, and final regulations relating to the 
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internal revenue laws cannot apply to any taxable period ending before the 
earliest of: (1) the date on which such regulation is filed with the Federal 
Register; (2) in the case of any final regulation, the date on which any proposed 
or temporary regulation to which such final regulation relates was filed with 
the Federal Register; or (3) the date on which any notice substantially 
describing the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final 
regulation is issued to the public. However, under § 7805(b)(2), this rule does 
not apply to regulations issued within 18 months of the date of the enactment 
of the statutory provision to which the regulation relates. These final 
regulations were issued within 18 months of 7/31/15, the date of enactment of 
the Surface  Transportation and Veterans  Health Care  Choice Improvement 
Act of 2015, which added to the Code §§ 1014(f) and 6035. 
 
3. Surrendering a Green Card can be very taxing.  
Topsnik v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 1 (1/20/16). The taxpayer was a German 
citizen who was a permanent resident of the United States. In 2004 he sold the 
stock of a U.S. corporation for a down payment and monthly installments and 
reported the gain on the § 453 installment method. In 2010, he received equal 
monthly payments pursuant to the promissory note executed in connection 
with the sale. On 11/20/10, the taxpayer formally abandoned his lawful 
permanent resident status. (He completed a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services Form I-407, Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident  Status, 
which was accepted by the USCIS; he surrendered his green card.) He filed a 
Form 1040NR, U.S. Nonresident Alien Income Tax Return, for 2010 claiming 
that the installment sale proceeds were exempt from taxation under the U.S.– 
Germany Tax Treaty. The IRS asserted a deficiency for 2010 attributable to 
the gain on his installment sale of stock. The IRS also asserted  that  the 
taxpayer was a “covered expatriate” who expatriated in 2010 and was required 
by § 877A to recognize gain on the deemed sale of his installment obligation 
on the day before his expatriation. The taxpayer claimed that he was not liable 
for tax on the installment sale proceeds because he was a German resident who 
expatriated on 12/31/09, and that he lived in Freiburg, Germany. The Tax 
Court (Judge Kerrigan) held that the taxpayer expatriated on 11/20/10, when 
he  formally  abandoned  his  status  as  a  lawful  permanent  resident.  Reg. 
§ 301.7701(b)–1(b)(3) provides that when an alien initiates a determination, 
“resident status is considered to be abandoned when the individual’s 
application for abandonment (INS Form I-407) … is filed with the INS.” (The 
German Competent Authority sent the U.S. Competent Authority letters 
stating, among other things, that (1) for tax year 2010 the taxpayer was 
registered in Germany as a person subject to taxation as a nonresident, (2) he 
did not file a German tax return for 2010, and (3) he did not have a registered 
residence or habitual abode in Germany in 2010.) Thus, he was liable for tax 
on  gains  attributable  to  the  eleven  monthly  installment  payments  that  he 
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received during 2010 before his expatriation date. Furthermore, pursuant to 
§ 877A he was liable for tax on gain from the deemed sale of his right to 
installment sale proceeds on the day before his expatriation date. 
 
4. The Tax Court emphasizes that the alchemy of 
transforming § 1231 gain into capital gain does not render § 1231 assets 
to be capital assets. CRI-Leslie, LLC v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. No. 8 
(9/7/16). The taxpayer, an LLC treated as a TEFRA partnership, entered into 
a contract to sell a hotel property that it owned and received a deposit of $9.7 
million. The buyer under the contract defaulted and forfeited the $9.7 million 
deposit, which was retained by the taxpayer. The hotel property was a § 1231 
asset, not a capital asset. The taxpayer reported the $9.7 million  forfeited 
deposit as net long-term capital gain, and the IRS asserted a deficiency based 
on treating the forfeited deposit as ordinary income. The taxpayer argued that 
its characterization of the forfeited deposit as long-term capital gain was 
supported by § 1234A, which provides that: 
Gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, expiration, 
or other termination of— 
(1) a right or obligation (other than a 
securities futures contract, as defined in 
section 1234B) with respect  to  property 
which is (or on acquisition would be) a 
capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer, or 
(2) a section 1256 contract (as defined in 
section 1256) not described in paragraph (1) 
which is a capital asset in the hands of the 
taxpayer, 
shall be treated as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset. 
The preceding sentence shall not apply to the retirement of 
any debt instrument (whether or not through a trust or other 
participation  arrangement). 
The taxpayer’s position was that “Congress clearly intended for section 1234A 
to apply not only to payments received from contract terminations relating to 
capital assets but also to payments from terminations relating to section 1231 
property.”  The  IRS  argued  that  the  “plain  and  unambiguous  wording”  of 
§ 1234A requires a narrow interpretation limited to a “capital asset in the hands 
of the taxpayer.” The Tax Court (Judge Laro) agreed with the IRS’s position. 
The  court  rejected  the  taxpayer’s  argument  that  the  legislative  history  of 
§ 1234A, see S. Rept. No. 105-33, at 134 (1997), 1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1067, 
1214, warranted extending § 1234A to § 1231 assets because it demonstrated 
that Congress enacted § 1234A to “ensure that taxpayers received the same tax 
characterization of gain or loss whether the property is sold or the contract to 
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which the property is subject is terminated.” The court reasoned that “[s]ince 
section 1234A expressly refers to property that is ‘a capital asset in the hands 
of the taxpayer’ and no other type of property, and since property described in 
section 1231 is excluded explicitly from the definition of ‘capital asset’ in 
section 1221, we must conclude that the plain meaning of ‘capital asset’ as 
used in section 1234A does not extend to section 1231 property.” The court 
was “unable find anything in the legislative history of section 1234A  to 
support [the taxpayer’s] assertion that Congress intended to include section 
1231 property within its ambit.” 
 
B. Interest, Dividends, and Other Current Income 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
C. Profit-Seeking  Individual Deductions 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
D. Section 121 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
E. Section 1031 
 
1. The Tax Court confirms that § 1031 is an exception to 
the principle that substance controls over form. Estate of Bartell v. 
Commissioner, 147 T.C. No. 5 (8/10/16). This case involved a reverse like- 
kind exchange structured before the promulgation of Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 
2000-2 C.B. 308 (effective for qualified  exchange  accommodation 
arrangements entered into by an exchange accommodation titleholder on or 
after September 15, 2000). In 1999, Bartell Drug (an S corporation) entered 
into an agreement to purchase a property (Property #2). To further structuring 
the disposition of another property already owned by Bartell Drug (Property 
#1) as a § 1031 like-kind exchange, Bartell Drug assigned its rights in the 
purchase agreement to a third-party exchange facilitator (EPC) and entered 
into an agreement with EPC that provided for EPC to purchase Property #2 
and gave Bartell Drug a right to acquire Property #2 from EPC for a stated 
period and price. EPC purchased Property #2 on August 1, 2000, with bank 
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financing   guaranteed   by   Bartell   Drug.   Bartell   Drug   then   supervised 
construction  of  a  drugstore  on  Property  #2  using  proceeds  of  the  EPC 
financing  guaranteed  by  Bartell  Drug.  Upon  substantial  completion  of  the 
construction in June 2001, Bartell Drug leased the store from EPC until Bartell 
Drug acquired Property #2 on December 31, 2001. In late 2001, Bartell Drug 
contracted to sell Property #1 to another party. Bartell Drug thereupon entered 
an exchange agreement with intermediary SS and assigned to SS its rights 
under the sale agreement and under the earlier agreement with EPC. SS sold 
Property #1, applied the proceeds of that sale to the acquisition of Property #2 
from EPC and transferred Property #2 to Bartell Drug on December 31, 2001. 
The Tax Court (Judge Gale) held that the transactions qualified as a § 1031 
like-kind exchange of Property # 1 for Property #2. The Court rejected the 
IRS’s argument that under a “benefits and burdens” analysis Bartell Drug was 
the owner of Property #2 long before the formal transfer of title on December 
31, 2001, and treated EPC as the owner of Property #2 during the period it 
held title to the property. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 
1963), rev’g 38 T.C. 215 (1962), and Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 
(1978), aff’d, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980), were cited as precedent for the 
proposition that § 1031 is formalistic, and that the exchange facilitator not 
bearing the benefits and burdens of ownership during the period it holds title 
to the property for the purpose of facilitating a like kind exchange on behalf 
of  a  taxpayer  who  contractually  does  bear  the  benefits  and  burdens  of 
ownership does not preclude § 1031 nonrecognition for the deferred exchange. 
[G]iven that the caselaw has countenanced a taxpayer’s pre- 
exchange control and financing of the construction of 
improvements on the replacement property while an exchange 
facilitator held title to it, see J.H. Baird Publ’g. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 610-611 (1962), we see no 
reason why the taxpayer’s pre-exchange, temporary 
possession of the  replacement property  pursuant to  a  lease 
from the exchange facilitator should produce a different 
result. 
 
F. Section 1033 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
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G. Section 1035 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
H. Miscellaneous 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
IV. COMPENSATION  ISSUES 
 
A. Fringe Benefits 
 
1. The IRS provides guidance on the application of the 
Affordable Care Act’s market reforms to HRAs, EPPs, FSAs, and EAPs 
— it’s the bee’s knees! Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287 (9/13/13), 
supplemented by Notice 2015-87, 2015-52 I.R.B. 889 (12/16/15). The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act amended the Public Health Service Act to 
implement certain market reforms for group health plans, including 
requirements that: (1) group health plans not establish any annual limit on the 
dollar amount of benefits for any individual, and (2) non-grandfathered group 
health plans provide certain preventive services without imposing any cost- 
sharing requirements for the services. The notice provides guidance, in Q&A 
format, on the application of these market reforms to: (1) health 
reimbursement arrangements (including HRAs integrated with group health 
plans), (2) group health plans under which employers reimburse employees 
for premium expenses incurred for an individual health insurance policy 
(referred to in the notice as “employer payment plans”), and (3) health flexible 
spending arrangements. The notice also provides guidance on employee 
assistance programs and on § 125(f)(3), which generally provides that a qualified 
health plan offered through a health insurance exchange established under the 
Affordable Care Act is not a qualified benefit that can be offered through a 
cafeteria plan. The notice applies for plan years beginning on and after 1/1/14, 
but taxpayers can apply the guidance provided in the notice for all prior periods. 
The Department of Labor has issued guidance in substantially identical form 
(Technical Release 2013-03) and the Department of Health and Human Services 
is issuing guidance indicating that it concurs. 
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a. The obvious solution has a great big catch in 
it. In a Q&A issued on 5/13/14, available on the IRS’s web site 
(https://perma.cc/FK5A-FRF2), the IRS states: 
Q1. What are the consequences to the employer if the 
employer does not establish a health insurance plan for its 
own employees, but reimburses those employees for 
premiums they pay for health insurance (either through a 
qualified health plan in the Marketplace or outside the 
Marketplace)? 
[A1]. Under IRS Notice 2013-54, such arrangements are 
described as employer payment plans. An employer payment 
plan, as the term is used in this notice, generally does not 
include an arrangement under which an employee may have 
an after-tax amount applied toward health coverage or take 
that amount in cash compensation. As explained in Notice 
2013-54, these employer payment plans are considered to be 
group health plans subject to the market reforms, including 
the prohibition on annual limits for essential health benefits 
and the  requirement to  provide certain preventive care 
without cost sharing. Notice 2013-54 clarifies that such 
arrangements cannot be integrated with individual policies to 
satisfy the market reforms. Consequently, such an 
arrangement fails to satisfy the market reforms and may be 
subject to a $100/day excise tax per applicable employee 
(which is $36,500 per year, per employee) under section 
4980D of the Internal Revenue Code. 
 
b. Good news (?) for some employers: the IRS 
reiterates prior guidance and clarifies issues related to employer payment 
plans and provides transition relief from the § 4980D excise tax. Notice 
2015-17, 2015-14 I.R.B. 845 (2/18/15). This notice reiterates the conclusion 
in prior guidance, including Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287, that 
employer payment plans are group health plans that will fail to comply with 
the market reforms that apply to group health plans under the Affordable Care 
Act. The notice provides guidance, in Q&A format, on several issues, 
including the treatment of: (1) an S corporation’s payment or reimbursement 
of premiums for individual health insurance coverage covering a 2-percent 
shareholder, (2) an employer’s reimbursement of an employee’s Medicare 
premiums or payment of medical expenses for employees covered by 
TRICARE, (3) an employer’s increase of an  employee’s  compensation  to 
assist with payments for individual coverage, and (4) an employer’s provision 
of  premium  assistance  on  an  after-tax  basis.  The  notice  also  provides  a 
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transition rule under which the IRS will not assert the excise tax imposed by 
§ 4980D for any failure to satisfy the market reforms by employer payment 
plans that pay, or reimburse employees for individual health policy premiums 
or Medicare part B or Part D premiums: (1) for 2014 for employers that are 
not applicable large employers for 2014, and (2) for 1/1/15 through 6/30/15 
for employers that are not applicable large employers for 2015. Generally, 
applicable large employers are those that employed an average of at least 50 
full-time employees on business days during the preceding calendar year. 
Employers eligible for this transition rule are not required to file Form 8928 
(Return of Certain Excise Taxes Under Chapter 43 of the Internal Revenue 
Code) solely as a result of having employer payment plans for the period for 
which the employer is eligible for the relief. 
 
c. Final regulations provide guidance on many 
issues under the Affordable Care Act and incorporate prior  guidance 
issued in forms other than regulations. T.D. 9744, Final Rules for 
Grandfathered Plans, Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual 
Limits, Rescissions, Dependent Coverage,  Appeals, and Patient Protections 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 F.R. 72192 (11/18/15). The Treasury 
Department and the IRS have issued final regulations regarding grandfathered 
health plans, preexisting condition exclusions, lifetime and annual dollar limits 
on benefits, rescissions, coverage of dependent children to age 26, internal 
claims and appeal and external review processes, and patient protections under 
the Affordable Care Act. Among many other changes, the final regulations 
provide guidance on integration of health reimbursement arrangements with 
other group health plan coverage and modify Notice 2015-17 by providing a 
special rule for employers with fewer than 20 employees who offer group 
health plan coverage to employees who are not eligible for Medicare but do 
not offer coverage to employees who are eligible for Medicare. If such an 
employer is not required by the applicable Medicare secondary payer rules to 
offer group health plan coverage to employees who are eligible for Medicare 
coverage, then the employer’s reimbursement of Medicare part B or D 
premiums may be integrated with Medicare and deemed to satisfy the annual 
dollar limit prohibition and the preventive services requirements if the 
employees who are not offered other group health plan coverage would be 
eligible for that group health plan but for their eligibility for Medicare. The 
regulations are effective on 1/19/16 and apply to group health plans and health 
insurance issuers beginning on the first day of the first plan year (or, in the 
individual market, the first day of the first policy year) beginning on or after 
1/1/17. 
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d. Just in time for Christmas! The IRS continues 
to prove that the Affordable Care Act, like the jelly-of-the-month club, is, 
as cousin Eddie put it, “the gift that keeps on giving [guidance] the whole 
year.” Notice 2015-87, 2015-52 I.R.B. 889 (12/16/15). This notice, in Q&A 
format, provides guidance on the application of various provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act to employer-provided health coverage. The notice 
supplements the guidance in Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287 (9/13/13) 
and T.D. 9744, Final Rules for Grandfathered Plans, Preexisting Condition 
Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, Dependent Coverage, 
Appeals, and Patient Protections Under the Affordable Care Act,  80  F.R. 
72192 (11/18/15). The notice (1) provides guidance on the application of the 
Affordable Care Act’s market reforms for group health plans to various types 
of employer health care arrangements, including health reimbursement 
arrangements and group health plans under which an employer reimburses an 
employee for some or all of the premium expenses incurred for an individual 
health insurance policy; (2) clarifies certain aspects of the employer shared 
responsibility provisions of § 4980H; (3) clarifies certain aspects of the 
application to government entities of § 4980H, the information reporting 
provisions for applicable large employers under § 6056, and application of the 
rules for health savings accounts to persons eligible for benefits administered 
by the Department of Veterans Affairs; (4) clarifies the application of the 
COBRA continuation coverage rules to unused amounts in a health flexible 
spending arrangement carried over and available in later years, and conditions 
that may be put on the use of carryover amounts; and (5) addresses relief from 
penalties under §§ 6721 and 6722 that has been provided for employers that 
make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements under § 6056 to 
report information about offers made in calendar year 2015. The guidance 
provided in the notice generally applies for plan years beginning on and after 
12/16/15, but taxpayers can apply the guidance provided in the notice for all 
prior periods. 
e. Colleges and universities providing health 
insurance premium reductions to students who perform services might 
have employer payment plans that violate the Affordable Care Act’s 
market reforms and may need to look at alternatives. Notice 2016-17, 
2016-9 I.R.B. 358 (2/5/16). Colleges and universities often provide students, 
especially graduate students, with health coverage at greatly reduced or no cost 
as part of a package that includes tuition assistance and a stipend for living 
expenses. Some of these students perform services for the school (such as 
teaching or research), which raises the issue whether these premium reduction 
arrangements might be viewed as employer-sponsored group health plans that 
are employer payment plans that violate the market reform provisions of the 
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Affordable Care Act. The notice concludes that whether such arrangements 
constitute group health plans will depend on all of the facts and circumstances, 
and that they might or might not be viewed as employer payment plans. To 
give colleges and universities time to examine this issue and adopt suitable 
alternatives if necessary, the notice provides that the Treasury Department 
(and the Department of Labor and the Department of Health and Human 
Services) will not assert that a premium reduction arrangement fails to satisfy 
the Affordable Care Act’s market reforms if the arrangement is offered in 
connection with other student health coverage (either insured or self-insured) 
for a plan year or policy year beginning before 1/1/17. Thus, colleges and 
universities have relief for plan years or policy years that are roughly 
coterminous with academic years beginning in the summer or fall of 2016 and 
ending in 2017. This notice applies for plan years beginning before 1/1/17. 
 
f. Congress provides relief from the § 4980D 
excise tax for small employers offering health reimbursement 
arrangements, imposes new reporting requirements, limits the exclusion 
from gross income under § 106, and coordinates HRAs with the § 36B 
premium tax credit. The 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”), Pub. L. No. 
114-255, was signed by the President on 12/13/16. Among other changes, the 
Cures Act made several modifications to the rules related to health 
reimbursement  arrangements. 
Health Reimbursement Arrangements Offered by Small Employers— 
Section 18001(a)(1) of the Cures Act amends Code § 9831 by adding 
subsection (d), which provides that, for purposes of title 26 (other than the 
Cadillac Tax of § 4980I), a “qualified small employer health reimbursement 
arrangement” (QSEHRA) is not treated as a group health plan. The effect of 
this amendment is to allow employers to offer health reimbursement 
arrangements that meet the definition of a QSEHRA without becoming subject 
to the excise tax of § 4980D. An arrangement is a QSEHRA if it (1) is offered 
by an “eligible employer;” (2) subject to certain exceptions, is provided to all 
“eligible employees” on the same terms, (3) is funded solely by the employer 
and does not call for contributions through salary reduction; (4) provides for 
the payment or reimbursement of documented expenses for medical care (as 
defined in § 213(d)) incurred by the employee or the employee’s family 
members; and (5) the amount of payments and reimbursements for the year do 
not exceed $4,950 ($10,000 in the case of an arrangement that also provides 
for payments or reimbursements for family members of the employee). These 
dollar limitations will be adjusted for inflation after 2016. An “eligible 
employer” is an employer that is not an applicable large employer as defined 
in § 4980H(c)(2) and does not offer a group health plan to any of its 
employees.  An  “eligible  employee”  generally  is   any  employee  of  the 
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employer, but the terms of the arrangement may exclude from consideration 
certain employees, such as those who have not completed 90 days of service, 
those who have not attained age 25, and part-time or seasonal employees. This 
relief from the § 4980D excise tax applies for years beginning after 12/31/16, 
which means that employers may begin offering QSEHRAs  beginning  in 
2017. 
New Reporting Obligations—The Cures Act imposes  two  new 
reporting requirements related to health reimbursement arrangements. First, 
Code § 9831(d)(4), as added by § 18001(a)(1) of the Cures Act, provides that 
an employer funding a QSEHRA for any year must provide to each eligible 
employee a written notice not later than 90 days before the beginning of the 
year (or, if later, the date on which the employee becomes an eligible 
employee). The notice must include the following information: (1) a statement 
of the amount of the employee’s permitted benefit under the arrangement for 
the year; (2) a statement that the employee should provide the amount of his 
or her permitted benefit to any health insurance exchange to which the 
employee applies for advance payment of the premium tax credit; and (3) a 
statement that, if the employee is not covered under minimum essential 
coverage for any month, the employee may be subject to tax under section 
§ 5000A for that month and reimbursements under the arrangement may be 
includible in gross income. An employer that fails to provide the required 
notice is subject to a $50 penalty per employee for each incident of failure, 
subject to a $2,500 calendar year maximum for all failures. Second, new Code 
§ 6501(a)(15), as added by § 18001(a)(6) of the Cures Act, requires an 
employer to report on Form W-2 the amount of each employee’s permitted 
benefit under a QSEHRA. These rules regarding reporting apply to years 
beginning after 12/31/16. However, the legislation provides that a person shall 
not be treated as failing to provide the written notice required by § 9831(d)(4) 
if the notice is provided not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of the Cures Act. 
Extension of Relief Provided by Notice 2015-17—Notice 2015-17, 
2015-14 I.R.B. 845 (2/18/15), provided a transition rule under which the IRS 
would not assert the excise tax imposed by § 4980D for any failure to satisfy 
the market reforms by employer payment plans that pay or reimburse 
employees for individual health policy premiums or Medicare part B or Part 
D premiums: (1) for 2014 for employers that are not applicable large 
employers for 2014, and (2) for 1/1/15 through 6/30/15 for employers that are 
not applicable large employers for 2015. Section 18001(a)(7)(B) of the Cures 
Act provides that the relief under Notice 2015-17 shall be treated as applying 
to any plan year beginning on or before 12/31/16. This means that employers 
that are not applicable large employers will not be subject to the § 4980D 
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excise tax as a result of offering an employer payment plan for plan years 
beginning on or before 12/31/16. 
Limitation on the Exclusion of Code § 106—New Code § 106(g), as 
added by § 18001(a)(2) of the Cures Act, provides that, for purposes of Code 
§§ 105 and 106, payments or reimbursements to an individual for medical care 
from a QSEHRA shall not be treated as paid or reimbursed under employer- 
provided coverage for medical expenses under an accident or health plan if, 
for the month in which the medical care is provided, the individual does not 
have minimum essential coverage within the meaning of  §  5000A(f).  The 
effect of this amendment is that payments or reimbursements under a 
QSEHRA are included in an individual’s gross income if the individual does 
not have minimum essential coverage. 
Coordination with the § 36B Premium Tax Credit—Code § 36B(c)(4), 
as added by § 18001(a)(3) of the Cures Act, makes an individual ineligible for 
the § 36B premium tax credit for any month if the individual is provided a 
QSEHRA for the month that constitutes affordable coverage. If the QSEHRA 
does not constitute affordable coverage, then the employee remains eligible 
for the premium  tax credit for the month, but the amount of the credit is 
reduced by the 1/12 of the employee’s permitted benefit under the QSEHRA 
for the year. A QSEHRA constitutes affordable coverage for a month (and 
therefore makes an employee ineligible for the premium tax  credit)  if  the 
excess of (1) the premium  for the month for self-only coverage under the 
second lowest cost silver plan offered in the relevant individual health 
insurance market, over (2) 1/12 of the employee’s permitted benefit under the 
QSEHRA, exceeds 1/12 of 9.69 percent (for 2017) of the employee’s 
household income. (Note that this calculation requires using the cost of self- 
only coverage, even for employees with insured family members.) The 
statutory rules provide for adjusting the calculation in the case of employees 
employed for less than a full year. An employee must provide the amount of 
his or her permitted benefit to any health insurance exchange to which the 
employee applies for advance payment of the premium tax credit. 
Application of the Cadillac Tax—Generally, § 4980I, which was 
enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act, imposes a 40 percent excise tax on 
the amount by which the cost of group health coverage provided by an 
employer (referred to as “applicable employer-sponsored coverage”) exceeds 
a specified dollar limit. Subsequent to the enactment of the Affordable Care 
Act, Congress in 2015 delayed the effective date of the Cadillac Tax to taxable 
years beginning after 12/31/19. Section 18001(a)(4) of the Cures Act amends 
Code § 4980I(d)(2)(D) to provide that a QSEHRA is considered “applicable 
employer-sponsored coverage” for purposes of the Cadillac Tax. Accordingly, 
the cost of a QSEHRA to the employer must be taken into account in 
determining the applicability of the Cadillac Tax. 
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2. Providers of minimum essential health coverage and 
employers subject to the Affordable Care Act’s shared responsibility 
payment get a break—statements required to be furnished to individuals 
for 2016 have a delayed due date, but the date for filing with the IRS 
remains unchanged. Notice 2016-70, 2016-49  I.R.B.  784  (11/18/16). 
Sections 6055 and 6056 were added to the Code by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. Section 6055 requires annual information reporting by 
health insurance issuers, self-insuring employers, government agencies, and 
other providers of health coverage and requires the provider to furnish a related 
statement to each individual whose information is reported. The IRS has 
designated Forms 1094-B and 1095-B to meet the requirements of § 6055. 
Section 6056 requires annual information reporting by applicable large 
employers relating to the health insurance that the employer offers (or does 
not offer) to its full-time employees and requires the  employer  to  furnish 
related statements to employees that employees may use to determine whether, 
for each month of the calendar year, they may claim on their individual tax 
returns a premium tax credit under § 36B. The IRS has designated Forms 
1094-C and 1095-C to meet the requirements of § 6055. The IRS and Treasury 
previously issued final  regulations  implementing  these  reporting 
requirements. T.D.  9660, Information Reporting of Minimum Essential 
Coverage, 79 F.R. 13220 (3/10/14); T.D. 9661, Information Reporting by 
Applicable Large Employers on Health Insurance Coverage Offered Under 
Employer-Sponsored Plans, 79 F.R. 13231 (3/10/14). Under the final 
regulations, the required statements generally must be furnished to individuals 
or employees for a calendar year on or before January 31 of the succeeding 
year, and the information returns for a calendar year generally must be filed 
on or before February 28 of the succeeding year (March 31 if filed 
electronically). The regulations generally apply for calendar years beginning 
after 12/31/14. This notice extends the due date for furnishing to individuals 
the 2016 Forms 1095-B and 1095-C to 3/2/17. Because of this extension, those 
furnishing Forms 1095-B and 1095-C do not have, as they normally would, 
the ability to request a 30-day extension. However, this notice, unlike similar 
relief granted in prior years, does not extend the due date for filing with the 
IRS Forms 1094-B, 1095-B, 1094-C, or 1095-C. The due date for  filing 
remains 2/28/17, if not filed electronically, or 3/31/17, if filed electronically. 
Nevertheless, an automatic 30-day extension of the due date for filing is 
available by filing Form 8809 on or before the due date. 
• Because  the  extended  due  dates  may 
delay an individual’s receipt of Forms 1095-B or 1095-C, the notice provides 
that, for 2016, individuals do not need to wait to receive Forms 1095-B and 
1095-C  before  filing  their  returns.  Instead,  taxpayers  can  rely  on  other 
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information received from their employers or coverage providers about their 
offers of coverage for purposes of determining either eligibility for the § 36B 
premium tax credit or to confirm that they had minimum essential coverage. 
Such individuals should keep the information on which they rely with their tax 
records but need not send it to the IRS. 
• The notice extends transition relief from 
penalties under §§ 6721 and 6722 for incorrect or incomplete information 
reported on the return or statement to reporting entities that establish they 
made good-faith efforts to comply with  the  information-reporting 
requirements under §§ 6055 and 6056 for 2016 (both for furnishing to 
individuals and for filing with the Service). However, no penalty relief is 
available for failing to file an information return or furnish a statement by the 
due dates (as extended by the notice). 
 
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans 
 
1. Relief for certain closed defined benefit pension plans. 
Notice 2014-5, 2014-2 I.R.B. 276 (12/13/13). This notice provides temporary 
nondiscrimination relief for certain “closed”  defined  benefit  pension  plans 
(i.e., those that provide ongoing accruals but that have been amended to limit 
those accruals to some or all of the employees who participated in the plan on 
a specified date). Typically, new hires are offered only a defined contribution 
plan, and the closed defined benefit plan has an increased proportion of highly 
compensated  employees. 
 
a. The relief is extended to plan years beginning 
before 2017. Notice 2015-28, 2015-14 I.R.B. 848 (3/19/15). This notice 
extends for an additional year the  temporary  nondiscrimination  relief 
originally provided in Notice 2014-5, 2014-2 I.R.B. 276 (12/13/13), by 
applying that relief to plan years beginning before 2017. The notice cautions 
that  all  remaining  provisions  of  the  nondiscrimination  regulations  under 
§ 401(a)(4) (including the rules relating to the timing of plan amendments 
under Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)–5) continue to apply. The Treasury and IRS 
anticipate issuing proposed amendments to the § 401(a)(4) regulations that 
would be finalized and apply after the relief under Notice 2014-5 and this 
notice expires. 
 
b. Proposed regulations provide 
nondiscrimination relief for certain closed plans and formulas and make 
other changes. REG-125761-14, Nondiscrimination Relief  for  Closed 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Additional Changes to the Retirement Plan 
Nondiscrimination  Requirements,  81  F.R.  4976  (1/29/16).  The  Treasury 
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Department and the IRS have published proposed amendments to the 
regulations under § 401(a)(4), which provides generally that a plan is a 
qualified plan only if the contributions or benefits provided under the plan do 
not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. The proposed 
regulations modify a number of provisions in the existing regulations under 
§ 401(a)(4) to address situations and plan designs that were not contemplated 
in the development of the existing regulations. Many of the changes in the 
proposed regulations provide nondiscrimination relief for certain closed plans 
and formulas, but the proposed regulations also include other changes that are 
not limited to closed plans and formulas. The proposed amendments generally 
would apply to plan years beginning on or after the date of publication of final 
regulations and, subject to some significant  exceptions,  taxpayers  are 
permitted to apply the provisions of the proposed regulations for plan years 
beginning on or after 1/1/14. 
 
c. The relief is extended to plan years beginning 
before 2018. Notice 2016-57, 2016-40 I.R.B. 432 (9/19/16). This notice 
extends for an additional year the  temporary  nondiscrimination  relief 
originally provided in Notice 2014-5, 2014-2 I.R.B. 276 (12/13/13), by 
applying that relief to plan years beginning before 2018. The IRS has done so 
because it anticipates that the proposed regulations (REG-125761-14, 
Nondiscrimination Relief for Closed Defined Benefit Pension Plans and 
Additional Changes to the Retirement Plan Nondiscrimination Requirements, 
81 F.R. 4976 (1/29/16)) will not be published as final regulations in time for 
plan sponsors to make plan design decisions based on the final regulations 
before expiration of the relief provided under Notice 2014-5 (as extended by 
Notice 2015-28). Therefore, the IRS has extended the relief for an additional 
year. 
 
2. IRA trustees and plan administrators can take the 
taxpayer’s word for it that the taxpayer is eligible for a waiver of the 60- 
day rollover period. Rev. Proc. 2016-47, 2016-37 I.R.B. 346 (8/24/16). This 
revenue procedure provides for a self-certification procedure (subject to 
verification on audit) that a taxpayer can use to claim eligibility for a waiver 
with respect to a rollover into a qualified plan or IRA. Under §§ 402(c)(3) and 
408(d)(3), any amount distributed from a qualified plan or IRA is excluded 
from gross income if it is transferred to an eligible retirement plan no later than 
the 60th day following the day of receipt. A similar rule applies to § 403(a) 
annuity plans, § 403(b) tax sheltered annuities, and § 457 eligible 
governmental plans. A taxpayer who fails to meet the 60-day requirement can 
seek a waiver, pursuant to §§ 402(c)(3)(B) and 408(d)(3)(I), on the grounds 
that  “failure  to  waive  such  requirement  would  be  against  equity  or  good 
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conscience, including casualty, disaster, or other events beyond the reasonable 
control of the individual subject to such requirement.” Taxpayers  seek  a 
waiver by submitting a request for a private letter ruling pursuant to Rev. Proc. 
2003-1 C.B. 359. This revenue procedure does not eliminate  a  taxpayer’s 
ability to seek a private letter ruling, but it allows a taxpayer to make a written 
self-certification to a plan administrator or an IRA trustee provided that three 
conditions are met: (1) the IRS has not previously denied a waiver request with 
respect to the rollover, (2) the taxpayer failed to meet the 60-day requirement 
because of the taxpayer’s inability to complete a rollover due to one or more 
of several specified reasons, including an error by the financial institution 
receiving the contribution or making the distribution, the taxpayer’s 
misplacement and failure to cash the distribution check, severe damage to the 
taxpayer’s principal residence, incarceration of the taxpayer, serious illness of 
the taxpayer or a member of the taxpayer’s family, or the death of a member 
of the taxpayer’s family, and (3) the taxpayer makes the contribution to the 
plan or IRA as soon as practicable after the circumstance justifying the waiver 
no longer prevents the taxpayer from making the contribution. (This third 
requirement is deemed to be satisfied if the contribution is made within 30 
days after the circumstance justifying the waiver no longer prevents the 
taxpayer from making the contribution.) The revenue procedure provides a 
model letter that taxpayers can use for a self-certification. A plan administrator 
or IRA trustee can rely on a taxpayer’s self-certification in determining 
whether the taxpayer has satisfied the conditions for a waiver of the 60-day 
rollover requirement unless the administrator or trustee has actual knowledge 
to the contrary. However, IRA trustees will be required to report on Form 5498 
that a contribution was accepted after the 60-day deadline. The self- 
certification allows a taxpayer to report a contribution as a valid rollover, but 
the IRS can challenge on audit the taxpayer’s eligibility for a waiver and can 
still seek to impose penalties such as the failure-to-pay penalty of § 6651. The 
revenue procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 2003-16 by providing that the IRS may 
grant a waiver during an examination of the taxpayer's income tax return. The 
revenue procedure is effective on 8/24/16. 
 
3. Retirement   plans   can   make   loans   and   hardship 
distributions to victims of natural disasters. 
a. Relief for Louisiana flood victims. 
Announcement 2016-30, 2016-37 I.R.B. 355 (8/30/16). Section 401(k) plans 
and similar employer-sponsored retirement plans can make loans and hardship 
distributions to victims of flooding that began in Louisiana on August 11, 
2016. Participants in § 401(k) plans, employees of public schools and tax- 
exempt organizations with § 403(b) tax-sheltered annuities, as well as state 
and local government employees with § 457(b) deferred-compensation plans, 
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may be eligible to take advantage of these streamlined loan procedures and 
liberalized hardship distribution rules. IRA participants are barred from taking 
out loans but may be eligible to receive distributions under liberalized 
procedures. Pursuant to this relief, an eligible plan will not be treated as failing 
to satisfy any requirement under the Code or regulations merely because the 
plan makes a loan, or a hardship distribution for a need arising from these 
Louisiana storms, to an employee, former employee, or certain family 
members who live or work in one of the parishes identified as part of a covered 
disaster area because of the Louisiana storms. To qualify for this relief, 
hardship withdrawals must be made by 1/17/17. To facilitate access to plan 
loans and distributions, the IRS will not treat a plan as failing to follow 
procedural requirements for plan loans or distributions imposed by the terms 
of the plan merely because those requirements are disregarded for any period 
beginning on or after 8/11/16 and continuing through 1/17/17, provided the 
plan administrator (or financial institution in the case of IRAs) makes a good- 
faith diligent effort under the circumstances to comply with those 
requirements. As soon as practicable, the plan administrator (or financial 
institution in the case of IRAs) must make a reasonable attempt to assemble 
any forgone documentation. 
• This relief means that a retirement plan 
can allow a victim of the Louisiana flooding to take a hardship distribution or 
borrow up to the specified statutory limits from the victim’s retirement plan. 
It also means that a person who lives outside the disaster area can take out a 
retirement plan loan or hardship distribution and use it to assist a son, daughter, 
parent, grandparent or other dependent who lived or worked in the disaster 
area. 
• A plan is allowed to make loans or 
hardship distributions before the plan is formally amended to provide for such 
features. Plan amendments to provide for loans or hardship distributions must 
be made no later than the end of the first plan year beginning after 12/31/16. 
In addition, the plan can ignore the reasons that normally apply to hardship 
distributions, thus allowing them, for example, to be used for food and shelter. 
• Except to the extent the distribution 
consists of already-taxed amounts, a hardship distribution made pursuant to 
this relief will be includible in gross income and generally subject to the 10- 
percent additional tax of § 72(t). 
 
b. Relief   for   victims   of   Hurricane   Matthew. 
Announcement 2016-39, 2016-45 I.R.B. 720 (10/21/16). Similar relief allows 
§ 401(k) plans and similar employer-sponsored retirement plans to make loans 
and hardship distributions to victims of Hurricane Matthew. Pursuant to this 
relief, an eligible plan will not be treated as failing to satisfy any requirement 
under the Code or regulations merely because the plan makes a loan, or a 
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hardship distribution for a need arising from Hurricane Matthew, to an 
employee, former employee, or certain family members who live or work in 
one of the counties identified as part of a covered disaster area because of 
Hurricane Matthew. To qualify for this relief, hardship withdrawals must be 
made by 3/15/17. To facilitate access to plan loans and distributions, the IRS 
will not treat a plan as failing to follow procedural requirements for plan loans 
or distributions imposed by the terms of the plan merely because those 
requirements are disregarded for any period beginning on or after 10/4/16 
(10/3/16 for Florida) and continuing through 3/15/17, provided the plan 
administrator (or financial institution in the case of IRAs) makes a good-faith 
diligent effort under the circumstances to comply with those requirements. As 
soon as practicable, the plan administrator (or financial institution in the case 
of IRAs) must make a reasonable attempt to assemble any forgone 
documentation. A qualified employer plan that does not provide for them must 
be amended to provide for loans or hardship distributions no later than the end 
of the first plan year beginning after 12/31/16. 
 
 
141 (10/27/16). 
4. Some inflation adjusted numbers for 2017. I.R. 2016- 
 
• Elective  deferral  in  §§  401(k),  403(b), 
and 457 plans remains unchanged at $18,000 with a catch up provision for 
employees aged 50 or older of $6,000. 
• The limit on contributions to an IRA will 
be unchanged at $5,500. The AGI phase out range for contributions to a 
traditional IRA by employees covered by a workplace retirement plan is 
increased to $62,000 to $72,000 (from $61,000-$71,000) for single filers and 
heads of household, increased to $99,000-$119,000 (from $98,000-$118,000) 
for married couples filing jointly in which the spouse who makes the IRA 
contribution  is  covered  by  a  workplace  retirement  plan,  and  increased  to 
$186,000-$196,000 (from $184,000-$194,000) for an IRA contributor who is 
not covered by a workplace retirement plan and is married to someone who is 
covered. The phase-out range for contributions to a Roth IRA is increased to 
$186,000-$196,000 (from $184,000-$194,000) for married couples filing 
jointly, and increased to $118,000-$133,000 (from $117,000-$132,000) for 
singles and heads of household. 
• The annual benefit from a defined benefit 
plan under § 415 is increased to $215,000 (from $210,000). 
The  limit  for  defined  contribution  plans  is 
increased to $54,000 (from $53,000). 
• The amount of compensation that may be 
taken into account for various plans is increased to $270,000 (from $265,000), 
and is increased to $400,000 (from $395,000) for government plans. 
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• The AGI limit for the retirement savings 
contribution  credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income  workers  is  increased  to 
$62,000  (from  $61,500)  for  married  couples  filing  jointly,  increased  to 
$46,500 (from $46,125) for heads of household, and increased  to  $31,000 
(from $30,750) for singles and married individuals filing separately. 
 
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, 
and Stock Options 
1. Reducing  redundant  paperwork  to  facilitate  e-filing. 
T.D. 9779, 81 F.R. 48707 (7/26/16). The Treasury Department and IRS have 
finalized, without change, proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.83–2(c) (REG- 
135524-14, Property Transferred in Connection With the Performance of 
Services, 80 F.R. 42439 (7/17/15)). As amended, Reg. § 1.83–2(c) requires a 
§ 83(b) election to be made by filing one copy of a written statement with the 
internal revenue office with which the person who performed the services files 
his return. This eliminates the requirement that taxpayers submit a copy of a 
§ 83(b) election with their tax return for the year in which the property subject 
to the election was transferred and thereby facilitates electronic filing. Section 
83(b)(2) statutorily requires that a § 83(b) election be filed with the IRS no 
later than 30 days after the date that the property is transferred to the service 
provider. The amendment applies to property transferred on or after 1/1/16. 
However, taxpayers may rely on the guidance in the proposed regulations 
(which is identical to the guidance in the final regulations) for property 
transferred on or after 1/1/15. 
 
D. Individual Retirement Accounts 
 
1. The form of the transaction was a mystery, but Judge 
Gustafson peers through the fog to find that the substance was what the 
taxpayer said it was. McGaugh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-28 
(2/24/16). The taxpayer had a self-directed IRA of which Merrill Lynch was 
the custodian. Among its other assets, the IRA held stock in First Personal 
Financial Corp. The taxpayer asked Merrill Lynch to purchase additional stock 
in First Personal Financial Corp. for the IRA. Although the investment in First 
Personal Financial Corp. was not a prohibited investment for the IRA, Merrill 
Lynch, for reasons not reflected in the record, refused to purchase the stock 
directly. At the taxpayer’s request, Merrill Lynch issued a wire transfer 
directly to First Personal Financial Corp., and more than 60 days thereafter, 
First Personal Financial Corp. issued the stock in the name of the taxpayer’s 
IRA. Merrill Lynch attempted to deliver the stock certificate to the taxpayer, 
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but at trial, the possession of the stock certificate issued in the name of the IRA 
was unclear. The record indicated that if the stock certificate had been received 
by Merrill Lynch within the 60-day period, it would have  been  accepted. 
Merrill Lynch reported the transaction on Form  1099-R  as a taxable 
distribution because it had determined that the wire transfer was a distribution 
to the taxpayer that was not followed by a rollover investment within the 60- 
day period permitted under § 408(d)(3). The IRS determined that the wire 
transfer issued by Merrill Lynch constituted a “distribution” from the IRA and 
was includible in gross income under §§ 408(d) and 72 and that, because the 
taxpayer had not yet reached age 59½, it was an “early distribution” subject to 
the § 72(t) 10 percent additional tax. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held 
that there had not been a distribution from the IRA to the taxpayer and did not 
uphold the deficiency. The opinion noted that there was no evidence that the 
taxpayer requested an IRA distribution to himself. “No cash, check, or wire 
transfer ever passed through [the taxpayer’s] hands, and he was therefore not 
a literal ‘payee or distributee’ of any amount.” The taxpayer “was, at most, a 
conduit of the IRA funds.” The court distinguished Dabney v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2014-108, which involved a similar wire transfer of self-directed 
IRA funds to purchase an asset and in which the court found a taxable 
distribution, on the basis that the asset purchased in Dabney (land) was one 
that the IRA custodian would not permit the IRA to hold. In contrast, the asset 
purchased in this case, stock of First Personal Financial Corp., was a 
permissible investment that the IRA already held. 
 
2. SEP IRA SNAFU. Vandenbosch v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2016-29 (2/24/16). The taxpayer maintained a self-directed SEP IRA 
with Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. as the custodian. The taxpayer agreed to 
lend money to a friend and/or the friend’s corporation, and to that end, the 
taxpayer signed a form titled “Retirement Distribution or Internal Transfer.” 
He requested that Edward Jones distribute $125,000 from his SEP-IRA into 
his joint account with his wife. (He did not elect to have federal and state 
income tax withheld. He checked a box indicating “I am under the age of 59½. 
(IRS premature distribution TAX APPLIES *** ).”) Edward Jones distributed 
$125,000 from the SEP-IRA into the taxpayers’ joint account at Edward Jones. 
The taxpayer wired $125,000 from the joint account to his personal account at 
BankFirst, following which the taxpayer wired $125,000 from the BankFirst 
account to his friend’s account at JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. The taxpayer 
and his friend executed a loan agreement and note in their personal capacities, 
with the taxpayer denominated as the lender. He did not indicate that he was 
signing on behalf of his SEP-IRA. The taxpayer received a Form 1099-R, 
Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, 
IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., reporting a gross distribution of $125,000; the 
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form indicated that the withdrawal was an early distribution and that the entire 
$125,000 was taxable. The taxpayer reported the transaction as a § 408(d)(3) 
rollover. The  Tax  Court (Judge  Buch)  had  no  problem in  finding  that the 
taxpayer had received a distribution includable in gross income and that the 
§ 72(t) early distribution 10 percent additional tax applied. However, the 
asserted § 6662 accuracy related penalty was not upheld because the court 
found that the taxpayers acted with reasonable cause and in good faith in their 
reliance on the advice of a tax professional. “The Vandenbosches have been 
using the accounting firm for over 20 years. Dr. Vandenbosch explained to his 
return preparer what had happened with the distribution  and  provided  his 
return preparer with the note and information regarding the transfer of funds 
that ended with [his friend] receiving the funds. The Vandenbosches included 
with their return a copy of a letter from their tax preparer stating that he did 
not include the $125,000 as taxable because he believed it was directly rolled 
over.” 
 
3. A multi-million dollar “Abusive Roth IRA 
Transaction” goes south. Polowniak v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-31 
(2/25/16). The taxpayer had a Roth IRA that he funded with $2,000. The Roth 
IRA originally owned 98 percent of a newly formed C corporation, Bevco 
Investments, Inc., but ultimately came to own 100 percent. From its 
incorporation to its dissolution, the taxpayer was Bevco’s registered agent, and 
officer, director, and employee. The taxpayer’s pre-existing wholly owned S 
corporation, Strategies, and Bevco entered into a subcontracting agreement for 
the taxpayer’s consulting services. Strategies would pay Bevco 75 percent of 
the revenue it received from certain contracts with Delphi Automotive 
Services for the taxpayer’s consulting services. In exchange Bevco would 
provide certain specified services for Strategies that would be provided 
personally by the taxpayer. Over the years in issue, Strategies paid 
approximately $2.0 million to Bevco. Strategies reported net losses, which 
were passed through to the taxpayer. The IRS issued deficiency notices based 
on Strategies’ failure to report its consulting income and determined that the 
taxpayer was liable for the 6 percent § 4973 excise tax for excess contributions 
to his Roth IRA. Bevco’s gross receipts were treated as excess contributions. 
The Tax Court (Judge Paris) held that the payments “from Strategies of the 
Delphi payments to Bevco were nothing more than a mechanism for 
transferring value to the Roth IRA.” The subcontracting agreement did not 
change the services provided to Delphi, and the taxpayer continued to do all 
of the work as he had done previously. Accordingly, applying substance over 
form, the amounts transferred from Strategies to Bevco constituted excess 
contributions to the taxpayer’s Roth IRA, and the § 4973 excise tax applied. 
Consistently,   Strategies’   gross   receipts   were   increased   by   the   amounts 
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transferred to Bevco and the resulting deficiency upheld. A host of penalties— 
under § 6651(a)(1) for failure to file Form 5329, under § 6651(a)(2) for failure 
to pay the excise tax, and under § 6662A for a deficiency attributable to a listed 
transaction, because the taxpayer’s transaction was a listed transaction under 
Notice 2004-8, 2004-1 C.B. 333—were sustained. 
 
4. Another case suggesting that the answer to “Why not 
have a self-directed IRA?” is “Just say ‘No.’” Thiessen v. Commissioner, 
146 T.C. 100 (3/29/16). In 2003, the taxpayers rolled over their tax-deferred 
§ 401(k) retirement accounts into newly formed self-directed IRAs. They then 
caused the IRAs to acquire the initial stock of a newly formed C corporation, 
and caused the corporation to acquire the assets of an existing business. The 
taxpayers guaranteed the repayment of a loan to the corporation from the seller 
of the assets that was part of the acquisition price. The taxpayers reported that 
the rollover of the retirement funds into the IRAs was nontaxable. The IRS 
determined  that  the   loan  guaranties  were  prohibited  transactions  under 
§ 4975(c)(1)(B), resulting in deemed distributions of the IRAs’ assets to the 
taxpayers pursuant to § 408(e)(2) The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held that the 
taxpayers’   guaranties   of   the   loan   were   prohibited   transactions   under 
§ 4975(c)(1)(B), and that consequently the IRAs’ assets were deemed to have 
been distributed to the taxpayers. Peek v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 216 (2013), 
was not distinguishable and was followed. Because the taxpayers were not 
59½ as of the first day of the year of the deemed distributions, the 10 percent 
§ 72(t) penalty applied. Furthermore, even if its conditions were satisfied (and 
they were not), § 4975(d)(23)—which provides that § 4975(c)(1)(B) does not 
apply to the lending of money or other extension of credit between a plan and 
a disqualified person “in connection with the acquisition, holding, or 
disposition of any security or commodity, if the transaction is corrected before 
the end of the correction period”—was inapplicable because the taxpayers’ 
guaranties were not in connection with the acquisition, holding, or disposition 
of a security or commodity. Finally, § 6501(e) applied to extend to six years 
the statute of limitations for  assessment. The taxpayers’ reporting that the 
rollover was nontaxable was insufficient to advise the IRS of the nature and 
the amount of the unreported income flowing from the deemed distributions 
from the IRAs on account of the loan guaranties. 
 
5. A lesson on how not to handle a  deceased  spouse’s 
IRA. Ozimkoski v. Commissioner,  T.C.  Memo.  2016-228  (12/19/16).  The 
will of the taxpayer’s deceased husband appointed the taxpayer as personal 
representative and, with minor exceptions, left all of his property to the 
taxpayer. The taxpayer and her deceased husband each had a traditional IRA 
with Wachovia (later acquired by Wells Fargo). The deceased husband’s adult 
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son, who was the taxpayer’s stepson, petitioned the probate court to revoke the 
will. In settlement of the stepson’s claims, the taxpayer and the stepson agreed 
that the taxpayer would transfer to the stepson a 1967 Harley Davidson 
motorcycle and $110,000. The agreement provided that “[a]ll payments shall 
be net payments free of any tax.” Because of the stepson’s claims, Wachovia 
froze the deceased husband’s IRA. In 2008, following the settlement, 
Wachovia transferred approximately $235,000 from the deceased husband’s 
IRA to the taxpayer’s IRA. The taxpayer, who was age 53, then withdrew a 
total of approximately $175,000 from her IRA during  2008,  $110,000  of 
which she paid to the stepson. Wachovia issued a Form 1099-R reporting the 
distributions as early distributions. The taxpayer filed her 2008 income tax 
return twenty-four days late and did not include the IRA distributions in her 
gross income. The IRS issued a notice of deficiency asserting an income tax 
deficiency of $62,185, a § 72(t) penalty tax for early withdrawal by a taxpayer 
not yet age 59½ of $17,460, a late-filing penalty of $3,100, and an accuracy- 
related penalty of $12,437 for substantial understatement of income tax. The 
taxpayer, who appeared pro se, argued that $110,000  of  the  distributions 
should not be included in her gross income because the stepson was entitled 
to that amount through the probate litigation and resulting settlement. The Tax 
Court (Judge Paris) first concluded that Wachovia had incorrectly rolled the 
deceased husband’s IRA into the taxpayer’s IRA because she was not a named 
beneficiary of the deceased husband’s IRA. In the court’s view, Wachovia 
should have distributed the assets of the deceased husband’s IRA to his estate. 
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that it could not unwind that transaction and 
had to decide the issues based on the transfers that had actually occurred. The 
court held that the taxpayer had to include in her gross income all of the 2008 
distributions from her IRA, including the $110,000 that she paid to her 
stepson. The court also upheld the imposition of the § 72(t) penalty tax. 
Although an exception § 72(t)(2)(A)(ii) provides that the penalty tax does not 
apply to distributions “made to a beneficiary (or to the estate of the employee) 
on or after the death of the employee,” the court relied on prior decisions, 
including Gee v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 1 (2006), to conclude that the 
exception does not apply where, as here, a beneficiary rolls over the funds 
from a deceased spouse’s IRA into his or her IRA and then withdraws funds 
from his or her IRA. The court also upheld the late-filing penalty because the 
taxpayer had failed to establish that the late filing was due to reasonable cause 
and not due to willful neglect. However, the court held that, taking into account 
all the circumstances, including the taxpayer’s experience, knowledge, and 
education, the taxpayer had established a reasonable cause, good faith defense 
to the accuracy-related penalty with respect to the portion of the 
understatement attributable to the $110,000 the taxpayer paid to her stepson 
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(but not with respect to the portion attributable to the remaining $65,000 in 
distributions). 
• It appears to us that, with proper advice 
and planning, the taxpayer could have avoided both the 10 percent penalty of 
§ 72(t) and the inclusion in her gross income of the $110,000 she paid to her 
stepson. Rather than transfer the $235,000 balance of her deceased husband’s 
IRA into her own IRA, the taxpayer could have left the funds in her deceased 
husband’s IRA. This should have permitted a direct payment of $110,000 from 
her deceased husband’s IRA to the stepson without inclusion of those funds in 
her gross income. It also should have permitted her to avoid the 10 percent 
penalty by taking advantage of the exception in § 72(t)(2)(A)(ii). 
 
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS 
 
A. Rates 
 
1. The Treasury Department and the IRS are trying to 
get everyone to sing Kumbaya. T.D. 9785. Definition of Terms Relating to 
Marital Status, 81 F.R. 60609 (9/2/16). The Treasury Department and the IRS 
have finalized, with some changes, proposed regulations that reflect the 
holdings of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584  (2015), 
Windsor v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and Rev. Rul. 
2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, defining and describing the marital status of 
taxpayers (REG-148998-13, Definition of Terms Relating to Marital Status, 
80 F.R. 64378 (10/23/15)). Reg. § 301.7701-18 amends the current regulations 
under § 7701 to provide that for federal tax purposes the terms “spouse,” 
“husband,” and “wife” mean an individual lawfully married to another 
individual, and the term “husband and wife” means two individuals lawfully 
married to each other. These definitions apply regardless of sex. However, the 
terms “spouse,” “husband,” and “wife” do not include individuals who have 
entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil union, or other similar 
relationship not denominated as a marriage under the law of a state, 
possession, or territory of the United States; the term “husband and wife” does 
not include couples who have entered into such a relationship, and the term 
“marriage” does not include such relationships. 
• Effective date. The regulations apply to 
taxable years ending on or after 9/2/16. In reality, however, as a result of the 
holdings in Obergefell, Windsor, and Rev. Rul. 2013-17, these rules  are 
already in effect. 
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B. Miscellaneous  Income 
 
1. An   exclusion   from   gross   income   for   wrongfully 
incarcerated  individuals.  The  2015  PATH  Act,  §  304,  adds  to  the  Code 
§ 139F, which excludes from the gross income of an individual who is 
convicted of a criminal offense under federal or state law and wrongfully 
incarcerated any civil damages, restitution, or other monetary award relating 
to the individual’s incarceration. An individual was wrongfully incarcerated if 
the individual is pardoned, granted clemency, or granted amnesty  for  the 
offense because the individual was innocent, or if the conviction is reversed or 
vacated and the charging instrument is then dismissed or the individual is 
found not guilty at a new trial. The new provision applies to taxable years 
beginning before, on, or after 12/18/15, the date of enactment. A special rule 
allows individuals to make a claim for credit or refund of any overpayment of 
tax resulting from the exclusion, even if the claim would normally be barred 
by operation of any law or rule of law (including res judicata), if the claim for 
credit or refund is filed before the close of the one-year period beginning on 
12/18/15. 
 
a. Amounts received by a person other than the 
wrongfully incarcerated individual are not eligible for the § 139F 
exclusion. In re Elkins, 117 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-2124 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
6/14/16). Clarence Elkins was convicted of rape and murder and was 
incarcerated for seven years. He was exonerated and filed a lawsuit based on 
his wrongful conviction and incarceration in which he asserted claims for loss 
of consortium on behalf of his wife and son, who were debtors in a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding. Mr. Elkins and his family received a settlement of 
$5.25 million, of which his wife and son had shares of $611,000 and $627,000 
respectively. The bankruptcy trustee filed tax returns for the  bankruptcy 
estates including part of their shares of the settlement in gross income. The 
bankruptcy proceeding was closed in 2014. Following Congress’s enactment 
of § 139F in 2015, the wife and son sought to reopen their bankruptcy cases to 
file amended bankruptcy estate tax returns to exclude the settlement proceeds 
previously included in gross income. The Bankruptcy Court (Judge Kendig) 
denied their motions to reopen because doing so would be futile. The court 
reasoned that the exclusion of § 139F is available only to the wrongfully 
incarcerated individual, not to other persons, such as Mr. Elkins’ wife and son. 
The court supported its conclusion by reference to the language of § 139F, 
which provides in subsection (a): 
In the case of any wrongfully incarcerated individual, gross 
income shall not include any civil damages, restitution, or 
other monetary  award  (including  compensatory  or statutory 
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damages and restitution imposed in a criminal matter) relating 
to the incarceration of such individual for the covered offense 
for which such individual was convicted. 
 
2. Hallelujah! The government finally recognizes that 
nonpayment of a debt still owed is not necessarily COD income. T.D. 9793, 
81 F.R. 78908 (11/10/16). The IRS and Treasury have finalized proposed 
amendments (REG-136676-13, Removal of the 36-Month Non-Payment 
Testing Period Rule, 79 F.R. 61791 (10/15/14)) to Reg. § 1.6050P-1 that 
eliminate the rule that a deemed discharge of indebtedness for which a Form 
1099-C, “Cancellation of Debt,” must be filed occurs at the expiration of a 36- 
month non-payment testing period. The Preamble explains the change as 
follows: 
Because reporting under the 36-month rule may not reflect a 
discharge of indebtedness, a debtor may conclude that the 
debtor has taxable income even though the creditor has not 
discharged the debt and continues to pursue collection. 
Issuing a Form 1099–C before a debt has been discharged 
may also cause the IRS to initiate compliance actions even 
though    a    discharge    has    not    occurred.    Additionally, 
§ 1.6050P–1(e)(9) provides that no additional reporting is 
required if a subsequent identifiable event occurs. Therefore, 
in cases in which the Form 1099–C is issued because of the 
36-month rule but before the debt is discharged, the IRS does 
not subsequently receive third-party reporting when the debt 
is discharged. The IRS’s ability to enforce collection of tax 
for discharge of indebtedness income may, thus, be 
diminished when the information reporting does not reflect an 
actual cancellation of indebtedness. 
The final regulations are applicable to information returns required to be filed, 
and payee statements required to be furnished, after 12/31/16. The deadline 
for filing information returns and furnishing payee statements for calendar 
year 2016 is after 12/31/16. Accordingly, the expiration of a 36-month testing 
period during 2016 does not trigger a requirement to file information returns 
and furnish payee statements. (This effective date is a change from the 
proposed regulations, which were proposed to be effective and applicable as 
of the date of publication of final regulations in the Federal Register.) 
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 C. Hobby Losses and Section 280A Home Office 
and Vacation Homes 
 
  1. “It  may  have  been  a  fun  business,  but  fun doesn't 
convert a business to a hobby. If it did, Facebook would be a hobby, 
Microsoft and Apple would be hobbies, Amazon would be a hobby, etc. 
ad infinitum.” Roberts v. Commissioner, 820 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 4/15/16). The 
taxpayer had been a successful owner and operator of restaurants, bars, and 
nightclubs. He began withdrawing from those businesses in the mid-1990s, 
but he remained a paid consultant to the new owners. In 1999 he bought his 
first horses and embarked on a career as a thoroughbred racehorse owner, 
breeder and trainer. Over the following years, his stable of racehorses 
increased; by 2001 he had ten racehorses and a breeding stallion. In 2003 he 
was licensed as a trainer. In 2006 he acquired a 180-acre farm and invested 
between $500,000 and $600,000 in improvements for  the  training  of 
racehorses on the property. He trained the horses himself; “he even bathed 
them himself.” He spent 12 hours a day working with the horses on race days 
and about 8 hours a day on other days. In addition, he served on the boards of 
two professional horse-racing associations “in what the Tax Court’s opinion 
describe[d] as ‘leadership roles.’” However, his venture was not profitable. In 
2005 and 2006, the years in issue, he lost $153,420 and $30,604, respectively. 
In 2007 and 2008, which were not at issue, the losses increased to $98,251 in 
2007 and to $291,888 in 2008. He deducted the losses on his tax returns from 
his other income, mainly income from consulting in the restaurant business 
and from renting and selling real estate, but the IRS disallowed the losses for 
2005 and 2006 as hobby losses under § 183. The Tax Court (Judge Paris) 
sustained the IRS’s position and disallowed the losses, even though it found 
that only the eighth (substantial income from sources other than the activity) 
and ninth (elements of personal pleasure or recreation) factors in Reg. § 1.183– 
2 favored the IRS. The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, 
reversed. According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he Tax Court’s ruling that 
Roberts’ horse-racing enterprise was a hobby in 2005 and 2006 but became a 
business in 2007 and remained so in 2008, and apparently has been one in 
every year since given the IRS’s failure to challenge his horse-racing 
deductions for any year since 2008, is untenable.” The Court of Appeals found 
all nine factors in Reg. § 1.183–2 to favor the taxpayer, but was dismissive of 
the factors, referring to the regulation as “goofy.” 
Notice too that the factors in the Treasury Regulation 
overwhelmingly favor Roberts’ claim that even in 2005 and 
2006 his horse-racing enterprise was a business. He 
conducted it in a businesslike way (factor 1). He prepared by 
extensive study (to obtain a training license) (factor 2). He 
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largely withdrew from his previous businesses in order to 
devote “most of his energies” to his horse-racing enterprise 
(factor 3). He expected to derive an eventual profit from the 
enterprise, including profit in the form of appreciation of the 
value of the land and buildings used in the enterprise (factor 
4)—it’s not as if he were a billionaire indifferent to the modest 
profit that probably was all he could expect from horse racing. 
Entering the restaurant business on a small scale in his 
twenties, Roberts had suffered setbacks that prevented his 
business from being an immediate success—indeed his first 
restaurant burned down and the insurance settlement was too 
small to enable him to rebuild it as a full-service 
establishment. Yet he “grew” the business to large dimensions 
over time, a pattern consistent with his attempting to repeat 
the process in his horse-racing venture in 2005 and 2006 
(factor 5). “A series of losses during the initial or start-up 
stage of the activity may not necessarily be an indication that 
the activity is not engaged in for profit” (factor 6)—that’s this 
case, all right. A “substantial profit, though only occasional, 
would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged in 
for profit” (factor 7). The Tax Court awarded this factor to 
Roberts because he earned money from racing his first two 
horses and the growth in the prize purses (owing to the slot 
machines) could be expected to increase his income in the 
future; that one of his horses was nominated to run in the 
Triple Crown Races suggested that his horses might 
eventually achieve greater success. 
“The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial 
income or capital from sources other than the activity may 
indicate that an activity is engaged in for profit” is factor 8. In 
2005  and  2006  Roberts  reported  adjusted  gross  income  of 
$297,881 and $1,359,339 even after deducting his horse- 
racing losses, but he happened to have sold a large piece of 
land in 2006, and the Tax Court found that he is “not an 
excessively wealthy individual.” The  court  concluded  that 
this factor favored the IRS, but we believe the existence of 
other income has little weight when many other factors 
indicate a profit objective. 
As for the last factor—“the availability of other 
investments which would yield a higher return, or which 
would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that an 
activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be 
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treated as not engaged in for profit merely because the 
taxpayer has purposes or motivations other than  solely  to 
make a profit. Also, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal 
pleasure from engaging in the activity is not  sufficient  to 
cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit 
if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by 
other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.” This is 
sensible since obviously many businessmen derive pleasure, 
self-esteem, and other nonmonetary “goods” from their 
businesses, and horse racing is just the kind of business that 
would generate such “goods” for participants such as the 
owners and trainers (Roberts is both) of the horses. 
About factor 9 the court added that “there is likely no 
profit objective where the taxpayer combines  horse  racing 
with social and recreational activities.” That is  contrary  to 
what factor 9 says, and in addition no social or recreational 
activities engaged in by Roberts are listed, let alone described, 
by the court. The court does say that “petitioner’s 
involvement with the professional horse racing associations 
demonstrates that he engaged in some social aspect of the 
industry,” but that's like saying that serving on a corporate 
board of directors is a “social” activity. 
All in all, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is a well-written missive admonishing 
the Tax Court not to confuse with a hobby the start-up phase of an enjoyable 
but risky business, entered into as a new full-time career, in an established 
industry, with a high likelihood of failure with a low probability of a big 
payoff. 
 
D. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses 
 
1. When    multiple    unmarried    taxpayers    co-own    a 
qualifying residence, do the debt limit provisions found in 
§ 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and (C)(ii) apply per taxpayer or per residence? 
a. The Tax Court says the limits apply per 
residence: two unmarried co-owners holding residences in joint 
ownership were restricted to mortgage interest deductions on only $1.1 
million of loans. Sophy v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 204 (3/5/12). The Tax 
Court (Judge Cohen) decided that the $1.1 million § 163(h)(3) limitation on 
indebtedness giving rise to qualified residence interest should be applied on 
both a per-taxpayer and a per-residence basis with respect to residence owners 
who are not married to each other, rather than solely on the per-taxpayer basis 
argued for by the unmarried taxpayers who jointly owned the two residences 
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in question on which the purchase money mortgages exceeded $1.1 million. 
Thus, each of the two taxpayers, who were registered domestic partners under 
California law, was limited to deducting interest on only $500,000 of 
acquisition indebtedness on their two residences and $50,000 of home equity 
indebtedness on their principal residence. The decision was based upon 
congressional intent, as shown by the statute’s repeated use of phrases “with 
respect to any qualified residence” and “with respect to such residence,” which 
would have been superfluous had Congress intended that the limitations be 
applied on a per-taxpayer basis. 
 
b. But the Ninth Circuit says the debt limits 
apply per taxpayer, not per residence. Voss v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 
1051 (9th Cir. 8/7/15). In a 2-1 opinion by Judge Bybee, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the Tax Court’s decision in Sophy v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 204 
(2012), and held that the debt limit provisions of § 163(h)(3) apply on a per- 
taxpayer basis to unmarried co-owners of a qualified residence and remanded 
the case for a determination of the proper amount of interest that each taxpayer 
was entitled to deduct. The opinion focused principally on the parentheticals 
in § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and (C)(ii) that halve the debt ceilings “in the case of a 
married individual filing a separate return.” If Congress had wanted to draft 
the parentheticals in per-residence terms, it could have done so. “The per- 
taxpayer wording of the parentheticals, considered in light of the 
parentheticals’ use of the phrase ‘in the case of,’ thus suggests that the wording 
of the main clause—in particular, the phrase ‘aggregate amount treated’— 
should likewise be understood in a per taxpayer manner.” Furthermore, “the 
very inclusion of the parentheticals suggests that the debt limits apply per 
taxpayer.” The Ninth Circuit majority’s reasoning was summarized as follows: 
We infer this conclusion from the text of the statute: By 
expressly providing that married individuals filing separate 
returns are entitled to deduct interest on up to $550,000 of 
home debt each, Congress implied that unmarried co-owners 
filing separate returns are entitled to deduct interest on up to 
$1.1 million of home debt each. 
The majority opinion also pointed out that applying a per residence ceiling 
would be largely unworkable in situations  where  two  unmarried  taxpayers 
each had an individual primary residence that was a qualified residence but 
co-owned a secondary residence that was a qualified residence. Additionally, 
the majority noted that “[i]f Congress wants to go further and ensure that two 
or more unmarried taxpayers are treated as a single taxpayer for purposes of a 
particular deduction or credit, it can do that too,” citing the now-expired § 36 
first-time homebuyer credit as an example of a provision that did exactly that. 
The court acknowledged that the provisions of § 163(h)(3) limiting married 
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taxpayers filing separately to one-half of the amount of debt ceiling allowed 
to married taxpayers filing jointly results in a marriage penalty, but it was “not 
particularly  troubled.” 
Congress may very well have good reasons for allowing that 
result, and, in any event, Congress clearly singled out married 
couples for specific treatment when it explicitly provided 
lower debt limits for married couples yet, for whatever reason, 
did not similarly provide lower debt limits for unmarried co- 
owners. 
Finally, the court refused to give any deference to CCA 200911007, 2009 WL 
641772 (11/24/08, released 3/13/09), which concluded that unmarried co- 
owners are “limited to $1,000,000 of total, ‘aggregate’ acquisition 
indebtedness.” 
• Judge  Ikuta’s  dissenting  opinion  would 
have affirmed the Tax Court’s decision by giving deference to CCA 
200911007, which she described as “both reasonable and persuasive.” 
 
c. And a taxpayer friendly IRS opts to surrender 
to the Ninth Circuit view on a nationwide basis, thereby assuring yet 
another marriage penalty. AOD 2016-02, 2016-31 I.R.B. 193 (8/1/16). The 
IRS has acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Voss, thus negating any 
continuing importance for the Tax Court’s decision in Sophy. As a result, the 
§ 163(h)(3) limitations apply on a per taxpayer basis, allowing each taxpayer 
to deduct interest on mortgage indebtedness of up to $1.1 million, nationwide 
and not merely in the states comprising the Ninth Circuit. 
 
2. Proposed and temporary regulations on deducting 
casualty losses in the preceding tax year. T.D. 9789, Election to  Take 
Disaster Loss Deduction for Preceding Year, 81 F.R. 70938 (10/14/16). The 
Treasury Department and the IRS have issued proposed and temporary 
regulations under § 165(i), which allows a taxpayer to elect to treat an 
allowable loss occurring in a disaster area and attributable to a  federally 
declared disaster as a casualty loss sustained in the tax year immediately prior 
to the tax year in which the disaster occurred (preceding year). The temporary 
regulations generally provide that the due date for making the § 165(i) election 
is six months after the due date for filing the taxpayer’s federal income tax 
return for the disaster year (determined without regard to any extension of time 
to file). The temporary regulations also extend the period of time for revoking 
a § 165(i) election to ninety days after the due date for making the election. 
The temporary regulations are effective immediately. 
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a. Guidance   on   the   manner   of   making   the 
§ 165(i) election. Rev. Proc. 2016-53, 2016-44 I.R.B. 530 (10/13/16). This 
revenue procedure sets forth the rules and procedures regarding the election 
under § 165(i) (and the revocation of a § 165(i) election) to deduct a disaster 
loss for the tax year immediately preceding the tax year in which the disaster 
occurred. Generally, a taxpayer makes the election by deducting the disaster 
loss on either an original federal tax return or an amended federal tax return 
for the preceding year. A taxpayer must include with the original or amended 
return an election statement indicating the taxpayer is making a § 165(i) 
election. For an election made on an original return, a taxpayer must provide 
the information required by section 3.02 of the revenue procedure on Lines 1 
or 19 (as applicable) of Form 4684 (Casualties and Thefts). (A taxpayer filing 
an original federal tax return electronically may attach a statement as a PDF 
document if there is insufficient space on Form 4684 to provide the required 
information.) For an election made on an amended return, a taxpayer may 
provide the required information by any reasonable means. 
 
3. Proposed regulations address reporting requirements 
and related issues for education tax credits allowed by § 25A. REG- 
131418-14, Reporting for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses; Education 
Tax Credits, 81 F.R. 50657 (8/2/16). The Treasury Department and the IRS 
have issued proposed amendments to (1) the regulations under § 25A and 
§ 6050S to reflect amendments to §§ 25A and 6724 under the Trade 
Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27 (TPEA) and 
amendments to §§ 25A and 6050S under the 2015 PATH Act, and (2) the 
regulations under § 25A to update the definition of qualified tuition and related 
expenses to reflect changes made by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 (ARRA), to clarify the 
prepayment rule in Reg. § 1.25A-5(e), and to clarify the rule for refunds in 
Reg. § 1.25A–5(f). Among other requirements, the proposed regulations 
implement the TPEA’s requirement for qualified tuition and related expenses 
paid in tax years beginning after 6/29/15 that taxpayers must receive a Form 
1098-T to claim an education credit (the American Opportunity Tax Credit or 
Lifetime Learning Credit) under § 25A or the deduction under § 222; the 2015 
PATH Act’s requirement that the American Opportunity Tax Credit is not 
allowed if the TIN of the student or the taxpayer claiming the deduction is 
issued after the due date for filing the return or if the return does not include 
the EIN of the educational institution to which tuition was paid; and the 2015 
PATH Act’s requirement that educational institutions must report on Form 
1098-T amounts paid, rather than amounts billed, effective for amounts paid 
after 12/31/15 for education furnished in academic periods beginning after that 
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date. The proposed regulations will be effective upon publication in the 
Federal Register as final regulations. 
• The IRS previously issued 
Announcement 2016-17, 2016-20 I.R.B. 853 (4/27/16), which states that the 
IRS will not impose penalties under §§ 6721 or 6722 for failure to file or 
furnish correct or timely information returns solely because an eligible 
educational institution reports the aggregate amount billed for qualified tuition 
and related expenses for the 2016 calendar year. 
 
4. Standard deduction for 2017. Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 
2016-45  I.R.B.  707  (10/25/16).  The  standard  deduction  for  2017  will  be 
$12,700  for  joint  returns  and  surviving  spouses  (increased  from  $12,600), 
$6,350 for unmarried individuals and married individuals filing separately 
(increased from $6,300), and $9,350 for heads of households (increased from 
$9,300). 
 
5. A dependency exemption, but not the child tax credit, 
is available for a permanently and totally disabled child who has attained 
age seventeen. Polsky v. United States, 844 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 12/15/16). The 
taxpayers, a married couple appearing pro se, had a daughter who was 
permanently disabled and who was over age seventeen. For the years 2010 and 
2011, the taxpayers claimed a child tax credit with respect to their daughter 
under § 24. The IRS disallowed the credit on the ground that their daughter 
had attained age seventeen. Section 24(c)(1) allows the credit only for a 
“qualifying child,” defined in § 24(c)(1) as “a qualifying child of the taxpayer 
(as defined in section 152(c)) who has not attained age 17.” The taxpayers 
argued that the credit nevertheless was available because the cross-reference 
in § 24(c)(1) to § 152(c) incorporates § 152(c)(3)(B), which states that a child 
is a qualifying child without regard to the child’s age if the child is 
permanently and totally disabled. In a per curiam opinion, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court and held that the child 
tax credit is available only when the qualifying child both “meets the non-age- 
related requirements of § 152(c) and ‘has not attained age 17.’” Accordingly, 
the taxpayers were not entitled to the credit. The court quoted from the District 
Court’s opinion: 
Section 24 imports the basic qualifications from § 152(c), and 
adds an age limitation of seventeen years. ... The age 
restriction in § 24(c)(1) is intended to end the tax credit when 
the child reaches seventeen years of age. In contrast,  the 
special rule applicable to permanently and totally disabled 
dependents in § 152(c)(3)(B) is calculated to extend the tax 
deduction  as  long  as  the  child  is  disabled.  Therefore,  the 
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taxpayer can take a dependent deduction  regardless of the 
child’s age as long as the child is permanently and totally 
disabled, but cannot receive a tax credit for a disabled child 
who, by the close of the taxable year, was seventeen years of 
age. 
 
E. Divorce Tax Issues 
 
1. The taxpayer and his former spouse might have been 
overly optimistic that they could continue to operate jointly owned 
businesses following their divorce. When things did not work out, § 1041 
prevented the taxpayer from recognizing gain on the sale of his interest.  
Belot v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-113 (6/13/16). During their 
marriage, the  taxpayer  and his former spouse  operated three businesses: a 
dance school organized as a C corporation, a business engaged in the retail 
sale of dancewear and accessories organized as an LLC, and a real estate 
business organized as an LLC taxed as a partnership. During their divorce 
proceeding, the taxpayer and his spouse equalized their ownership interests in 
the businesses and planned to continue operating them together following the 
divorce. A judgment of divorce was entered in January 2007. In September 
2007, the taxpayer’s former spouse brought an action in which she alleged that 
he had mismanaged the dance school, sought to remove him as a director and 
employee, and asked the court to compel him to sell his shares to the 
corporation or to her. To  resolve this litigation, the parties entered  into a 
settlement agreement in April 2008, pursuant to which the taxpayer sold his 
interests in all of the businesses to his former spouse for $1.5 million, payable 
over a ten-year period. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer’s transfer of his 
interests did not qualify for nonrecognition under § 1041(a), which provides 
that no gain or loss is recognized on the transfer of property to a spouse or to 
a former spouse incident to divorce. Under § 1041(c), a transfer is incident to 
divorce if it occurs within one year after the date on which the marriage ceases 
or is related to the cessation of the marriage. The relevant regulation, Reg. 
§ 1.1041-1T(b), Q&A-7, provides: 
A transfer of property is treated as related to the cessation of 
the marriage if the transfer is pursuant to a divorce or 
separation instrument … and the transfer occurs not more than 
6 years after the date on which the marriage ceases. … Any 
transfer not pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument and 
any transfer occurring more than 6 years after the cessation of 
the marriage is presumed to be not related to the cessation of 
the marriage. This presumption may be rebutted only by 
showing that the transfer was made to effect the division of 
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property owned by the former spouses at the time of the 
cessation of the marriage. For example, the presumption may 
be rebutted by showing that (a) the transfer was not made 
within the one- and six-year periods described above because 
of factors which hampered an earlier transfer of the property, 
such as legal or business impediments to transfer or disputes 
concerning the value of the property owned at the time of the 
cessation of the marriage, and (b) the transfer is effected 
promptly after the impediment to transfer is removed. 
The Tax Court (Judge Colvin) held that the taxpayer’s transfer of his 
ownership interests was “incident to divorce” within the meaning of § 1041(c). 
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the government’s argument that 
the taxpayer’s transfer, which occurred more than one year after the date on 
which the marriage ceased, was not related to the cessation of the marriage 
because it was not made pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument. The 
relevant regulation, the court reasoned, contemplates that a transfer not made 
pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument can be related to the cessation 
of the marriage if it is “made to effect the division of property owned by the 
former spouses at the time of the cessation of the marriage.” The court also 
rejected the government’s arguments that the transfer was not related to the 
cessation of the marriage because (1) it took the form of a sale, and (2) the 
litigation that resulted in the sale concerned a business dispute, as evidenced 
by the fact that the litigation was brought in the superior court civil part rather 
than the family court, which had jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s divorce. 
 
2. A blue moon arrives in the Tax Court—a taxpayer 
successfully establishes through credible testimony that he was entitled to 
the dependency exemption, earned income tax credit, and child tax credit.  
Tsehay v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-200 (11/3/16). The taxpayer, 
whose first language was not English and who worked as a custodian at a 
community college, filed a return on Form 1040A for 2013 through a paid 
preparer. On the return, the taxpayer claimed head of household filing status, 
a dependency exemption and the child tax credit for four children, and an 
earned income tax credit for three children. (It was unclear from the record 
why the paid preparer had listed different numbers of children for the 
exemptions and credits.) The IRS issued a notice of deficiency disallowing all 
of the claimed exemptions and credits. The notice also changed the taxpayer’s 
filing   status   to   single   and   imposed   an   accuracy-related   penalty   under 
§ 6662(a). The IRS took the position that the taxpayer, who had previously 
been separated from his wife and ordered to pay child support, was a 
noncustodial parent and therefore subject to § 152(e)(2), which provides that 
a noncustodial parent can claim the dependency exemption for a child only if 
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the custodial parent signs a written declaration that the custodial parent will 
not claim the child as a dependent and the noncustodial parent attaches the 
written declaration to his or her tax return. The taxpayer had failed to submit 
Form 8332, the form designated for such written declarations, with his income 
tax return. The Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan) found credible the taxpayer’s 
testimony at trial. The taxpayer testified that, during 2013, he and his wife 
were married and lived together with their five children in a public housing 
apartment. Based on this testimony, the court held that the  taxpayer  was 
entitled to the dependency exemptions, the child tax credit, and the earned 
income tax credit. The court rejected the IRS’s reliance on a child support 
order to establish that the taxpayer was a noncustodial parent because the order 
was entered in August 2015, after the tax year in issue. Regarding his filing 
status, the taxpayer testified that he and his wife had separated by the time he 
filed his 2013 return and that he had asked the preparer to list his filing status 
as married filing separately. The preparer erroneously listed his filing status as 
head of household. The court held that his filing status could not be changed 
to single, as the IRS contended, but instead should be married filing separately. 
Although the erroneous filing status might have supported the  accuracy- 
related penalty, the court held that the taxpayer—who had a language barrier, 
sought and relied on professional advice, and was separated from his wife 
when he filed his return—had established a reasonable cause, good faith 
defense. 
• There appears to be some inconsistency 
in the court’s conclusions. A taxpayer whose filing status is married filing 
separately cannot claim the earned income tax credit. 
 
F. Education 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
G. Alternative Minimum Tax 
 
1. What God has joined together let the tax man put 
asunder! Vichich v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 186 (4/21/16). The issue in this 
case was whether § 53(e) allows a taxpayer, to use an AMT credit arising from 
incentive stock options exercised by a deceased spouse. The taxpayer, Nadine 
Vichich married William Vichich in 2002, and he died in 2004. William 
previously had been married to someone else. In 1998 William exercised 
employer-granted incentive stock options that resulted in AMT liability, which 
he reported on a 1998 tax return filed jointly with his then wife. (The 
difference between the exercise price and the fair market value of the stock on 
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the date of exercise (the spread) is treated as an item of adjustment and is 
included in  the taxpayer’s AMTI.) Payment of the AMT  liability in 1998 
generated a § 53(e) AMT credit carryforward. On her 2009 tax return, Nadine 
reported an AMT credit derived from William’s 1998 AMT credit 
carryforward that she used to offset her individual income tax liability. The 
IRS disallowed the claimed AMT  credit, and the Tax Court (Judge Nega) 
upheld the deficiency; Nadine was not entitled to use the AMT credit to offset 
her individual income tax liability for 2009. The IRS conceded that William 
was entitled to the credit following his prior divorce, but neither the statute nor 
the regulations provided an answer as to whether any of the AMT credit 
transferred to Nadine after William’s death. Prior case law established that 
“[i]t is axiomatic that income is taxed to the person who earns it, and credits 
and deductions are thus generally not transferable between taxpayers.” 
Furthermore, “[t]he Code treats married taxpayers who file jointly as  one 
taxable unit; however, it does not convert two spouses into one single taxpayer. 
Joint filing allows spouses to aggregate their income and deductions but ‘does 
not create a new tax personality’.” Observing that “the ability to offset one 
spouse’s income with the other’s [NOL] loss deductions is available only to 
spouses who elect to file joint returns,” the court found that the same principle 
should apply to credits. 
[B]ecause petitioner could not deduct for a postmarital year 
an NOL incurred by her husband even during their marriage, 
much less before it, we conclude, on the basis of the record 
and the arguments before us, that, she was not entitled to take 
into account under section 53(b)(1) her husband’s premarital 
adjusted net minimum tax liability in computing her own 
minimum tax credit for tax year 2009. 
 
VI. CORPORATIONS 
 
A. Entity and Formation 
 
1. Built-in losses cannot be “imported” either from 
offshore or from a U.S. tax-exempt. T.D. 9759, Limitations on the 
Importation of Net Built-in Losses, 81 F.R. 17066 (3/28/16). The Treasury and 
IRS   have   finalized,   with   minor   changes,   proposed   regulations   under 
§§ 334(b)(1)(B) and 362(e)(1), dealing with the importation of built-in losses 
in § 332 subsidiary liquidations and § 351 transfers (REG-161948-05, 
Limitations on the Importation of Net Built-in Losses, 78 F.R. 54971 (9/9/13)). 
(These regulations do not deal with § 362(e)(2); Reg. § 1.362–4 deals with 
§  362(e)(2).)  The  regulations  also  finalize  proposed  amendments  to  the 
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regulations under §§ 332 and 351 to reflect statutory changes (REG-163314- 
03, Transactions Involving the Transfer of No Net Value, 70 F.R. 11903 
(3/10/05)). Section 362(e)(1) applies property-by-property to assign each 
transferred property a fair market value basis rather than the normal § 362(a) 
transferred basis, if (1) there is net built-in loss in the aggregate transferred 
properties and (2) gain or loss realized by the transferor with respect to the 
property was not subject to U.S. income tax immediately prior to the transfer. 
If a controlled subsidiary is liquidated and (1) there is net built-in loss in the 
aggregate transferred properties and (2) gain or loss realized by the transferor 
with respect to the property was not subject to U.S. income tax immediately 
prior to the transfer, § 334(b)(1)(B) provides the parent with a fair market 
value basis in properties received in the liquidation. 
• Reg. § 1.362–3 terms the transactions to 
which § 362(e)(1) applies “loss importation transactions,” and the property to 
which it applies “loss importation property.” The regulations use a 
hypothetical sale analysis to identify loss importation property. The 
regulations clarify that § 362(e)(1) applies to transfers by U.S. tax-exempt 
organizations as  well as transfers by foreign persons. The regulations  also 
provide a look-through rule for transfers by grantor trusts, partnerships, and S 
corporations, and in certain “tax-avoidance” transactions, as well as rules 
dealing with tiered entities. (Although the Treasury and IRS agree that 
clarification of the interaction of the regulations issued under §§ 362(e)(1) and 
362(e)(2) and the regulations proposed under § 704(c)(1)(C) would be 
appropriate, the preamble to the final regulations states that these issues will 
be addressed when the regulations under § 704(c)(1)(C) are finalized.) The 
regulations clarify that whether a transaction is a loss importation transaction 
is determined with respect to the aggregate amount of built-in gain and built- 
in loss in all importation property acquired from all transferors in the 
transaction, unlike the transferor-by-transferor approach of § 362(e)(2). 
Detailed basis calculation rules are specified. In response to comments on the 
proposed regulations, the final regulations expressly provide that, 
notwithstanding the application of the anti-loss importation or anti-duplication 
provisions to a transaction, the transferee’s basis is generally considered 
determined by reference to the transferor’s basis for federal income tax 
purposes. The regulations are illustrated by nine examples.  The  rules  in 
Reg.§ 1.362-3 apply to any transaction occurring on or after 3/28/16, unless 
effected pursuant to a binding agreement that was in effect prior to that date 
and at all times thereafter. Taxpayers may apply the proposed regulations to 
transactions occurring after 10/22/04—almost 9 years retroactively. 
• Amendments to Reg. § 1.334–1(b) apply 
similar rules to “loss importation transactions,”  and  “loss  importation 
property” in § 332 liquidations. All of the examples deal with the liquidation 
of a foreign subsidiary by a U.S. parent. 
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B. Distributions and Redemptions 
 
1. Non-arm’s length transactions between commonly 
controlled corporations results in a festival of taxation. Key Carpets, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-30 (2/25/16). Mr. and Mrs.  Johnson 
owned all of the stock of Key Carpets, Inc., which sold carpets to businesses. 
Key Carpets was very successful. Mr. Johnson owned all of the stock of Clean 
Hands Co., Inc., which was attempting to develop a voice-activated hand 
washing monitoring system. Both businesses operated out of the same 
building. For the years in question, Clean Hands employed a computer 
technician who developed the voice-activated hand washing monitoring 
system. Mr. Johnson owned the patent on this system but testified that he 
thought Key Carpets owned the system. In addition to assisting with the 
development of the hand washing monitoring system, the Clean Hands 
computer technician provided information technology (IT) services to Key 
Carpets. The computer technician did not maintain a time log for 2008; he 
testified that he estimated “with a reasonably high degree of accuracy” that 
85 percent to 95 percent of his time at Clean Hands was spent working on the 
hand washing monitoring system. Clean Hands paid the computer technician 
a salary of $100,000 in 2007 and $90,000 in 2008. Key Carpets paid Clean 
Hands throughout the years at issue for purportedly developing the hand 
washing  monitoring  system  and  providing Key Carpets with IT  services— 
$130,300 in 2007 and $128,222 in 2008—and deducted those amounts for 
“computer service and consulting.” The IRS asserted deficiencies against both 
Key Carpets and the Johnsons on the grounds that the payments  by  Key 
Carpets to Clean Hands were not ordinary and necessary business expenses, 
but were constructive dividends. The Tax Court (Judge Paris) upheld the 
deficiencies with respect to 85 percent of the amounts of the payments; only 
15 percent of the amounts paid to Clean Hands by Key Carpets were actually 
paid for IT service provided to Key Carpets by Clean Hands’ computer 
technician. Because Key Carpets had no actual ownership interest in the hand 
washing monitoring system, Key Carpets’ transfer of funds to Clean Hands 
provided significant economic benefit to Mr. Johnson and his business, Clean 
Hands. Thus, following Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1982-314, aff’d, 730 F.2d 634 (11th Cir. 1984), which held that when 
a shareholder was required to make capital contributions and caused a related 
company to pay the contributions, the payments were for the personal benefit 
of the common shareholder and thus a constructive dividend, Johnson received 
a constructive dividend. Section 6662 accuracy related penalties were upheld. 
 
2. Clarifying the amount of deemed taxable stock 
dividends.  We  guess  there  was  a  problem.  REG–133673–15,  Deemed 
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Distributions Under Section 305(c) of Stock and Rights to Acquire Stock, 81 
F.R. 21795 (4/13/16). The IRS and Treasury have published proposed 
amendments to Regs. §§ 1.305–1, 1.305–3, and 1.305–7 that deal with 
distributions of warrants, subscription rights, options, convertible instruments 
that give the holder a right to convert the instruments into shares of stock in 
the issuing corporation, and similar instruments and adjustments to a 
convertible instrument that increase the number of shares of stock a holder 
would receive upon conversion that correspond to distributions of stock, cash, 
or other property made to actual shareholders, as well as rights to acquire stock 
that prevent actual shareholders’ interests from being diluted as a result of 
distributions of stock, cash, or other property to deemed shareholders (i.e., 
holders of rights to acquire stock). The proposed regulations provide that a 
deemed distribution of a right to acquire stock will be treated as a distribution 
of additional rights to acquire stock, the amount of which is the fair market 
value of the right. When an adjustment is or results in a deemed distribution 
under Prop. Reg. § 1.305–7(c)(1) or (2), the deemed distribution occurs at the 
time the adjustment occurs (pursuant to the terms of the relevant instruments), 
but in no event later than the date of the distribution of cash or property that 
results in the deemed distribution. For rights with respect to publicly-traded 
stock, if the relevant instrument does not provide when the adjustment occurs, 
the deemed distribution would occur immediately prior to the opening of 
business on the ex-dividend date for the distribution of cash or property that 
results in the deemed distribution. Prop. Reg. § 1.1441–2(d)(4)(i)  would 
clarify that a withholding agent has an obligation to withhold on a deemed 
distribution (as defined in Reg. § 1.305–1(d)(7)). 
 
C. Liquidations 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
D. S Corporations 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
E. Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
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F. Corporate  Divisions 
 
1. Congress kisses-off REIT spinoffs. The 2015  PATH 
Act, § 311(a), added new § 355(h), which provides that § 355 generally does 
not apply to any distribution if either the distributing corporation or controlled 
corporation is a REIT. If, however, both the distributing corporation and the 
controlled corporation are REITs immediately after the distribution, the 
distribution still may qualify under § 355. A second exception applies if (1) the 
distributing corporation was a REIT at all times during the  3-year  period 
ending on the date of the distribution, (2) the controlled corporation was a 
taxable REIT subsidiary of the distributing corporation at all times during that 
period, and (3) the distributing corporation controlled (directly or indirectly) 
the controlled corporation at all times during that period.  Section  355(h) 
applies to distributions after 12/6/15 unless the transaction was described in a 
ruling request initially submitted to IRS on or before 12/7/15, the request was 
not withdrawn, and the ruling was not issued or denied as of 12/7/15. 
 
a. TRA ‘86 strikes back at REIT conversions— 
with a vengeance. T.D. 9770, Certain Transfers of Property to Regulated 
Investment Companies [RICs] and Real Estate Investment  Trusts  [REITs]; 
Final and Temporary Regulations, 81 F.R. 36793 (6/8/16); REG-126452-15, 
Certain Transfers of Property to Regulated Investment Companies [RICs] and 
Real Estate Investment Trusts [REITs], 81 F.R. 36816 (6/8/16). Temp. Reg. 
§ 1.337(d)–7T provides that a C corporation engaging in a conversion 
transaction (as defined in § 1.337(d)–7(a)(2)(ii)—“the qualification of a C 
corporation as a RIC or REIT or the transfer of property owned by a C 
corporation to a RIC or REIT”) involving a REIT within the ten-year period 
following a related § 355 distribution is treated as making an election to 
recognize gain and loss as if it had sold all of the converted property to an 
unrelated party at fair market value on the deemed sale date (as defined in Reg. 
§ 1.337(d)–7(c)(3)). In these situations, § 1374 treatment is not available as an 
alternative to recognizing any gain with respect to the converted property on 
the deemed sale date. The temporary regulations also provide that a REIT that 
is a party to a § 355 distribution occurring within the ten-year period following 
a conversion transaction for which a deemed sale election has not been made 
recognizes any remaining unrecognized built-in gains  and  losses  resulting 
from the conversion transaction (after taking into account the impact of § 1374 
in the interim period, as described subsequently). 
• There are two exceptions to the general 
rules. The temporary regulations do not apply if both the distributing 
corporation and the controlled corporation are REITs immediately after the 
date of the § 355 distribution and at all times during the two years thereafter. 
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Second, the temporary regulations also do not apply to certain § 355 
distributions in which the distributing corporation is a REIT and the controlled 
corporation is a taxable REIT subsidiary. 
• The regulations generally apply to 
conversion transactions occurring on or after June 7, 2016, and to conversion 
transactions and related § 355 distributions for  which  the  conversion 
transaction occurs before, and the related § 355 distribution occurs on or after, 
June 7, 2016. 
 
2. Take that Alphabet! REG-134016-15, Guidance under 
Section 355 Concerning Device and Active Trade or Business, 81 F.R. 46004 
(7/15/16). The Treasury Department and the IRS have published proposed 
amendments to Reg. §§ 1.355–2 and 1.355–3 that would clarify the application 
of the device prohibition and the active business requirement of § 355. The 
purpose of the proposed amendments to the regulations is to curtail tax-free 
distributions involving relatively small active businesses and substantial 
amounts of investment assets. 
Device Test Factors―First, the  Treasury  and IRS have  concluded 
that the presence of business assets, whether or not held for five years, 
generally does not raise any more device concerns than the presence of assets 
used in a five-year active business. Thus, a proposed change to the nature and 
use of assets device factor in Reg. § 1.355–2(d)(2)(iv) would focus on assets 
used in a business (as defined in proposed § 1.355–2(d)(2)(iv)(B)) rather than 
only assets used in an active business meeting  the  five-year  history 
requirement of § 355(b). Second, conversely, the Treasury and IRS have 
concluded that device potential exists if either (1) Distributing or Controlled 
owns a large percentage of assets not used in business operations compared to 
total assets or (2) Distributing’s and Controlled’s percentages of these assets 
differs substantially. Accordingly, the proposed regulations would provide 
thresholds for determining whether the ownership of nonbusiness assets and/or 
differences in the nonbusiness asset percentages (the percentage of a 
corporation’s total assets that are nonbusiness assets) for Distributing and 
Controlled are evidence of device. If neither Distributing nor Controlled has 
nonbusiness assets that are 20 percent or more of its total assets, the ownership 
of nonbusiness assets ordinarily would not be evidence of device. 
Furthermore, a difference in the nonbusiness asset percentages for Distributing 
and Controlled ordinarily would not be evidence of device if such difference 
is less than 10 percentage points or, in the case of a non-pro rata distribution, 
if the difference is attributable to a need to equalize the value of the Controlled 
stock and securities distributed and the consideration exchanged therefor by 
the distributees. Third, the nondevice factor in §  1.355–2(d)(3)(ii),  which 
relates  to  corporate  business  purpose  for  a  transaction  as  evidence  of 
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nondevice, would be revised to provide that a corporate business purpose that 
relates to a separation of (a) nonbusiness assets from (b) one or more 
businesses or from business assets would not be evidence of nondevice, unless 
the business purpose involves an exigency that requires an investment or other 
use of the nonbusiness assets in a business. Absent such an exigency, such 
separations are not consistent with the intent of Congress to prevent § 355 
from applying to a distribution that is used principally as a device. 
Per Se Device―Prop. Reg. § 1.355–2(d)(5) would provide that a 
transaction is a per se device (notwithstanding the presence of any other 
nondevice factors, for example, a corporate business purpose or stock being 
publicly traded and widely held) if designated percentages of Distributing’s or 
Controlled’s total assets are nonbusiness assets. The test is multi-pronged. A 
per se device exists if both (1) the nonbusiness asset percentage of Distributing 
or Controlled is 66⅔ percent or more, and (2) the nonbusiness asset percentage 
of Distributing or Controlled is (a) 66⅔percent or more but less  than  80 
percent, and the nonbusiness asset percentage of the other corporation 
(Controlled or Distributing, as the case may be) is less than 30 percent, (b) 80 
percent or more but less than 90 percent, and the nonbusiness asset percentage 
of the other corporation is less than 40 percent; or (c) 90 percent or more, and 
the nonbusiness asset percentage of the other corporation is less  than  50 
percent. 
Active Business Test―Prop. Reg. § 1.355–9 would provide an entirely 
new minimum size requirement for an active business to qualify under § 355. 
The requirements of §§ 355(a)(1)(C) and 355(b) will be satisfied with respect 
to a distribution only if the five-year-active-business asset percentage (as 
defined in the regulations) of each of Distributing and Controlled is at least 
five percent. 
Special Operating Rules―Various special operating rules deal 
comprehensively with taking into account assets held by the separate affiliated 
groups of both Distributing and Controlled and assets of partnerships of which 
either or both of Distributing and Controlled are partners for purposes of 
applying the above rules, as well as distributions of multiple controlled 
corporations. And, of course, there are anti-abuse rules: A transaction or series 
of transactions undertaken with a principal purpose of affecting the five-year- 
active-business asset percentage of any corporation will not be given effect. 
Effective Date―The regulations generally will be effective upon 
publication of final regulations. 
 
3. “The Treasury Department and the IRS  recognize 
that determining whether an acquisition of control has substance for 
federal tax purposes can be difficult and fact-intensive.” Rev. Proc. 2016- 
40,  2016-32  I.R.B.  228  (7/15/16).  This  revenue  procedure  provides  fact 
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patterns (safe  harbors) in  which  the  IRS  will not assert  that a  distributing 
corporation, D, lacks control of another corporation, C, within the meaning of 
§ 355(a)(1)(A). There’s no way to paraphrase it, so we quote it: 
SECTION 3. TRANSACTIONS TO WHICH THIS 
REVENUE PROCEDURE APPLIES 
This revenue procedure applies to transactions in 
which― 
(1) D owns C stock not constituting control of C; 
(2) C issues shares of one or more classes of stock to D 
and/or to other shareholders of C (the issuance), as a result of 
which D owns C stock possessing at least 80 percent of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of C stock entitled 
to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of 
all other classes of stock of C; 
(3) D distributes its C stock in a transaction that otherwise 
qualifies under § 355 (the distribution); and 
(4) C subsequently engages in a transaction that, actually 
or in effect, substantially restores (a) C’s shareholders to the 
relative interests, direct or indirect, they would have held in C 
(or a successor to C) had the issuance not occurred; and/or 
(b) the relative voting rights and value of the C classes of 
stock that were present prior to the issuance (an unwind). 
SECTION 4. SAFE HARBORS 
The IRS will not assert that a transaction described in 
section 3 of this revenue procedure lacks substance, and that 
therefore D lacked control of C immediately before the 
distribution, within the meaning of § 355(a)(1)(A) of the 
Code, if the transaction is also described in one of the 
following safe harbors: 
.1 No Action Taken Within 24 Months.  No action is 
taken (including the adoption of any plan or policy), at any 
time prior to 24 months after the distribution, by C’s board of 
directors, C’s management, or any of C’s controlling 
shareholders (as defined in § 1.355–7(h)(3)) that would (if 
implemented) actually or effectively result in an unwind. 
.2 Unanticipated Third Party Transaction. C engages in 
a transaction with one or more persons (for example, a merger 
of C with another corporation) that results in an unwind, 
regardless of whether the transaction takes place more or less 
than 24 months after the distribution, provided that― 
(1) There  is  no  agreement,  understanding,  arrangement, 
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or substantial negotiations (within the meaning of § 1.355– 
7(h)(1)) or discussions (within the meaning of § 1.355– 
7(h)(6)) concerning the transaction or a similar transaction 
(applying the principles of § 1.355–7(h)(12) and (13), relating 
to similar acquisitions), at any time during the 24-month 
period ending on the date of the distribution; and 
(2) No more than 20 percent of the interest in the other 
party, in vote or value, is owned by the same persons that own 
more than 20 percent of the stock of C. For purposes of this 
section, ownership is determined by application of the 
constructive  ownership  rules  of  §  318(a)  as  modified  by 
§    304(c)(3),    except    that    for    purposes    of    applying 
§ 318(a)(3)(A) and (B), the principles of § 304(c)(3)(B)(ii) 
(without regard to § 304(c)(3)(B)(ii)(I)) apply. 
The revenue procedure is effective with respect to distributions that occur on 
or after 8/1/16. However, taxpayers can apply the revenue procedure with 
respect to a distribution that occurs before that date. 
 
G. Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
H. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
VII. PARTNERSHIPS 
 
A. Formation and Taxable Years 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, 
and Outside Basis 
 
1. Figuring out partners’ shares of partnership debt gets 
complicateder and complicateder as the Treasury and IRS nail down the 
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coffin lid on Canal-type transactions. T.D. 9788, Liabilities Recognized as 
Recourse Partnership Liabilities Under Section 752, 81 F.R. 69282 (10/5/16), 
corrected, 81 F.R 80993 (11/17/16). The IRS and Treasury have published 
final and temporary regulations (proposed in REG-119305-11, Section 707 
Regarding Disguised Sales, Generally, 79 F.R. 4826 (1/30/14)) under §§ 707 
and 752, relating to disguised sales of property to or by a partnership under 
§ 707(a)(2)(B) and concerning the treatment of partnership liabilities under 
§ 752. 
Disguised Sales of Property—New Temp. Reg. § 1.707–5T(a)(2) 
provides, for purposes of the disguised sale rules, that the partners’ shares of 
any partnership liabilities, regardless of whether they are recourse or 
nonrecourse under Reg. § 1.752–1 through 1.752–3, must be allocated in the 
manner that “excess nonrecourse liabilities” are allocated under Reg. § 1.752– 
3(a)(3)—which has been amended in T.D. 9787, 81 F.R. 69291 (10/5/16). 
Reg. § 1.752–3(a)(3) has been amended to provide that, for purposes of 
determining a partner’s share of partnership liabilities in applying the 
disguised sale rules of § 707(a)(2)(B) and Reg. § 1.707–5(a)(2), regardless of 
whether they are recourse or nonrecourse, only the default rule for allocating 
partnership “excess nonrecourse liabilities”—in accordance with the partners’ 
interests in partnership profits—applies, “but such share shall not exceed the 
partner's share of the partnership liability under section 752 and applicable 
regulations (as limited in the application of § 1.752–3(a)(3) to this paragraph 
(a)(2)).” This means that for purposes of applying the § 707 disguised sale 
rules, the contributing partner’s share of partnership liabilities cannot be 
determined with reference to that partner’s economic risk of loss under Reg. 
§ 1.752–2, and that no portion of any partnership liability for which another 
partner bears the risk of loss can be allocated to the contributing partner under 
the profit-share method. The Treasury and IRS believe that for purposes of the 
disguised sale rules, this allocation method reflects the overall economic 
arrangement of the partners. According to the preamble, “[i]n most cases, a 
partnership will satisfy its liabilities with partnership profits, the partnership’s 
assets do not become worthless, and the payment obligations of partners or 
related persons are not called upon.” These rules are designed to be the death 
knell of leveraged partnership disguised sale transactions ala Canal Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 135 T.C. 199 (2010), to which reference is made in the 
preamble. 
Effective Date of New Rules for Disguised Sales—There are complex 
effective dates that provide for transition; the new rules are completely 
effective for transactions with respect to which all transfers occur on or after 
1/3/17. 
Recourse  versus  Nonrecourse  Debt—New  Temp.  Reg.  §  1.752– 
2T(b)(3) continues to provide that “[t]he determination of the extent to which 
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a partner or related person has an obligation to make a payment under [Reg. 
§ 1.752–2(b)(1)] is based on the facts and circumstances at the time of the 
determination,” and that “[a]ll statutory and contractual obligations relating to 
the partnership liability are taken into account.” However, the temporary 
regulation now carves out an exception under  which  “bottom  dollar” 
guarantees and indemnities (or their equivalent, termed “bottom dollar 
payments”) will not be recognized. Temp. Reg. § 1.752–2T(b)(3)(ii) and (iii). 
Temp. Reg. § 1.752–2T(b)(3)(ii)(C) provides: 
[t]he term “bottom dollar payment obligation”  includes 
(subject to certain exceptions): (1) any payment obligation 
other than one in which the partner or related person is or 
would be liable up to the full amount of such partner’s or 
related person’s payment obligation if, and to the extent that 
(A) any amount of the partnership liability is not otherwise 
satisfied in the case of an obligation that is a guarantee or 
other similar arrangement, or (B) any amount of the 
indemnitee’s or benefited party’s payment obligation is 
satisfied in the case of an obligation which is an indemnity or 
similar arrangement; and (2) an arrangement with respect to a 
partnership liability that uses tiered partnerships, 
intermediaries, senior and subordinate liabilities, or similar 
arrangements to convert what would otherwise be a single 
liability into multiple liabilities if, based on the facts and 
circumstances, the liabilities were incurred (A) pursuant to a 
common plan, as part of a single transaction or arrangement, 
or as part of a series of related transactions or arrangements, 
and (B) with a principal purpose of avoiding having at least 
one of such liabilities or payment obligations with respect to 
such liabilities being treated as a bottom dollar payment 
obligation. Any payment obligation under [Reg.] § 1.752–2, 
including an obligation to make a capital contribution and to 
restore a deficit capital account upon liquidation of the 
partnership as described in [Reg.] §1.704–1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3), 
may be a bottom dollar payment obligation if it meets the 
requirements set forth above. 
As long as a partner or related person is or would be liable for the full amount 
of a payment obligation, the obligation will be recognized under Temp. Reg. 
§ 1.752–2T(b)(3) if, taking into account any indemnity, reimbursement 
agreement, or similar arrangement, that partner or related person is liable for 
at least 90 percent of the initial payment obligation. Temp. Reg. § 1.752– 
2T(b)(3)(ii)(B). Also, a payment obligation is not a bottom dollar obligation 
merely  because  a  maximum  amount  is  placed  on  the  partner’s  or  related 
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person’s payment obligation, a partner’s or related  person’s  payment 
obligation is stated as a fixed percentage of every dollar of the partnership 
liability to which such obligation relates, or there is a right of proportionate 
contribution running between partners or related persons who are co-obligors 
with respect to a payment obligation for which each of them is jointly and 
severally liable. Temp. Reg. § 1.752–2T(b)(3)(ii)(C)(2). Guarantees of a 
vertical slice of a partnership liability will be recognized. 
Anti-Abuse Rules—Temp Reg. § 1.752–2T(j)(2) provides an anti- 
abuse rule that the IRS can apply to assure that if a partner actually bears the 
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability, partners may not agree among 
themselves to create a bottom dollar payment obligation so that the liability 
will be treated as nonrecourse. 
Disclosure requirement—Temp. Reg. §  1.752–2T(b)(3)(ii)(D) 
requires the partnership to disclose to the IRS all bottom dollar payment 
obligations with respect to a partnership liability on a completed Form 8275, 
Disclosure Statement, attached to the partnership return for the taxable year in 
which the bottom dollar payment obligation is undertaken or modified. 
Effective Date of New Rules on Recourse vs. Nonrecourse Debt— 
Subject to an exception for written binding contracts already in effect, the new 
rules generally apply to liabilities incurred or assumed by a partnership and 
payment obligations imposed or undertaken with respect to a partnership 
liability on or after 10/5/16. A partner whose allocable share of partnership 
liabilities exceeds the partner’s adjusted basis in its partnership interest on the 
date the temporary regulations are finalized can continue to apply the existing 
regulations under § 1.752–2 with respect to a partnership liability for a seven- 
year period to the extent that the partner’s allocable share of partnership 
liabilities exceeds the partner’s adjusted basis in its partnership interest on 
10/5/16. 
 
2. Proposed regulations address deficit restoration 
obligations and when partnership liabilities are treated as recourse 
liabilities. REG-122855-15, Liabilities Recognized as Recourse Partnership 
Liabilities Under Section 752, 81 F.R. 69301 (10/5/16). The Treasury 
Department and IRS have issued proposed regulations that partially withdraw 
proposed regulations issued in 2014 (REG-119305-11, Section 707 Regarding 
Disguised Sales, Generally, 79 F.R. 4826 (1/30/14)) and address when certain 
obligations to restore a deficit balance in a partner’s capital account are 
disregarded under § 704 and when partnership liabilities are treated as recourse 
liabilities under § 752. 
Current Regulations—Under Reg. § 1.752–2, a partnership liability is 
recourse to the extent that any partner or related person bears the economic 
risk of loss (EROL) for the liability. A partner or related person bears the 
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EROL to the extent the partner or related person would have a payment 
obligation if the partnership liquidated in a worst-case scenario in which all 
partnership liabilities are due and  all  partnership  assets  generally  are 
worthless. For purposes of determining the extent to which a partner or related 
person has an obligation to make a payment, an obligation to restore a deficit 
capital account upon liquidation of the partnership under the § 704(b) 
regulations is taken into account. Further, for this purpose, Reg.  §  1.752– 
2(b)(6) presumes that partners and related persons who have payment 
obligations actually perform those obligations, irrespective of their net worth, 
unless the facts and circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the 
obligation.  However,  this  presumption  is  subject  to  an  anti-abuse  rule  in 
§ 1.752–2(j) pursuant to which a payment obligation of a partner or related 
person may be disregarded or treated as an obligation of another person if facts 
and circumstances indicate that a principal purpose of the arrangement is to 
eliminate the partner’s EROL with respect to that obligation or create the 
appearance of the partner or related person bearing the EROL when the 
substance is otherwise. This presumption is also subject to a disregarded entity 
net value requirement under § 1.752–2(k) pursuant to which, for purposes of 
determining the extent to which a partner bears the EROL for a partnership 
liability, a payment obligation of a disregarded entity is taken into account 
only to the extent of the net value of the disregarded entity as of the allocation 
date. 
2014 Proposed Regulations Under § 752—The 2014 proposed 
amendments to Reg. § 1.752-2 provided that obligations to make a payment 
with respect to a partnership liability (excluding those imposed by state law) 
would not be recognized for purposes of §  752 unless  certain  recognition 
factors were present. These factors were intended to ensure that the terms of a 
payment obligation are not designed solely to obtain tax benefits. For example, 
one factor required a partner or related person to either  maintain  a 
commercially reasonable net worth during the term of the payment obligation 
or be subject to commercially reasonable restrictions on asset transfers for 
inadequate consideration. The 2014 proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.752–2 
also provided generally that a payment obligation would be recognized only 
to the extent of the net value of a partner or related person as of the allocation 
date. 
2016 Proposed Regulations Under § 752—In response to comments 
expressing concern about the “all or nothing” approach of the 2014 proposed 
regulations, the new proposed regulations move the list of recognition factors 
to an anti-abuse rule in § 1.752–2(j) (other than the recognition factors 
concerning bottom dollar guarantees and indemnities, which are addressed in 
concurrently issued temporary regulations under § 752). Under the anti-abuse 
rule, the factors are weighed to determine whether a payment obligation (other 
 
 
206 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 20:3 
 
than an obligation to restore a deficit capital account upon liquidation) should 
be respected. The list of factors in the anti-abuse rule is nonexclusive, and the 
weight to be given to any particular factor depends on the particular case. The 
2016 proposed regulations state that the presence or absence of any particular 
factor, in itself, is not necessarily indicative of whether or not a payment 
obligation is recognized under § 1.752–2(b). The 2016 proposed regulations 
also modify the recognition factors in various ways in response to comments 
on the 2014 proposed regulations. Finally, the 2016 proposed regulations 
remove § 1.752–2(k), which currently provides that a payment obligation of a 
disregarded entity is taken into account only to the extent of the net value of 
the disregarded entity as of the allocation date. Instead, the 2016 proposed 
regulations create a new presumption under the anti-abuse rule in § 1.752–2(j) 
under which evidence of a plan to circumvent or avoid an obligation is deemed 
to exist if the facts and circumstances indicate that there is not a reasonable 
expectation that the payment obligor will have the ability to make the required 
payments if the payment obligation becomes due and payable. A payment 
obligor includes disregarded entities (including grantor trusts). The 2016 
proposed regulations add an example to illustrate the application of the anti- 
abuse rule when the payment obligor is an underfunded entity. 
2016 Proposed Regulations Under § 704—Section 1.704– 
1(b)(2)(ii)(c)(2) of the regulations currently provides that a partner’s deficit 
restoration obligation is not respected if the facts and circumstances indicate a 
plan to circumvent or avoid the partner’s deficit restoration obligation. The 
2016 proposed regulations add a list of factors to Reg. § 1.704–1(b)(2)(ii)(c) 
that  are  similar  to  the  factors  in  the  proposed  anti-abuse  rule  under  Reg. 
§ 1.752–2(j). However, these factors are specific to deficit restoration 
obligations and are intended to indicate when a plan to circumvent or avoid an 
obligation exists. The weight to be given to any particular factor depends on 
the particular case and the presence or absence of any particular factor is not, 
in itself, necessarily indicative of whether or not the obligation is respected. 
The factors are: (1) the partner is not subject to commercially reasonable 
provisions for enforcement and collection of the obligation; (2) the partner is 
not required to provide (either at the time the obligation is made or 
periodically) commercially reasonable documentation regarding the partner’s 
financial condition to the partnership; (3) the obligation ends or could, by its 
terms, be terminated before the liquidation of the partner’s interest in the 
partnership or when the partner’s capital account as provided in § 1.704– 
1(b)(2)(iv) is negative; and (4) the terms of the obligation are not provided to 
all the partners in the partnership in a timely manner. 
Effective Date—The 2016 proposed amendments to the regulations 
will be effective upon the publication of final regulations in the Federal 
Register. This means that current Reg. § 1.752–2(k)—which provides that a 
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payment obligation of a disregarded entity is taken into account only to the 
extent of the net value of the disregarded entity as of the allocation date— 
continues to apply until the publication of final regulations. Otherwise, 
partnerships and partners may rely on the 2016 proposed amendments prior to 
the date they are published as final regulations. 
 
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the 
Partnership and Partners 
1. Tax planning goes awry in Old Virginny. SWF Real 
Estate LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-63 (4/2/15). SWF Real Estate 
LLC owned farm land in Virginia on which it granted a conservation easement 
to a qualified donee. In connection with the grant of the easement, which 
would earn approximately $3.5 million of State of Virginia conservation tax 
credits, SWF Real Estate entered into a transaction with Virginia Conservation 
Tax Credit Fund LLLP in which Virginia Conservation made a capital 
contribution to SWF Real Estate LLC (thereby converting it to a partnership 
from a disregarded entity) of $1,802,000 for a 1 percent interest and an 
allocation of $3,400,000 of State of Virginia conservation tax credits. The 
contribution was computed as 53 cents per $1 of Virginia tax credits allocated 
to Virginia Conservation. The 99 percent was allocated only $300,000 of 
Virginia tax credits. The parties entered into an indemnity agreement under 
which SWF Real Estate and the one partner other than Virginia Conservation 
(the previous partners of the partnership) were jointly and severally liable to 
indemnify Virginia Conservation if the Virginia tax credits were disallowed. 
The other partner of the partnership also had the option to purchase all, but not 
less than all, of Virginia Conservation’s membership interest in SWF on or 
any time after January 1, 2010 at a price to be agreed upon by the parties or, if 
not agreed upon, 1 percent of the net fair market value of SWF Real Estate’s 
assets at exercise. The IRS took the position that SWF Real  Estate  sold 
Virginia tax credits to Virginia Conservation in exchange for cash, thus 
engaging in a disguised sale under section 707 and  that  the  capital 
contributions to the partnership were ordinary income to SWF. The Tax Court 
(Judge Wells) upheld the IRS’s position because it found that the facts were 
“squarely in point” with Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. 
Commissioner, 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011), rev’g T.C. Memo. 2009–295, 
and that after applying the Golsen rule (Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 
757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.1971)), and that under the factors of 
Reg. § 1.707–3(b) the transfer of Virginia tax credits by SWF Real Estate to 
Virginia Conservation in exchange for money should be characterized as a 
disguised sale pursuant to  707(a)(2)(B). First, because the amount of Virginia 
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Conservation’s capital contribution to SWF Real Estate was based directly on 
the amount of Virginia tax credits to be transferred or allocated to Virginia 
Conservation, Virginia Conservation could precisely determine the number of 
Virginia tax credits it could expect to receive on the basis of the amount of 
money it contributed to SWF Real Estate. Reg. § 1.707–3(b)(2)(i). Second, 
Virginia Conservation had a legally enforceable right to the later transfer of 
Virginia tax credits; under the subscription agreement and  operating 
agreement, Virginia Conservation’s capital contribution would entitle it to 
specific dollar amount of Virginia tax credits in exchange, and if SWF Real 
Estate and the other partner failed to fulfill the terms of those agreements, 
Virginia  Conservation  could  have  pursued  breach  of  contract  claims.  Reg. 
§ 1.707–3(b)(2)(ii). Third, Virginia Conservation’s right to receive the credits 
was secured by the indemnity agreement. Reg. § 1.707–3(b)(2)(iii). Fourth, on 
the facts, SWF Real Estate held Virginia tax credits, beyond the reasonable 
needs of its business, that were expected to be available to make the transfer 
to Virginia Conservation. Reg. § 1.707–3(b)(2)(iv). Fifth, SWF Real Estate’s 
transfer of Virginia tax credits to Virginia  Conservation was 
disproportionately large in relationship to Virginia Conservation’s general and 
continuing interest in SWF Real Estate’s profit; Virginia Conservation held a 
1% interest in partnership profits and losses and net cash flow, but was 
ultimately allocated 92% of the Virginia tax credits available to SWF Real 
Estate. Reg. § 1.707–3(b)(2)(ix). Sixth (and lastly), after receiving the Virginia 
tax credits, Virginia Conservation was free to use or transfer the credits as it 
desired; it had no further obligations to SWF Real Estate with regard to the 
Virginia tax credits. Reg. § 1.707–3(b)(2)(x). The court went on to hold, after 
detailed analysis of the rights and obligations of the parties, that the sale 
occurred in 2005, the year that SWF Real Estate and Virginia Conservation 
entered into the agreement, not in 2006, the year in which the State of Virginia 
awarded the tax credits and in which SWF Real Estate distributed the credits 
to Virginia Conservation. As of December 31, 2005, Virginia Conservation 
“owned” the tax credits, and even though Virginia Conservation’s cash 
contribution was held by an escrow agent until 2006, under the “economic 
benefit” theory,  the income  had been realized in 2005 because SWF Real 
Estate’s right to the escrowed funds was vested on or before December 31, 
2005. 
• The opinion noted that the facts of this 
case were nearly identical to those in Route 231, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 2014–30 (2/24/14), which reached the same result. 
 
a. Things continue to go poorly in Ole Virginny 
for taxpayers trying to pull a fast one. Route 231, LLC v. Commissioner, 
810 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 1/8/16). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in 
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an  opinion  by  Judge  Agee,  affirmed  the  Tax  Court’s  decision  that  the 
§ 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rules applied to treat as a disguised sale a 
transaction involving a contribution of cash to a partnership by a new partner 
followed by an allocation and distribution to that partner of State of Virginia 
conservation tax credits earned by the partnership. The court rejected the 
taxpayer’s argument that the Tax Court improperly relied on Virginia Historic 
Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner, 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011), and 
applied the factors of Reg. § 1.707–3 to affirm the Tax Court’s conclusion that 
a disguised sale had occurred. “Viewing all the circumstances surrounding this 
transaction, and in particular the terms of the amended operating agreements, 
the Tax Court did not err in finding that ‘Route 231 would not have transferred 
$7,200,000 of Virginia tax credits to Virginia Conservation but for the fact 
that Virginia Conservation had transferred $3,816,000 to it’ and vice versa.” 
In reaching its holding, the court stated as follows: 
The bona fides of Virginia Conservation’s status as a member 
of Route 231, or that entity’s status as a valid limited liability 
company (and valid partnership for tax purposes) do not 
matter for this inquiry. In short, the analysis under § 707 goes 
to the bona fides of a particular transaction, not to the general 
status of the participants to that transaction. Contrary to Route 
231’s repeated assertions, I.R.C. § 707 applies by its plain 
terms to designated transactions between otherwise valid 
ongoing partnerships and their legitimate partners. 
 
2. Tweaking the disguised sale rules and helping nail 
down the coffin lid on Canal-type transactions. T.D. 9787, Section 707 
Regarding Disguised Sales, Generally, 81 F.R. 69291 (10/5/16). The Treasury 
and  IRS  have  promulgated  final  amendments  to  the  regulations  under 
§ 707(a)(2)(B), relating to disguised sales, and § 752, relating to the treatment 
of partnership liabilities, which were proposed in REG-119305-11, Section 
707 Regarding Disguised Sales, Generally, 79 F.R. 4826 (1/30/14). 
Disguised  Sales  Rules—The  amendments  to  the  regulations  under 
§ 707 provide a number of clarifications of the § 707 disguised sale rules. 
(1) An ordering rule is added in Reg. § 1.707–5 to provide that the treatment 
of a transfer should first be determined under the debt-financed distribution 
exception, and any amount not excluded from Reg. § 1.707–3 under the debt- 
financed distribution exception should be tested to see if such amount would 
be excluded from Reg. § 1.707–3 under a different exception in Reg. § 1.707– 
4. (2) The proposed regulations provided that the exception in Reg. § 1.707–4 
for preformation capital expenditures up to 20 percent of fair market value of 
the property and the exception to the limitation where the fair market value of 
the property does not exceed 120 percent of basis apply property-by-property. 
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The final regulations adopt this rule but permit aggregation to the extent: (i) the 
total fair market value of the aggregated property (of which no single 
property’s fair market value exceeds 1 percent of the total fair market value of 
such aggregated property) is not greater than the lesser of 10 percent of the 
total fair market value of all property, excluding money and marketable 
securities (as defined under § 731(c)), transferred by the partner to the 
partnership, or $1,000,000; (ii) the partner uses a reasonable aggregation 
method that is consistently applied; and (iii) the aggregation of property is not 
part of a plan a principal purpose of which is to avoid §§ 1.707–3 through 
1.707–5. (3) The amendments also provide a rule coordinating the exception 
for preformation capital expenditures and the rules regarding liabilities 
traceable to capital expenditures. For purposes of defining qualified liabilities 
under Reg. § 1.707–3, the term “capital expenditures” has the same meaning 
as the term “capital expenditures” generally does, except  that  it  includes 
capital expenditures taxpayers elect to deduct, and does not include deductible 
expenses taxpayers elect to treat as capital expenditures. The final regulations 
add that to the extent any qualified liability under Reg. § 1.707–5(a)(6) is used 
by a partner to fund capital expenditures and economic responsibility for that 
borrowing shifts to another partner, the exception for preformation capital 
expenditures does not apply. Under the final regulations, capital expenditures 
are treated as funded by the proceeds of a qualified liability to the extent the 
proceeds are either traceable to the capital expenditures under Reg. § 1.163– 
8T or are actually used to fund the capital expenditures, irrespective of the 
tracing requirements under Reg. § 1.163–8T. (4) The final regulations provide 
a “step-in-the-shoes” rule for applying the exception for preformation capital 
expenditures and for determining whether a liability is a qualified liability 
under § 1.707–5(a)(6) when a partner acquires property, assumes a liability, 
or takes property subject to a liability from another person in connection with 
a nonrecognition transaction under §§ 351, 381(a), 721, or 731. The final 
regulations supersede Rev. Rul. 2000-44, 2000–2 C.B. 336, which allowed 
‘‘step-in-the-shoes’’ treatment when a  corporation that acquires assets in a 
transaction described in section 381(a) succeeds to the status of the transferor 
corporation for purposes of applying the exception for preformation capital 
expenditures and determining whether a liability is a qualified liability under 
§ 1.707–5(a)(6). (5) The amendments to the regulations add to the list of 
qualified liabilities that, pursuant to Reg. § 1.707–5, may be assumed without 
triggering the disguised sale rules liabilities that were not incurred in 
anticipation of the transfer of the property to a partnership, but that were 
incurred in connection with a trade or business in which property transferred 
to the partnership was used or held, but only if all the assets related to that 
trade or business are transferred (other than assets that are not material to a 
continuation of the trade or business). (6) The amendments to the regulations 
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clarify the anticipated reduction rule in Reg. § 1.707–5(a)(3) by providing that 
a reduction that is subject to the entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations 
is not an anticipated reduction. (7) As amended, Reg. § 1.707–5(a)(5) does not 
take into account qualified liabilities as consideration in transfers of property 
treated as a sale when the total amount of all liabilities other than qualified 
liabilities that the partnership assumes or takes subject to is the lesser of 10 
percent of the total amount of all qualified liabilities the partnership assumes 
or takes subject to, or $1,000,000. (8) The final regulations add additional rules 
regarding tiered partnerships. 
Effective Date of Final Regulations Under § 707—The final 
regulations under § 707 apply to any transaction with respect to which all 
transfers occur on or after 10/5/16. 
Partner’s Share of Nonrecourse Liabilities—Reg. § 1.752–3(a)(3) has 
been amended to provide that, for purposes of determining a partner’s share of 
partnership liabilities in applying the disguised sale rules of § 707(a)(2)(B) 
and Reg. § 1.707–5(a)(2), regardless of whether they are recourse or 
nonrecourse, only the default rule for allocating partnership “excess 
nonrecourse liabilities”—in accordance with the partners’ interests in 
partnership profits—applies, unless another partner bears the economic risk of 
loss. This means that for purposes of applying the § 707 disguised sale rules, 
the contributing partner’s share of partnership liabilities cannot be determined 
with reference to that partner’s economic risk of loss under Reg. § 1.752–2. 
For purposes of applying § 704, all of the methods for allocating partnership 
“excess nonrecourse liabilities” continue to be allowed. 
Effective Date of Final Regulations Under § 752—Subject to an 
exception for written binding contracts already in effect, the final regulations 
under § 752 generally apply to liabilities that are incurred by a partnership, 
that a partnership takes property subject to, or that are assumed by a 
partnership on or after 10/5/16. 
 
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations 
and Mergers 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
E. Inside Basis Adjustments 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
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F. Partnership Audit Rules 
 
1. Bye  bye  TEFRA!  The  Bipartisan  Budget Act of 2015 
§ 1101, Pub. L. No. 114-74, signed by the President on 11/2/15, made 
sweeping  changes  to  the  partnership  audit  rules.  The  TEFRA  rules  (in 
§§ 6221-6231) and Electing Large Partnership rules (in §§ 6240-6242, 6245- 
6248, 6251-6252, and 6255) have been repealed and replaced in new §§ 6221- 
6223, 6225-6227, 6231-6235, and 6241, with an entity-level audit process that 
allows the IRS to assess and collect the taxes against the partnership unless the 
partnership properly elects out. The new rules will simplify the current 
complex procedures on determining who is authorized to settle on behalf of 
the partnership and also avoid the IRS’s need to send various notices to all of 
the partners. Under the new provisions the IRS may reduce the potential tax 
rate assessed against the partnership to take into account factors such as tax- 
exempt partners and potential favorable capital gains tax rates. The new rules 
should significantly simplify partnership audits. As a result, the audit rate of 
partnerships might increase. Although partnerships with 100 or fewer partners 
can elect out of the new rules, § 6221(b), such election is not available if there 
is another partnership as a partner. Implementation of the new rules is 
deferred; the new rules apply to partnership taxable years beginning after 
12/31/17. Partnership agreements should be amended to  take  into  account 
these changes. 
 
a. The early bird catches the worm (or is that 
eats the worm at the bottom of the tequila bottle?). T.D. 9780, Election into 
the Partnership Audit Regime Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, 81 
F.R. 51795 (8/5/16). The Treasury and IRS have promulgated Temp. Reg. 
§ 301.9100-22T dealing with the time, form, and manner for making  an 
election to have the new partnership audit regime, §§ 6221-6223, 6225-6227, 
6231-6235, and 6241, enacted in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, apply to 
returns filed for tax years beginning after 11/2/15 and before 1/1/18. Under 
Temp Reg. § 301.9100–22T(b) an election to have the new partnership audit 
regime apply must be made within 30 days of the date of the written notice 
from the IRS that the partnership return has been selected for examination. 
The election must be in writing, signed by the tax matters partner, and must 
include the name, taxpayer identification number, address, and telephone 
number of the individual who signs the statement, as well as the partnership’s 
name, taxpayer identification number, and tax year to which the statement 
applies. The statement must include representations that the partnership is not 
insolvent and does not reasonably anticipate becoming insolvent,  the 
partnership  is  not  currently  and  does  not  reasonably  anticipate  becoming 
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subject to a title 11 bankruptcy petition, and the partnership has sufficient 
assets, and reasonably anticipates having sufficient assets, to pay the potential 
imputed underpayment  that may be determined during the  partnership 
examination.  The  election  must  designate  the  partnership  representative 
(§ 6223). An election may not be revoked without the IRS’s consent. Temp. 
Reg. § 301.9100–22T(c) allows a partnership that has not been issued a notice 
of selection for examination to make an election with respect to a partnership 
return for the purpose of filing  an  administrative adjustment request under 
§ 6227 (as amended); this election may only be made after 12/31/17. The 
temporary regulation is effective on 8/5/16. 
 
2. Al Davis led the Raiders to three Super Bowl 
championships and was inducted into the Pro Football Hall of Fame, but 
was not able to persuade the Ninth Circuit that the IRS’s breach of its 
closing agreement rendered the assessment invalid or that the limitations 
period on assessment had expired. Davis v. United States, 811 F.3d 335 (9th 
Cir. 1/25/16). The taxpayer had the largest interest in the Oakland Raiders, a 
limited partnership subject to the TEFRA audit rules, and also was the 
president of A.D. Football, Inc., the limited partnership’s sole general partner 
and tax matters partner. For the years at issue, the partnership and the IRS 
entered into a closing agreement to settle Tax Court litigation. The closing 
agreement required the IRS to make computational adjustments to determine 
the settlement’s effect on each partner’s tax liability. Paragraph Q  of  the 
closing agreement provided that each partner would have at least 90 days to 
review and comment on the computational adjustments and at least 60 days to 
review and comment on revised computational adjustments before the IRS 
assessed the tax resulting from the adjustments. Stipulations reflecting the 
closing agreement and signed by the attorney for the petitioner (the partnership 
and its TMP) were filed in the Tax Court and the Tax Court approved and 
entered stipulated decisions on 6/6/06. The IRS subsequently issued 
computational adjustments and issued revised computational adjustments on 
8/27/07. Because the limitations period on assessment was about to expire, the 
IRS did not give the partners 60 days to review the revised computational 
adjustments and instead assessed tax against the taxpayer for three taxable 
years on 9/4/07. The IRS collected the assessed tax by applying refunds due 
to the taxpayer for earlier taxable years, and the taxpayer brought this refund 
action. The taxpayer argued that the IRS had breached the closing agreement 
and that the breach rendered the assessment of tax invalid. The District Court 
held in favor of the taxpayer. In an opinion by Judge Hurwitz, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed. The government conceded on appeal that it had breached the closing 
agreement. Nevertheless, the court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the 
language of § 7121(b)(2), which provides that closing agreements are “final 
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and conclusive,” dictates that the remedy for the IRS’s breach is invalidation 
of the assessment. The court reasoned that closing agreements are contracts, 
and that the remedy for the IRS’s breach of contract is damages, a remedy that 
the taxpayer had not sought: “The IRS’s failure to perform its contract with 
the Partnership cannot relieve Davis of his statutory obligation to pay taxes; 
nothing in the Closing Agreement provided that any taxes assessed on the 
partners pursuant to statute would be rendered invalid if the government failed 
to perform.” The court also held that the assessment was timely. The court 
rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the stipulated decisions entered by the 
Tax Court on 6/6/06 were each a “settlement agreement with the partner” 
within the meaning of § 6231(b)(1)(C) that triggered a one-year limitation 
period on assessment under § 6229(f). “[W]e conclude that the IRS does not 
‘enter into a settlement agreement with the partner’ when it enters into a 
settlement agreement with the TMP and the individual partner is bound merely 
by operation of the tax court’s decision to which the partner is a party. Here, 
the stipulations were not agreements with Davis individually. … Thus, the 
stipulations, like the Closing Agreement, were agreements only between the 
IRS and the Partnership.” The court concluded that, pursuant to § 6229(d), the 
limitations period on assessment expired one year and 90 days after the 
stipulated decisions were entered, and that this period expired on 9/4/07, the 
day on which the IRS assessed tax. 
 
3. A TEFRA partnership’s failure to challenge penalties 
does not preclude a partner from raising a reasonable cause, good faith 
defense to penalties in a partner-level proceeding. McNeill v. United States, 
836 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 9/6/16). The taxpayer invested in and was the tax 
matters partner of TEFRA partnerships used as vehicles for distressed debt tax 
shelters. In a partnership-level proceeding, the IRS issued a notice of final 
partnership administrative adjustment that imposed several million dollars in 
penalties and  interest. As  the  tax  matters  partner, the taxpayer  brought an 
action in federal district court, but that action was dismissed without prejudice 
and the taxpayer never sought to reinstate it. The IRS determined that the 
taxpayer’s share of the partnership’s liability was approximately $7.5 million, 
which he paid. The taxpayer filed a refund action in a federal district court and 
argued  that  he  had  a  reasonable  cause,  good  faith  defense,  pursuant  to 
§ 6664(c) (based on reliance on professional advice), to approximately $4.6 
million in penalties and related interest. The District Court held that the 
taxpayer was precluded from asserting defenses by § 6230(c)(4), which 
provides: 
For purposes of any claim or suit under this subsection, the 
treatment of partnership items on the partnership return, under 
the  settlement,  under  the  final  partnership  administrative 
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adjustment, or under the decision of the court (whichever is 
appropriate) shall be conclusive. In addition, the 
determination under the final partnership administrative 
adjustment or under the decision of the court (whichever is 
appropriate) concerning the applicability of any penalty ... 
which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item shall also 
be conclusive. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the 
partner shall be allowed to assert any partner level defenses 
that may apply or to challenge the amount of the 
computational  adjustment. 
(Emphasis added). In an opinion by Judge Gorsuch, the Tenth Circuit reversed. 
According to the Tenth Circuit, the third sentence of the relevant provision 
states that a partner “shall be allowed to assert any partner level defenses,” and 
this overrides the language in the preceding sentence stating that 
determinations concerning penalties at the partnership level are conclusive. 
The court noted that the government’s position on the availability of defenses 
in partner-level proceedings seems to have changed over time and is not well 
defined. For example, the court noted, in Klamath Strategic Investment Fund 
v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009), the government argued that the 
reasonable cause, good faith defense is a partner-level defense that can be 
asserted only in partner-level proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and 
remanded to the District Court. 
• Judge  Phillips  dissented.  He  reasoned 
that the third sentence in § 6230(c)(4) does not override the conclusive 
determination of penalties at the partnership level. According to Judge 
Phillips, the third sentence should be read “as ensuring that  partners  can 
always bring partner-level defenses subject to any conclusive determinations 
being applied in those partner-level proceedings.” 
 
G. Miscellaneous 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
VIII. TAX SHELTERS 
 
A. Tax Shelter Cases and Rulings 
 
1. A judge sees the STARS and grants partial summary 
judgment for the taxpayer; only the Shadow [and the First Circuit] knows 
what comes next. Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 977  F. 
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Supp. 2d 46 (D. Mass. 10/17/13). The STARS tax shelter in the form marketed 
to banks involved two basic components: a loan from Barclays Bank to the 
U.S. taxpayer, which generated interest deductions, and the U.S. taxpayer 
placing assets in a trust, which required payment of U.K. taxes and generated 
foreign tax credits. The transaction also featured a payment from Barclays to 
the U.S. taxpayer equal to approximately one-half of the U.K. taxes that the 
U.S. taxpayer paid. A key element in whether a STARS transaction has a 
reasonable prospect for profit, and thus might not run afoul of the economic 
substance doctrine, is whether the payment from Barclays effectively reduced 
the taxpayer’s payment of the U.K. taxes as a rebate. (We will not go into the 
details of the economic analysis.) Suffice it to say that the  government’s 
position was that “the Barclays payment was not ‘in substance’ a payment by 
Barclays at all, but rather it was ‘effectively’ a rebate of taxes originating from 
the U.K. tax authorities. The theory is that Barclays was only able to make the 
payment because of the tax credits it had received from the U.K.” The District 
Court (Judge O’Toole) found the government’s argument on this point 
“wholly unconvincing,” and held that the Barclays payment was not in any 
way a rebate to the taxpayer of U.K. taxes, citing Reg. § 1.901–2(f)(2), which 
provides: “Tax is considered paid by the taxpayer even if another party to a 
direct or indirect transaction with the taxpayer agrees, as a part of the 
transaction, to assume the taxpayer’s foreign tax liability.” Accordingly, he 
ruled that the Barclays payment to the taxpayer “should be accounted for as 
revenue to [the taxpayer] in assessing whether [the taxpayer] had a reasonable 
prospect of profit in the transaction.” He also rejected the government’s 
argument that the entire transaction was a “sham” “concocted to manufacture 
a bogus foreign tax credit,” because he found that argument to be foreclosed 
by his finding that “[i]f the Barclays payment is included in the calculation of 
pre-tax profitability, then there was a reasonable prospect of profit as to the 
trust transaction, giving it economic substance.” Finally, Judge O’Toole 
concluded that under First Circuit precedent, if a transaction had “objective 
economic substance,” the economic substance doctrine could not be applied 
to deny the tax benefits of the transaction on “subjective” grounds, although 
he acknowledged that the First Circuit might revisit the issue and  “would 
perhaps move a bit  away from a rigid ‘objective only’ test to one that is 
primarily objective but has room for consideration of subjective factors where 
necessary or appropriate.” 
a. The STARS are aligned for this taxpayer. The 
District Court grants summary judgment and upholds both the 
taxpayer’s interest deductions and foreign tax credits. Santander Holdings 
USA, Inc. v. United States, 116 A.F.T.R.2d 2015-6795 (D. Mass. 11/13/15). 
The court (Judge O’Toole) granted the taxpayer’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment 
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and held that the taxpayer properly claimed both the interest deductions and 
the foreign tax credits generated by the STARS transaction. In reaching this 
conclusion, the court rejected what it characterized as the government’s 
argument that the taxpayer’s payments of U.K. tax should be ignored under 
two substance over form doctrines, specifically the step transaction and 
conduit doctrines. 
• The  Courts  of  Appeals  for  the  Second 
Circuit and the Federal Circuit both have held with respect to the STARS 
transaction that the taxpayers properly claimed interest deductions on the loans 
from Barclays, but that the taxpayers were not entitled to foreign tax credits 
because that aspect of the transaction lacked economic substance. Bank of New 
York Mellon Corp. v. Commissioner, 801 F.3d. 104 (2d Cir. 9/9/15); Salem 
Financial, Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 5/14/15). The District 
Court’s decision in this case that the taxpayer properly claimed foreign tax 
credits generated by the STARS transaction conflicts with those decisions. 
 
b. But the First Circuit looks past  the  STARS 
and sees a lack of economic substance. Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. 
United States, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 12/16/16). In an opinion by Judge Lynch, 
the First Circuit reversed the District Court and held that the government was 
entitled to summary judgment in its favor as to the lack of economic substance 
of the STARS transaction. Judge Lynch’s opinion states that the court largely 
agreed “with the reasoning of the Federal Circuit opinion in Salem [Financial, 
Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 5/14/15)] rejecting the claims 
that the trust transaction had economic substance and substantially rely on its 
analysis.” The government did not contest the taxpayer’s claimed interest 
deductions on the loan from Barclays, and therefore the effect of the First 
Circuit’s decision is to deny the taxpayer’s foreign tax credits. The court 
remanded for a trial limited to the issue of penalties. 
 
2. The taxpayer came to regret his decision to organize 
his business as a C corporation, and a midco transaction failed to solve 
the problem. Tricarichi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-201 (10/14/15). 
The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a C corporation, West Side Cellular, 
Inc. After lengthy litigation regarding network access, West Side received a 
settlement of $65 million and was required both to terminate its business as a 
retail provider of cell phone service and to end all service to its customers. To 
reduce the impact of corporate-level tax, the taxpayer engaged in a midco 
transaction in which a Cayman Islands affiliate of Fortrend International LLC 
purchased the stock of West Side for approximately $11.2 million more than 
the corporation’s  net asset  value (the value of its assets  less its estimated 
federal tax liabilities) and then used a distressed debt strategy to generate a 
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bad debt deduction of $42.4 million to eliminate West Side’s tax liabilities. In 
the notice of deficiency issued to West Side, the IRS determined a deficiency 
of $15.2 million based on its disallowance of the corporation’s bad debt 
deduction and asserted an accuracy-related penalty of roughly $62,000 and a 
gross valuation misstatement penalty of $5.9 million. The Tax Court (Judge 
Lauber) held the taxpayer liable as a transferee for West Side’s federal tax 
liability, the accuracy-related penalty, and the gross valuation misstatement 
penalty. In order for a shareholder to have transferee  liability  for  a 
corporation’s tax liability, the court stated, two requirements must be satisfied: 
(1) the shareholder must be liable for the corporation’s debts under some 
provision of state law, and (2) the shareholder must be a “transferee” within 
the meaning of § 6901. With respect to the first requirement, the court held 
that the taxpayer  was liable as a transferee under Ohio law (the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act) for the corporation’s tax deficiency as well as the 
penalties: 
In sum, we find that petitioner had constructive knowledge of 
Fortrend’s tax-avoidance scheme; that the multiple steps of 
the Midco transaction must be collapsed; and that collapsing 
these steps yields a partial or complete liquidation of West 
Side from which petitioner received in exchange for his stock 
a $35.2 million liquidating distribution. Under [Ohio law], 
petitioner is thus a direct transferee of West  Side’s  assets 
under respondent’s “de facto liquidation” theory as well as 
under the “sham loan” theory discussed previously. 
With respect to the second requirement, the court disregarded the form of the 
transaction and concluded that the taxpayer was a transferee within the 
meaning of § 6901 because the taxpayer had in substance directly received 
West Side’s cash. Any appeal of the court’s decision will be directed to the 
Ninth Circuit. 
 
a. How about a little salt in that wound? The 
taxpayer also is liable for pre-notice interest of $13.9 million. Tricarichi v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-132 (7/18/16). In a supplemental opinion, 
the Tax Court (Judge Lauber) upheld the government’s calculation of pre- 
notice interest, i.e., interest that accrued on the corporation’s unpaid federal 
income tax liability from the date on which payment was due from the 
corporation in March 2004 to the date on which the IRS issued the notice of 
liability to the taxpayer in June 2012. The government asserted that the 
taxpayer’s liability for pre-notice interest must be determined under federal 
law and computed in accordance with the rules for interest on underpayments 
in § 6601. According to the government, the pre-notice interest amounted to 
$13.9 million. The taxpayer contended that his liability for pre-notice interest 
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must be determined under state law, and that under state law his liability for 
pre-notice interest was zero. The court reviewed prior decisions addressing 
liability for pre-notice interest, including Lowy v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 393 
(1960) and Estate of Stein, 37 T.C. 945 (1962), and concluded that courts have 
applied state law to determine liability for pre-notice interest only when the 
transferee has received an amount less than the transferor’s liability: 
In short, the courts have consulted State law to ascertain 
whether the Government may recover from the transferee, in 
the form of pre-judgment interest, an amount larger than the 
value of the assets the transferee received. Petitioner has cited, 
and our own research has discovered, no case in which a court 
has invoked State law governing pre-judgment interest as a 
basis for reducing the  Government's  recovery  to  an 
amount smaller  than the value of the assets the transferee 
received. That is what petitioner seeks to do here, and there is 
simply no precedent for it. 
Because the taxpayer received from the corporation assets in the amount of 
$35.2 million, more than the $35.1 million total of the transferor corporation’s 
liability for income tax, penalties, and pre-notice interest, the taxpayer’s 
liability for pre-notice  interest  was  properly determined under federal  law. 
Accordingly, the court held the taxpayer liable as a transferee for $13.9 million 
in pre-notice interest. 
 
3. The Sixth Circuit says that a  listed  transaction 
actually does deliver the desired tax benefits. But the court admonishes 
the government that it possibly could have won had it argued lack of 
economic substance or had promulgated prophylactic regulations. Wright 
v. Commissioner, 809 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1/7/16), rev’g T.C. Memo. 2011-292 
(12/22/11). The taxpayer entered into a series of mutually offsetting over-the- 
counter foreign currency options in euros and Danish krones—a euro put and 
a krone call, and a euro call and krone put. (Because the krone is closely tied 
to the euro, both calls should largely offset each other, as should both puts.) 
The taxpayer claimed a loss by marking to market under § 1256 the euro put 
option upon his assignment of the option to a charity, but took the position that 
the transfer of the offsetting over-the-counter option in the minor currency (the 
Danish krone) was not a § 1256 contract (because krone positions are not 
traded through regulated futures contracts) and thus not subject to the mark- 
to-market rules. The IRS disallowed the loss because the transaction is a listed 
transaction. Notice 2003-81, 2003-2 C.B. 1223, modified and supplemented, 
Notice 2007-71, 2007-2 CB 472. Relying on its prior decision in Summitt v. 
Commissioner, 134 T.C. 248 (2010), the Tax Court held that the taxpayer 
could not recognize the loss on the assignment of the euro put option because, 
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as argued by the IRS, the option was not a “foreign currency contract” under 
§ 1256. That reasoning, which also was the government’s argument in the 
Court of Appeals, was grounded on the theory that to be a § 1256 contract, a 
“contract must mandate at maturity either a physical delivery of a foreign 
currency or a cash settlement based on the value of the currency.” The Sixth 
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Rogers, reversed the Tax Court’s holding. 
Judge Rogers concluded that “[w]hile the Tax Court’s disallowance of the 
Wrights’ claimed tax loss makes sense as a matter of tax policy, the plain 
language of the statute clearly provides that a foreign currency option can be 
a ‘foreign currency contract.’ ... Section 1256 provides that a ‘foreign currency 
contract’ is a contract ‘the settlement of which depends’ upon the value of a 
foreign currency even if that contract does not mandate that any such 
settlement occur. I.R.C. § 1256(g)(2)(A)(i).” Judge Rogers finished his 
opinion with an insightful missive on statutory interpretation. 
We see no conceivable tax policy that supports this 
interpretation of the plain language of § 1256, and none has 
been suggested to us by the parties. To the contrary, this 
interpretation of § 1256 seems to allow the Wrights to 
engineer a desired tax loss by paying only a minimal cash 
outlay and by engaging in major-minor transactions that 
subject the Wrights to little actual economic risk. Although 
these transactions involve large sums of dollars, euros, and 
krones, these  transactions appear to have  subjected the 
Wrights to little actual economic risk because the four options 
in the major-minor transactions offset each other.  Further, 
when the premium payments are netted against each other, the 
transactions subjected the Wrights to a short-term capital loss 
of only $25,200. Accordingly, the Wrights were able to pay 
$50,200 out of pocket—based upon the Wrights’ short-term 
capital loss of $25,200 and payment of $25,000 to a tax 
attorney for a tax opinion—in order to reduce their taxes by 
at least the $603,093 deficiency upheld by the Tax Court. 
Moreover, the Wrights did not plausibly explain  how 
engaging in transactions involving transfers of offsetting 
foreign currency options that opened and closed over the 
course of  three days  could accomplish the Wrights’ stated 
goals of investment diversification and realization of a 
significant economic return. Accordingly, the Wrights appear 
to have engaged in the major-minor transactions primarily to 
generate the desired tax loss. 
Congress  may  have  wanted  to  create  a  different  result 
when  Congress  added  the  “settlement”  prong  to  §  1256. 
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Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 105, 98 
221 
 Stat. 494. Congress explained that prior to this amendment a 
contract “require[d] delivery of a [major] foreign currency” to 
 
 meet the “foreign currency definition.” H.R. Rep. No. 98-432,  
 pt. 2, at 1646 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 
1269.  The  House  report  indicates  that  Congress  amended 
 
 § 1256 to allow a contract that provides for a settlement in an  
 amount  determined  by  the  value  of  the  foreign  currency, 
rather  than  actual  delivery  of  the  currency,  to  meet  the 
 
 “delivery”  requirement  of  the  “foreign  currency  contract”  
 definition.  Id.  Congress  may  have  wanted  a  contract  that  
 provides  for  settlement  in  cash  to  fall  within  the  “foreign 
currency contract” definition only if that contract mandates 
 
 settlement at maturity. If Congress had wanted to expand the  
 definition  of  a  “foreign  currency  contract”  to  include  only  
such      contracts,      Congress      could      have      amended 
§ 1256(g)(2)(A)(i) to provide that a “foreign  currency 
contract” is a contract “which requires delivery of, or which 
requires a settlement which depends on the value of, a foreign 
currency.” But Congress did not amend § 1256 in this way. 
The fact that tax policy does not appear to support 
allowance of the Wrights’ claimed loss is not sufficient to 
reform the statutory language, for two reasons. First, the 
court’s attempt to reform § 1256 might unintentionally permit 
other tax-avoidance schemes. Second, Congress provided two 
escape hatches to guard against the type of adverse tax policy 
outcome at issue here. In particular, Congress allows the 
Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations to exclude 
any type of contract from the “foreign currency contract” 
definition if the inclusion of this type of contract would be 
“inconsistent”    with    the    purposes    of    §    1256.   I.R.C. 
§ 1256(g)(2)(B). The Secretary therefore could prevent future 
taxpayers from relying on § 1256 to mark to market foreign 
currency options by issuing a regulation that excludes foreign 
currency options from the definition of a “foreign currency 
contract.” Further, Congress also allows the Commissioner to 
prevent taxpayers from claiming tax losses based upon 
transactions involving offsetting foreign currency options by 
challenging specific transactions under  the  economic 
substance  doctrine,  as  lacking  in  economic  substance.  See 
I.R.C. § 7701(o) (providing that a transaction shall be treated 
as   having   economic   substance   only   if   “the   transaction 
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changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax 
effects) the taxpayer’s economic position” and “the taxpayer 
has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax 
effects) for entering into such transaction”). These statutorily 
provided bases for dealing with tax shelters that may violate 
the underlying policy of the Internal Revenue Code make it 
doubly inappropriate for this court to try to achieve such a 
result by torturing the plain language of the statute. 
 
B. Identified “tax avoidance transactions” 
 
1. Micro-captive  insurance  transactions  are 
“transactions of interest” that might be on their way to being listed. Notice 
2016-66, 2016-47 I.R.B. 745 (11/1/16) This notice identifies certain captive 
insurance arrangements, referred to as “micro-captive transactions,” as 
transactions of interest for purposes of Reg. § 1.6011–4(b)(6) and §§ 6111 and 
6112 of the Code. Generally, these arrangements involve a person who owns 
an insured business and that same person or a related person also owns an 
interest in the insurance company providing coverage. The insured business 
deducts the premiums paid to the insurance company, and the insurance 
company, by making the election under § 831(b) to be taxed only on taxable 
investment income, excludes the premiums from gross income. An insurance 
company making the § 831(b) election can receive up to $2.2 million in 
premiums annually (adjusted for inflation after 2015). The notice describes the 
coverage under these arrangements as having one or more of the following 
characteristics: 
(1) the coverage involves an implausible risk; (2) the coverage 
does not match a business need or risk of Insured; (3) the 
description of the scope of the coverage in the Contract is 
vague, ambiguous, or illusory; or (4) the coverage duplicates 
coverage provided to Insured by an unrelated, commercial 
insurance company, and the policy with the commercial 
insurer often has a far smaller premium. 
The Treasury Department and the IRS believe these transactions have a 
potential for tax avoidance or evasion but lack enough information to 
determine whether the transactions should be identified specifically as a tax 
avoidance transaction. Transactions that are the same as, or  substantially 
similar to, the transaction described in § 2.01 of the notice are identified as 
“transactions of interest” for purposes of Reg. § 1.6011–4(b)(6) and §§ 6111 
and 6112 effective 11/1/16. Persons entering into these transactions after that 
date must disclose the transaction as described in Reg. § 1.6011–4. 
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C. Disclosure and Settlement 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
D. Tax Shelter Penalties 
 
1. Jurisdiction is not arithmetic—you can’t divide $24.9 
million by 193. Diversified Group, Inc. v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 442 
(9/29/15). The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Sweeny), in a case of first 
impression, held that it lacked jurisdiction in a suit seeking a refund of a partial 
payment of a § 6707 penalty assessed for failure to register a tax shelter as 
required § 6111. The plaintiff argued that the penalty was divisible, that it was 
not necessary to pay the full amount of the penalty prior to bringing suit but, 
only to pay the penalty with respect to one of the 193 individual transactions 
involving the tax shelter. The court rejected this argument, holding that the 
$24.9 million penalty for failure to register the tax shelter related to a single 
act. 
Although it is true that the IRS calculated the amount of the 
penalty based upon each client’s aggregate investment in the 
tax shelter, neither the number of clients that participated in 
the tax shelter nor the number of commercial steps necessary 
to accomplish that participation in the tax shelter triggers 
liability under § 6707. Consequently, the penalty is not 
divisible for any reason, including the number of clients who 
participated in the tax shelter. 
Thus, the full payment rule for seeking a refund established by Flora v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958), had not been met because the penalty was not 
divisible and “‘[e]xceptions to the full payment rule have been recognized by 
the courts only where an assessment covers divisible taxes.’  Rocovich  v. 
United States, 933 F.2d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A tax or penalty is divisible 
when ‘it represents the aggregate of taxes due on multiple transactions.’” 
 
a. The Federal Circuit sees it the same way.  
Diversified Group, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 11/10/16). In 
an opinion by Chief Judge Prost, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit  affirmed  the  Claims  Court’s  decision.  The  plaintiff  argued  that  the 
$24.9 million § 6707 penalty was divisible because it was calculated based 
upon each client’s aggregate investment in the tax shelter. The plaintiff 
emphasized that a separate Form 8264 (the form by which a tax shelter is 
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registered) necessarily would be required for each client’s investment because 
it would be impossible to fill out a Form 8264 for the entire tax shelter on the 
first day it was offered for sale because, at that time, many of the details that 
the form requires are unknown. Accordingly, the plaintiff argued, each filing 
should  be  considered  a  separate  instance  of  tax  shelter  registration  under 
§ 6111. The court concluded, however, that § 6707 penalties are not divisible 
into the individual transactions or investors that may comprise a single tax 
shelter: 
Section 6707(a) provides that “if a person ... fails to register 
such tax shelter ... such person shall pay a penalty with respect 
to such registration.” This language makes clear that liability 
for a § 6707 penalty arises from the single act of failing to 
register the tax shelter (which, under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 
301.611–1T, A-1, A-47, is failing to file the necessary 
Form(s) 8264). This omission creates a single source of 
liability, regardless of how many individuals or transactions 
are involved in the tax shelter. Liability cannot be sub-divided 
beyond this. 
 
b. A District Court in New York reaches the 
same conclusion. Larson v. United States, 118 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-7004 
(S.D.N.Y 12/28/16). The IRS assessed more than $160 million in penalties 
against the taxpayer under § 6707 for failure to register two tax shelters as 
required by § 6111. The tax shelters involved were the Foreign Leveraged 
Investment Program (“FLIP”), also known as the Offshore  Portfolio 
Investment Strategy (“OPIS”), and the Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure 
(“BLIPS”). The penalties were later reduced to $67.6 million to reflect 
payments made by other persons who were jointly and severally liable. The 
taxpayer paid $1.4 million and brought this action seeking a refund of the $1.4 
million and abatement  of  all  assessed penalties.  The District  Court  (Judge 
Caproni), relying on the holdings in Diversified Group, Inc. v. United States, 
841 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 11/10/16) and Pfaff v. United States, 117 A.F.T.R.2d 
2016-981 (D. Colo. 3/10/16), held that the § 6707 penalties imposed on the 
taxpayer were not divisible. Because the taxpayer had not paid the full amount 
of the tax for which he sought a refund, as required by the full payment rule 
of Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958), the court granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that 
application of the full payment rule to his situation violated the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment. He argued that, taking into account  his 
inability to challenge the penalty in the Tax Court because of the absence of a 
notice of deficiency, application of the full payment rule violated his right to 
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due process because he could not pay the penalty and could not seek review 
of his claim without paying the penalty. The court similarly rejected the 
taxpayer’s claim for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
in which the taxpayer asserted that the IRS’s penalty assessment and denial of 
his refund claim were arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and his 
argument that the § 6707 penalty was an excessive fine that violates the Eighth 
Amendment. Finally, the court dismissed for failure to state a claim the 
taxpayer’s claim to compel the IRS to give him information relating to 
payments from others who are jointly and severally liable. 
 
2. Final regulations on the § 6708 penalty for failing to 
make available lists of advisees with respect to reportable transactions. 
T.D. 9764, Section 6708 Failure to Maintain List of Advisees With Respect to 
Reportable Transactions, 81 F.R. 25328 (4/28/16). The Treasury and IRS have 
finalized, with some changes, proposed regulations under § 6708 (REG- 
160873-04, American Jobs Creation Act Modifications to Section 6708, 
Failure To Maintain List of Advisees With Respect to Reportable 
Transactions,  78  F.R.  14939  (3/8/13)).  Section  6708  imposes  a  penalty  of 
$10,000 per day (absent reasonable cause) upon material advisors for failing 
to make available to the IRS, within twenty business days of a written request, 
a list required to be maintained by § 6112 with respect to  any reportable 
transaction  (as  defined  in  §  6707A(c)).  A  material  advisor,  as  defined  in 
§ 6111(b)(1), generally is any person who provides any material aid, assistance 
or advice with respect to carrying out any reportable transaction and who 
directly or indirectly derives gross income in excess of a specified threshold 
for doing so. The final regulations provide guidance on several issues, 
including the determination of the 20-business-day period, requests for 
extensions of the 20-business-day period for good cause, and the 
circumstances in which a failure to make a list available will be treated as due 
to reasonable cause, such as a taxpayer’s reliance on advice from an 
independent tax professional. The final regulations contain many examples 
illustrating the rules. The regulations apply to all requests for lists required to 
be maintained under § 6112 made on or after 4/28/16. 
 
IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING 
 
A. Exempt  Organizations 
 
1. Final   regulations   on   program-related   investments. 
T.D. 9762, Examples of Program-Related Investments,  81  F.R.  24014 
(4/25/16). The Treasury and IRS have finalized, with minor changes, proposed 
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amendments to regulations under § 4944 (REG-144267-11, Examples of 
Program-Related Investments, 77 F.R. 23429 (4/19/12)). Section 4944(a) 
imposes an excise tax on a private foundation that makes an investment that 
jeopardizes the carrying out of its exempt purposes. Section 4944(c) provides 
that investments that are program-related investments are not jeopardizing 
investments. Generally, under § 4944(c), a program-related investment is an 
investment: (1) the primary purpose of which is to accomplish one or more of 
the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B); and (2) no significant purpose of 
which is the production of income or the appreciation of property. The 
proposed regulations added nine new examples depicting a wider range of 
investments that qualify as program-related investments. The final regulations 
retain these nine examples with only minor modifications made in response to 
comments on the proposed regulations. The new examples demonstrate that a 
program-related investment may accomplish a variety of charitable purposes, 
such as advancing science, combating environmental deterioration, and 
promoting the arts. Several examples also show that an investment funding 
activities in one or more foreign countries, including investments to provide 
below-market loans to poor individuals in developing countries or that fund 
educational programs for poor individuals, may further the accomplishment of 
charitable purposes and qualify as a program-related investment. The 
amendments are effective on and after 4/25/16. 
 
2. From now on PACs disguised as tax-exempt social 
welfare organizations will have to rat themselves out within 60 days of 
organization. Will they really comply? T.D. 9775, Requirement To Notify 
the IRS of Intent To Operate as a Section 501(c)(4) Organization; Final and 
Temporary Regulations, 81 F.R. 45008 (7/12/16). The Treasury and IRS have 
promulgated Temp. Reg. § 1.506–1T relating to the requirement, added by the 
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, that organizations must 
notify the IRS of their intent to operate under § 501(c)(4). The regulations 
provide that  the notification must be submitted on Form 8976, “Notice of 
Intent to Operate Under Section 501(c)(4),” or its successor, no later than 60 
days after the date the organization is organized. The notification must include: 
(1) the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the organization; 
(2) the date on which, and the state or other jurisdiction under the laws of 
which, the organization was organized; and (3) a statement of the purpose of 
the organization. In addition, the temporary regulations provide that the 
notification must include such additional information as may be specified in 
published guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin or in other guidance, such 
as forms or instructions, issued with respect to the notification. The applicable 
user’s fee will be published in separate guidance. Filing of the Notice and 
acknowledgment   of   receipt   by   the   IRS   does   not   constitute   a   status 
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determination. (An organization must secure a determination of status by 
following procedures under § 506(f)). Section 6652(c)(4) penalties apply for 
failure to file the Notice. The regulations affect only § 501(c)(4) organizations 
that are organized after 12/18/15, and certain § 501(c)(4) organizations in 
existence on that date. The text of the temporary regulations serves as the text 
of the proposed regulations set forth in a related notice of proposed 
rulemaking, REG-101689-16, Requirement To Notify the IRS of Intent To 
Operate as a Section 501(c)(4) Organization, 81 F.R. 45088 (7/12/16). 
 
a. The devil is in the details. Rev. Proc. 2016-41, 
2016-30 I.R.B. 165 (7/8/16). This revenue procedure sets forth in detail the 
procedure  for  an  organization  to  notify  the  IRS  that  it  is  operating  as  a 
§ 504(c)(4) organization. 
 
B. Charitable Giving 
 
1. We really shouldn’t have charitable organizations 
collect taxpayer identification numbers of donors, says the IRS. The 
proposed regulations are withdrawn. IRS-2015-0049-37970, Substantiation 
Requirement for Certain Contributions; Withdrawal, 81 F.R. 882 (1/8/16). The 
Treasury Department and the IRS have withdrawn proposed regulations 
(REG-138344-13,  Substantiation  Requirement  for  Certain  Contributions,  80 
F.R. 55802 (9/17/16)) under § 170(f)(8) governing the substantiation of 
charitable contributions of $250 or more. Section 170(f)(8)(A) requires a 
taxpayer who claims a charitable contribution deduction for any contribution 
of $250 or more to obtain substantiation in the form of a contemporaneous 
written acknowledgment (CWA) from the donee organization. An exception 
in § 170(f)(8)(D) provides that a CWA is not required if the donee organization 
files a return (on such form and in accordance with such regulations as are 
prescribed) that includes the information required in a CWA. When final 
regulations on the CWA requirements were issued in 1997, the Treasury and 
IRS declined to issue regulations under § 170(f)(8)(D) to effectuate donee 
reporting and have since taken the position that the § 170(f)(8)(D) exception 
is not available without final regulations prescribing the method by which 
donee reporting may be accomplished. Nevertheless, some taxpayers under 
examination for their claimed charitable contribution deductions have argued 
that a failure to comply with the CWA requirements can be cured if the donee 
organization files an amended Form 990 that includes the required information 
for the contribution at issue. The proposed  regulations  established  a 
framework    under    which    a    donee    organization    could,    pursuant    to 
§ 170(f)(8)(D), file an information return and furnish a copy to the donor no 
later than February 28 of the year following the calendar year in which the 
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contribution was made. The information return required by the proposed 
regulations had to include the donor’s name, address, and taxpayer 
identification number. In response to comments on the proposed regulations 
and their own misgivings about potential identity theft arising from donee 
organizations collecting and maintaining taxpayer identification numbers, the 
Treasury and the IRS have withdrawn the proposed  regulations.  The 
withdrawal indicates that the Treasury and the IRS have “decided against 
implementing the statutory exception to the CWA requirement” and continue 
to take the position that the § 170(f)(8)(D) “exception remains unavailable 
unless and until final regulations are issued prescribing the method for donee 
reporting.” 
 
a. You say mandatory, I say discretionary. Let’s 
call the whole deduction off. 15 West 17th Street LLC v. Commissioner, 147 
T.C. No. 19 (12/22/16). The partnership claimed a $64,490,000 charitable 
contribution deduction for the contribution of a conservation easement. The 
opinion is silent regarding whether the taxpayer failed to secure from the donee 
organization and maintain in its files a “contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment”  as  required  by  §  170(f)(8)(A),  which  as  specified  in 
§ 170(f)(8)(B), among other things must state whether the donee provided the 
donor with any goods or services in exchange for the gift. But there is an 
inference from the context of the arguments that it did not do so. On audit, the 
IRS disallowed the charitable contribution deduction. After the case was 
docketed in the Tax Court, the donee organization submitted an amended Form 
990 that included the information specified in § 170(f)(8)(B). The partnership 
moved for partial summary judgment, contending that filing by the donee 
eliminated the need for the taxpayer to have received a “contemporaneous 
written acknowledgment” as required  by § 170(f)(8)(A) to  substantiate the 
gift. This argument was grounded on § 170(f)(8)(D), which waives the 
contemporaneous written receipt requirement “if the donee organization files 
a return, on such form and in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary 
may prescribe,” that includes the information specified in § 170(f)(8)(B). The 
IRS and Treasury have not issued any regulations under § 170(f)(8)(B), but 
the partnership argued the regulations under which the donee organizations’ 
Form 990 was filed satisfied the statutory requirement. In a reviewed opinion 
(8-3-6) by Judge Lauber, the Tax Court held that § 170(f)(8)(D) provides a 
discretionary, rather than mandatory, delegation of rule-making authority, and 
that § 170(f)(8)(D) is not self-executing in the absence of the regulations to 
which the statute refers. In the absence of such regulations, the requirements 
of § 170(f)(8)(A) applied and the motion for summary judgment was 
dismissed. The majority opinion stated that the partnership had not “cited, and 
our own research has discovered, no case in which a court has held to be self- 
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executing a Code provision containing a discretionary delegation that refers to 
regulations that the Secretary ‘may prescribe.’ Conversely, every judicial 
decision that has held a Code provision to be self-executing in the absence of 
regulations has involved a mandatory delegation that included the word 
‘shall.’” 
• Judge  Gustafson, in  a  dissent in  which 
Judges Colvin, Foley, Vasquez, Paris and Morrison joined, would have found 
the statutory requirement of § 170(f)(8)(D) to have been met by virtue of the 
information required by § 170(f)(8)(B) being included on the donee 
organization’s return under § 6033, the informational requirements for which 
are provided in Reg. § 1.6033–2. 
• Judge  Foley’s  dissent,  in  which  Judges 
Colvin, Vasquez, Gustafson, Paris and Morrison joined, would have held that 
§   170(f)(8)(D)   abrogates   the   requirement   that   the   donor   comply   with 
§ 170(f)(8)(A) as long as the donee files a return that contains the information 
described in § 170(f)(8)(B), which was done in this case. 
 
2. Pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered. Carroll v. 
Commissioner, 146 T.C. 196 (4/27/16). The taxpayers granted an otherwise 
qualifying conservation easement to a qualified donee. However, the 
conservation easement deed provided that if the conservation purpose was 
extinguished because of an unexpected change in circumstances surrounding 
the donated property, the donee organization would be entitled  to  a 
proportionate share of extinguishment proceeds at least equal to (1) the value 
of the easement at the time of the contribution over (2) the fair market value 
of the property at the time of the contribution and that the value of the easement 
on the effective date “shall be the deduction for federal income tax purposes 
allowable by reason of this grant, pursuant to Section 170(b) of the Code.” The 
IRS disallowed the deduction on the ground that the easement was not 
protected in perpetuity because Reg. § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(ii), which permits a 
“single—and exceedingly narrow—exception to the requirement that a 
conservation easement impose a perpetual use restriction,” requires that the 
grantee’s proportionate interest upon extinguishment of  a  conservation 
easement be a percentage determined by (1) the fair market value of the 
conservation easement on the date of the gift (numerator), over (2) the fair 
market value of the property as a whole on the date of the gift. The Tax Court 
(Judge Ruwe) upheld the IRS’s disallowance of the deduction. Reg. § 1.170A– 
14(g)(6)(ii) is “designed in case of extinguishment both (1) to prevent 
taxpayers from reaping a windfall if the property is destroyed or condemned 
and they get the proceeds from insurance or condemnation and (2) to assure 
that the donee organization can use its proportionate share of the proceeds to 
advance the cause of historic preservation elsewhere.” Because the formula in 
the conservation easement deed employed a formula that differed from the 
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formula in Reg. § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(ii), in the event of an extinguishment of 
the conservation easement, the grantee would not be guaranteed a 
proportionate share of extinguishment proceeds as required by Reg. § 1.170A– 
14(g)(6)(ii). In the event of extinguishment, if the deduction  for  the 
conservation easement was disallowed for a reason other than valuation (and 
the IRS had unsuccessfully raised a number of other grounds for disallowing 
the deduction), the taxpayers or their heirs could argue that they never received 
a tax deduction and, therefore, the donees would not be entitled to any 
extinguishment proceeds. Finally, the taxpayers could not circumvent the strict 
requirement of Reg. § 1.170A–14(g)(6) by showing that the probability of 
extinguishment is so remote as to be negligible under Reg. § 1.170A–14(g)(3). 
The court upheld a 20 percent accuracy-related penalty for substantial 
understatement of income under § 6662(a) and (b)(2) and held that the 
taxpayers  did  not  qualify  for  the  reasonable  cause,  good  faith  defense  of 
§ 6662(c)(1): they “offered no evidence which would explain why the terms 
of the conservation easement varied from the requirements of section 1.170A– 
14(g)(6), Income Tax Regs., nor do they clarify why Dr. Carroll[, who 
personally handled the conservation easement,] failed to seek competent 
advice from a tax attorney or other adviser to ensure the conservation 
easement’s compliance with pertinent regulations.” 
 
3. Certain syndicated  conservation  easement 
transactions entered into after 2009 are listed transactions and taxpayers 
who have invested in them must disclose them for each tax year in which 
they participated. Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544 (12/23/16). This notice 
identifies certain syndicated conservation easement transactions entered into 
after 2009 as listed transactions. In these transactions, a promoter typically 
markets interests in a pass-through entity that owns real property. The pass- 
through entity grants a conservation easement on the real property based on an 
appraisal that, in the IRS’s view, greatly inflates the value of the conservation 
easement based on unreasonable conclusions about the development potential 
of the real property. The charitable contribution deduction resulting from the 
grant of the conservation easement flows through to the investors in the pass- 
through entity. The effect of these transactions is that an investor in the pass- 
through entity receives a charitable contribution deduction that significantly 
exceeds the amount invested. The IRS plans to challenge these transactions 
based on the overvaluation of the conservation easement and also may 
challenge them based on the partnership anti-abuse rule, economic substance, 
or other rules or doctrines. Transactions that are the same as, or substantially 
similar to, the transactions described in § 2 of the notice are identified as 
“listed transactions” for purposes of Reg. § 1.6011–4(b)(2) and §§ 6111 and 
6112 effective 12/23/16. A person entering into these transactions on or after 
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1/1/10 must disclose the transactions as described in Reg. § 1.6011–4 for each 
taxable year in which the person participated in the transactions, provided that 
the period of limitations for assessment of tax has not expired on or before 
12/23/16. 
 
X. TAX PROCEDURE 
 
A. Interest, Penalties, and Prosecutions 
 
1. Updated instructions on how to rat yourself out. Rev. 
Proc. 2016-13, 2016-4 I.R.B. 290 (1/25/16). This revenue procedure updates 
Rev. Proc. 2015-16, 2015-7 I.R.B. 596, and identifies circumstances under 
which the disclosure on a taxpayer’s income tax return with respect to an item 
or a position is adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement of 
income tax under § 6662(d), relating to the substantial understatement aspect 
of the accuracy-related penalty, and for the purpose of avoiding the tax return 
preparer penalty under § 6694(a), relating to understatements due to 
unreasonable positions. There have been no substantive changes. The revenue 
procedure does not apply with respect to any other penalty provisions, 
including § 6662(b)(1) accuracy-related penalties. If this revenue procedure 
does not include an item, disclosure is adequate with respect to that item only 
if made on a properly completed Form 8275 or 8275–R, as appropriate, 
attached to the return for the year or to a qualified amended return. A 
corporation’s complete and accurate disclosure of a tax position on the 
appropriate year’s Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax Position Statement, is treated 
as if the corporation had filed a Form 8275 or Form 8275-R regarding the tax 
position. 
 
2. More taxpayer (or nontaxpayer?) choice of forum.  
Norman v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 277 (4/11/16). The Court of Federal 
Claims (Judge Merow) held that the court has jurisdiction to hear suits seeking 
a refund of FBAR penalties imposed under the Bank Secrecy Act. The court 
concluded that the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), extends to suits seeking the recovery of a penalty 
such as the one in this case. The court rejected the government’s argument that 
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving penalties is vested in the United 
States District Courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1355, which provides that “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of 
any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, 
or forfeiture … incurred under any Act of Congress.” Nevertheless, the court 
“acknowledge[d] … that substantial ground for difference of opinion on this 
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controlling question  of law exists, so  that an  interlocutory appeal … may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 
 
3. Schools can report amounts billed, rather than 
amounts paid, on Form 1098-T for calendar year 2016, but after 2016 
penalties will apply for reporting amounts billed. Announcement 2016-17, 
2016-20 I.R.B. 853 (4/27/16). Prior to 2016, § 6050S(b)(2) allowed eligible 
educational institutions to report either the aggregate amount  of payments 
received for qualified tuition and related expenses or the aggregate amount 
billed for such tuition and expenses. The 2015 PATH Act, § 212, amended 
§ 6050S(b)(2) and eliminated the option to report aggregate qualified tuition 
and related expenses billed effective for amounts paid after 12/31/15 for 
education furnished in academic periods beginning after that date. This 
announcement  states  that  the  IRS  will  not  impose  penalties  under  section 
§§ 6721 or 6722 for failure to file or furnish correct or timely information 
returns solely because an eligible educational institution reports the aggregate 
amount billed for qualified tuition and related expenses for the 2016 calendar 
year. Educational institutions therefore continue to have the option of 
reporting either the amount of payments received or the amount billed for the 
2016 calendar year without being subject to penalties. This penalty relief does 
not apply to any other failure subject to a penalty under §§ 6721 or 6722. 
 
4. What is the meaning of “same taxpayer” when 
corporations merge? Wells Fargo & Co v. United States, 827 F.3d 1026 (Fed. 
Cir. 6/29/16), rev’g in part and aff’g in part, 117 Fed. Cl. 30 (6/27/14). Section 
6621(d) allows “global netting” on interest rates for tax overpayments and tax 
underpayments by the “same taxpayer” to address the disparity between the 
higher interest rate imposed on tax underpayments and the lower interest rate 
applied when the government pays a refund on tax overpayments. On a motion 
for summary judgment, the Court of Federal Claims (Judge Firestone) held 
that the term “same taxpayer” includes both predecessors of the surviving 
corporation in a statutory merger. Section 6621(d) allows interest netting 
regardless of whether the overlapping overpayments and underpayments 
involve corporations that were separate prior to the merger; following  a 
merger, the entities become one and the same as a matter of law and thus 
become the “same” for purposes of interest netting. The Court  of  Federal 
Claims rejected the government’s argument that § 6621(d) netting applies only 
when the overpayment and underpayment were made by the taxpayer with the 
same TIN at the time of the payments. The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Stoll, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The 
Court of Appeals held that where before a merger of two corporations one had 
made an overpayment and the other had an underpayment, they do not meet 
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the “same taxpayer” requirement under § 6621(d), and interest netting is not 
allowed—because both the underpayment and overpayment occurred prior to 
the merger of the underpaying and overpaying entities, the payments were 
made by two separate corporations. But where before a merger the corporation 
acquired in the merger had an overpayment and after the merger the acquiring 
corporation  has  an  underpayment,  the  “same  taxpayer”  requirement  of 
§ 6621(d) has been met, and interest netting is allowed. 
 
5. If an NOL falls in the forest and no one is around to 
hear it, does it reduce interest on a deficiency? Interest accrues on a 
deficiency without reduction for a subsequent year’s NOL carried back 
to the deficiency year until the NOL comes into existence. United States v. 
Beane, 841 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 11/23/16). The taxpayer in this case owed 
interest on a deficiency in 1998 taxes, payment of which was due on 4/15/99. 
The taxpayer had a net operating loss in 2000 which was carried back to 1998. 
Among other issues, the question was whether interest on the 1998 deficiency 
should be calculated by using (1) the amount of the deficiency in 1998 taxes 
from 4/15/99 through 4/15/01, when the 2000 net operating loss became 
effective, or (2) the amount of the deficiency ultimately calculated by the Tax 
Court, which reflected a reduction by the 2000 net operating loss carryback 
starting as of 4/15/99? Stated differently, the issue was whether, for purposes 
of the interest calculation, the net operating loss carryback was effective as of 
4/15/99 or 4/15/01? In an opinion by Judge Hull, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
the net operating loss carryback was not effective until it came into existence 
in 2001. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Manning v. Seeley 
Tube & Box Co. of N.J., 338 U.S. 561 (1950) as well as § 6601(d)(1), which 
provides: 
If the amount of any tax imposed by subtitle A is reduced by 
reason of a carryback of a net operating loss or net capital loss, 
such reduction in tax shall not affect the computation of 
interest under this section for the period ending with the filing 
date for the taxable year in which the net operating loss or net 
capital loss arises. 
Accordingly, interest on the 1998 deficiency was calculated for the period 
prior to 4/15/01 without reduction to reflect the 2000 net operating loss 
carryback. 
 
6. A majority of the Tax Court refuses to call  a 
procedural foot-fault on the IRS, but not all the judges see it that way.  
Graev v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. No. 16 (11/30/16). The taxpayers had 
claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the donation of a facade 
conservation easement that ultimately was disallowed by the Tax Court (140 
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T.C. 377 (2013)). The  IRS examining agent determined that  the taxpayers 
were liable for the § 6662(h) 40 percent gross valuation misstatement penalty, 
and he prepared a penalty approval form for which he obtained written 
approval from his immediate supervisor. On that form only the § 6662(h) 
40 percent penalty was asserted. The agent prepared a notice of deficiency that 
included the 40 percent penalty. However, before the notice of deficiency was 
issued, a Chief Counsel attorney reviewed a draft and, through a memorandum 
approved by his supervisor, the attorney advised that an alternative § 6662(a) 
20 percent accuracy-related penalty should be added to the notice. The notice 
of deficiency was revised to include the 20 percent § 6662(a) accuracy-related 
penalty, the calculation of which in the notice of deficiency yielded a zero 
20 percent penalty to avoid stacking with the 40 percent penalty. The notice 
of deficiency was issued as revised, but the revised notice with the alternative 
20 percent penalty was not reviewed or approved by the examining agent’s 
supervisor. After the IRS conceded that the 40 percent gross valuation 
misstatement penalty did not apply, it asserted the alternative 20 percent 
accuracy-related penalty as a non-zero amount, sine the  stacking  issue  no 
longer existed. The taxpayers argued that, because the notice of deficiency 
showed a zero amount for the § 6662(a) 20 percent penalty, the IRS failed to 
comply with the requirements of § 6751(a), which requires that a computation 
of the penalty be included in the notice of deficiency, and § 6751(b), which 
requires that the “initial determination of ... [the] assessment” of the penalty 
be “personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor ... or such 
higher level official as the Secretary may designate,” and that these failures 
barred assessment of the 20 percent penalty. In a reviewed opinion by Judge 
Thornton, the Tax Court (9-3-5) held that: (1) the notice of deficiency 
complied with the requirements of § 6751(a); (2) because the penalty had not 
yet been assessed, the taxpayers’ argument that the IRS failed to comply with 
§ 6751(b)(1) was premature; and (3) the 20 percent accuracy-related penalty 
for a substantial understatement applied. With respect to the first holding, 
regarding compliance with § 6751(a), the court reasoned as follows: 
The notice of deficiency clearly informed petitioners of the 
determination of the 20% penalty (as an alternative) and 
clearly set out the computation (albeit reduced to zero, as it 
had to be then, to account for the greater 40% penalty). The 
notice of deficiency thus complied with section 6751(a). 
Moreover, even if petitioners were correct that the IRS failed 
to include a computation of a penalty as required by section 
6751(a), such a failure would not invalidate a notice of 
deficiency. In similar contexts this Court has held that 
procedural errors or omissions are not a basis to invalidate an 
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administrative act or proceeding unless there was prejudice to 
the complaining party. 
With respect to the third holding regarding application of the 20 percent 
accuracy-related penalty, the court rejected the taxpayers’ defenses and 
concluded that: (1) the taxpayers had not established that they had reasonable 
cause for claiming the charitable contribution deductions and acted in good 
faith; (2) “the authorities that support [the taxpayers’] deductions for the cash 
and conservation easement contributions are not substantial when weighed 
against the contrary authorities;” and (3) the taxpayers had no reasonable basis 
for their return position and had not adequately disclosed on their return the 
relevant facts concerning their deductions because they had not disclosed a 
side letter from the National Architectural Trust (NAT) (the easement holder) 
obligating the NAT to refund the taxpayers’ cash contribution and work to 
remove the easement if the IRS disallowed entirely their  charitable 
contribution deductions for the easement. 
• A  concurring  opinion  by  Judge  Nega 
(with whom Judges Goeke and Pugh joined) would have reached the same 
result as the majority on the ground that the taxpayers were not prejudiced, 
and would have left “to another case the more detailed statutory analysis 
performed by both the majority and the dissent.” 
• A dissent by Judge Gustafson (joined by 
Judges Colvin, Vasquez, Morrison and Buch) would not have sustained the 
penalty on the ground that the IRS failed to comply with § 6751(b)(1) because 
“the responsible revenue agent included a 20% accuracy-related penalty on the 
notice of deficiency without first obtaining the ‘approv[al] (in writing)’ of his 
‘immediate  supervisor’.” 
 
7. Return preparers need to be extra careful with not 
only the earned income tax credit, but also with the child tax credit, 
additional child tax credit, and the American Opportunity Tax Credit. 
T.D. 9799, Tax Return Preparer Due Diligence Penalty Under Section 
6695(g), 81 F.R. 87444 (12/5/16). The Treasury Department and the IRS have 
issued proposed and temporary regulations that amend Reg. § 1.6695–2 to 
implement changes made by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 
2015. These changes extend the § 6695(g) preparer due diligence requirements 
to returns or claims for refund including claims of the child tax credit (CTC), 
additional child tax credit (ACTC), and American  Opportunity Tax Credit 
(AOTC), in addition to the earned income credit (EIC). As a result of these 
changes, one return or claim for refund may contain claims for more than one 
credit subject to the due diligence requirements. Each failure to comply with 
the due diligence requirements set forth in the regulations results in a penalty, 
and therefore more than one penalty could apply to a single return or claim for 
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refund. Examples in the temporary  regulations  illustrate  how  multiple 
penalties could apply when one return or claim for refund is filed. Revisions 
to Form 8867 have been made for 2016 so that it is a single checklist to be 
used for all applicable credits. The temporary regulations are effective on 
12/5/16. 
 
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA 
 
1. Turnabout is fair play. Summonsed individuals might 
have the right to grill IRS agents regarding their motives in issuing the 
summons. United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361 (6/19/14), cert. denied, 
137 S.Ct. 625 (1/9/17). In the course of a partnership audit the IRS issued a 
summons to four individuals associated with the partnership whom the IRS 
believed had information and records relevant to the audit. The individuals 
refused to comply and the IRS sought enforcement of the summons. In the 
enforcement proceedings, the summonsed individuals asserted that the IRS 
had issued the summons for an improper purpose, namely to punish the 
partnership for refusing to extend the statute of limitations, and sought 
enforcement for an improper purpose, specifically, that the IRS decided to 
enforce the summonses, subsequent to the partnership filing suit in Tax Court, 
to “evad[e] the Tax Court[’s] limitations on discovery” and thus gain an unfair 
advantage in that litigation. In support of their request for an opportunity to 
question the IRS agents about their motives, the summonsed individuals 
submitted an affidavit from the attorney of another partnership associate, who 
had complied with a summons issued at the same time, which reported that 
only the IRS attorneys handling the Tax Court case, and not the original 
investigating agents, were present at the interview of his client. The District 
Court denied the request and ordered compliance, but the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed. 517 Fed. Appx. 689 (11th Cir. 4/18/13), finding that the District 
Court’s refusal to allow the summonsed individuals to examine IRS agents 
constituted an abuse of discretion. In support of that ruling, the  Court  of 
Appeals cited Fifth Circuit precedent holding that a simple “allegation of 
improper purpose,” even if lacking any “factual support,” entitles a taxpayer 
to “question IRS officials concerning the Service’s reasons for issuing the 
summons.” The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Kagan, 
vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case. After initially 
repeating that under United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 862 (1981), and its 
progeny “summons enforcement proceedings are to be ‘summary in nature,’” 
and “that courts may ask only whether the IRS issued a summons in good faith, 
and must eschew any broader role of ‘oversee[ing] the [IRS’s] determinations 
to  investigate,’”  and  “absent  contrary  evidence,  the  IRS  can  satisfy  that 
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standard by submitting a simple affidavit from the investigating agent,” the 
Court went on to hold as follows: 
As part of the adversarial process concerning a summons’s 
validity the taxpayer is entitled to examine an IRS agent when 
he can point to specific facts or circumstances plausibly 
raising an inference of bad faith. Naked allegations of 
improper purpose are not enough: The taxpayer must offer 
some credible evidence supporting his charge. But 
circumstantial evidence can suffice to meet that burden; after 
all, direct evidence of another person's bad faith, at this 
threshold stage, will rarely if ever be available. And although 
bare assertion or conjecture is not enough, neither is a fleshed 
out case demanded: The taxpayer need only make a showing 
of facts that give rise to a plausible inference of improper 
motive. That standard will ensure inquiry where the facts and 
circumstances make inquiry appropriate, without turning 
every summons dispute into a fishing expedition for official 
wrongdoing. And the rule is little different from the one that 
both the respondents and the Government have recommended 
to us. 
The Court went on to remind that (1) the appellate court review of the District 
Court's decision is for abuse of discretion, but that the “District Court’s 
decision is entitled to deference only if based on the correct legal standard,” 
and (2) the District Court’s latitude does not extend to legal issues about what 
counts as an illicit motive. Finally, the Court specifically declined to opine on 
whether either of the asserted improper motives for issuance of the summons 
actually were improper. 
• While the taxpayer got a partial victory in Clarke, 
perhaps the most important aspect of the decision is the reaffirmation of the 
breadth of the IRS’s summons power under Powell and its progeny. 
 
a. On remand, the  Eleventh  Circuit  concluded 
that the alleged motives of the IRS for issuing the summonses could be 
improper, but the individuals involved failed to show facts giving rise to 
a plausible inference of improper motive. United States v. Clarke, 816 F.3d 
1310 (11th Cir. 3/15/16). Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s remand to the 
Eleventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit remanded to the District Court, which 
denied the request of the summonsed individuals for an evidentiary hearing 
and enforced the summons on the grounds that (1) none of the improper 
purposes alleged by the individuals was an improper motive to issue a 
summons as a matter of law, and (2) the individuals had failed to show facts 
giving rise to a plausible inference of improper motive regarding issuance of 
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the summons. United States v. Clarke, 115 A.F.T.R.2d 2015-836 (S.D. Fla. 
2/18/15). In an opinion by Judge Dubina, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The 
Eleventh Circuit first addressed what constitutes an improper motive for 
issuing a summons as a matter of law and held that the District Court had erred 
in its analysis. According to the Eleventh Circuit, issuing a summons for the 
sole purpose of retaliating against a taxpayer or for the sole purpose of 
circumventing the limitations on Tax Court discovery would constitute 
improper motives for issuing a summons. Nevertheless, the court emphasized, 
“the circumstances under which a taxpayer could successfully allege improper 
circumvention of tax discovery are exceptionally narrow.” Next, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that the District Court’s refusal to hear additional evidence 
on remand was “appropriate in light of the summary nature of a summons 
enforcement proceeding” and did not amount to an abuse of  discretion. 
Finally, the court held that the District Court had correctly concluded that the 
submissions of the summonsed individuals raised no plausible inference of 
improper motive. 
 
2. In this case a not-for-profit corporation is treated the 
same as a for-profit corporation. Maimonides Medical Center v.  United 
States, 809 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 12/18/15). In an opinion by Judge Lynch, the 
Second Circuit held that the lower interest rate that under § 6621(a)(1) applies 
to a refund for an overpayment of taxes due to a corporation applies to not- 
for-profit corporations as well as to for-profit corporations. 
 
a. The Sixth Circuit agrees. United States v. 
Detroit Medical Center, 833 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 8/17/16). The IRS refunded 
FICA taxes paid by the plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation, for periods prior 
to 4/1/05 following the IRS’s ruling that medical residents were eligible for 
the student exemption from FICA taxes. The IRS paid interest on the employer 
portion of the FICA taxes at the statutory rate provided by § 6621(a)(1) for 
corporations (the federal short-term rate plus 2 percentage points, reduced to 
0.5 percentage points to the extent the overpayments exceed $10,000). The 
plaintiff asserted that, because it is a nonprofit corporation, it should not be 
treated as a corporation for this purpose. Instead, it asserted, it was entitled to 
interest at the higher statutory rate provided for non-corporate taxpayers (the 
federal short-term rate plus 3 percentage points). According to the plaintiff, it 
was entitled to additional interest of approximately $9.1 million. In an opinion 
by Judge Sutton, the Sixth Circuit held that nonprofit corporations are 
“corporations” for purposes of determining the rate of interest on 
overpayments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the District Court’s grant of 
the government’s motion for summary judgment. 
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b. Will the  Seventh Circuit  jump on the 
bandwagon? Medical College of Wisconsin Affiliate Hospitals, Inc. v. United 
States, 118 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-5798 (E.D. Wis. 9/14/16). In a case raising the 
same issue, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin (Judge Clevert) concluded that statutory interest rate for a nonprofit 
corporation is the statutory rate provided by § 6621(a)(1) for corporations. The 
court’s decision is appealable to the Seventh Circuit. 
3. The government can inspect a taxpayer’s books and 
records for a taxable year more than once as long as it does so in 
connection with audits of different taxable years. United States v. Titan 
International, Inc., 811 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2/1/16). The IRS audited the 
taxpayer’s 2009 federal income tax return and, in the course of that audit, 
summoned the taxpayer’s 2009 general ledger, its 2009 airplane flight logs, 
and other 2009 business travel documents. The taxpayer complied, the IRS 
reduced the taxpayer’s net operating loss for 2009 (an adjustment the taxpayer 
accepted), and the IRS closed the audit. The IRS subsequently audited the 
taxpayer’s 2010 return and, in the course of that audit, summoned the same 
2009 records it had previously examined in the 2009 audit. The IRS required 
these documents in connection with its examination of the net operating loss 
carryforward the taxpayer had claimed for 2010. The taxpayer refused  to 
comply and relied on § 7605(b), which provides that “only one inspection of 
a taxpayer’s books of account shall be made for each taxable year … unless 
the [Treasury] Secretary, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing 
that an additional inspection is necessary.” In an opinion by Judge Sykes, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the taxpayer’s reading of the statute, under which the 
IRS can inspect only once the taxpayer’s books of account created for a 
particular taxable year. The more natural reading, the court stated, is that the 
statute “limits the IRS to one inspection of a taxpayer’s books per audit of a 
given year’s tax return … .” Where, as here, the IRS is auditing different 
taxable years, it can inspect the same books and records in connection with 
each audit without the finding of necessity and issuance of a written notice 
required by § 7605(b). In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed two 
cases. The first is Reineman v. United States, 301 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1962), in 
which the court held the IRS could not inspect 1954 records a second time in 
connection with an audit of 1955 because the 1954 records were wholly 
irrelevant to the 1955 audit. The second is Digby v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 
441 (1994), in which the court held that the IRS could inspect a second time 
records relating to the taxpayers’ basis in S corporation stock when it did so in 
connection with separate audits of 1987 and 1988. In Digby, the court upheld 
the IRS’s disallowance of losses passed through in both 1987 and 1988, even 
though  the  IRS  previously  had  made  no  adjustment  to  the  1987  losses in 
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connection with its audit of 1987. After reviewing Reineman and Digby, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that “[t]his case is more like Digby than Reineman. 
… [T]he net operating loss carryforward on the 2010 tax return cannot be 
verified unless the IRS inspects the 2009 records.” Accordingly, the  court 
upheld the District Court’s order requiring the taxpayer to produce the records. 
 
4. The First Circuit declines to create a split in the 
Circuits and holds that, pursuant to the required records exception to the 
Fifth Amendment  privilege  against self-incrimination,  a taxpayer  must 
produce records required by the Bank Secrecy Act. United States v. Chen, 
815 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2/29/16). In the course of investigating the 2008 tax 
liability of Mr. Chen and his wife, the IRS served a summons that required 
him to appear for an interview with an IRS agent and to produce financial and 
banking records. Mr. Chen appeared but invoked his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and failed to provide the requested 
documents. The government filed a petition in the federal district court to 
enforce the summons. The District Court granted the government’s petition as 
to documents the taxpayer was required to keep under the Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA) and, after reviewing in camera other documents not required by the 
BSA, issued an order directing Mr. Chen to produce those documents as well. 
In an opinion by Judge Lynch for a panel that included retired U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice David Souter sitting by designation, the First Circuit affirmed as 
to documents Mr. Chen was required to keep under the BSA but vacated and 
remanded for further explanation as to the other documents the District Court 
ordered Mr. Chen to produce. The First Circuit held that the required records 
doctrine, which is an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination, applies to the recordkeeping scheme of the BSA. Specifically, 
the court held that the three-part test established by Shapiro v. United States, 
335 U.S. 1 (1948) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) for 
determining  whether  the  required  records  doctrine  applies  was  satisfied: 
(1) the government’s inquiry must be essentially regulatory, (2) the 
information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records that are 
of a kind the regulated party has customarily kept, and (3) the records must 
have assumed public aspects that render them at least analogous to public 
documents. The court acknowledged that the government was not engaging in 
impermissible targeting of activity that is criminal or almost always criminal 
because “Chen’s keeping an offshore bank account is not inherently criminal.” 
However, with respect to the District Court’s order, issued without explanation 
following its in camera review, that Mr. Chen produce personal and corporate 
domestic financial records not required to be kept by the BSA, the First Circuit 
vacated and remanded to the District Court for an explanation of its ruling. 
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• The First Circuit’s holding that the 
required records doctrine applies to records required by the BSA is consistent 
with the holding of every other federal court of appeals that has considered the 
issue. See United States v. Chabot, 793 F.3d 338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 559 (2015); In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012, 741 
F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 12/19/13); United States v. Under Seal, 737 F.3d 330 (4th 
Cir. 2013); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10, 707 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 129 (2013); In re: Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d 428 
(5th Cir. 2012); In re: Special February 2011-1 Grand Jury Subpoena Dated 
September 12, 2011, 691 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2338 (2013); M.H. v. United States, 648 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 
(2012). 
 
5. An individual successfully invokes his  Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a summons 
enforcement proceeding related to captive insurance. United States v. 
LaMotte, 117 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-1725 (D. Mass.  5/10/16). In this summons 
enforcement proceeding, the District Court (Judge Mastroianni) adopted 
Magistrate Judge Robertson’s report and recommendation (reported at 117 
A.F.T.R.2d 2016-1718 (4/19/16)) that Timothy LaMotte had properly invoked 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to 103 
questions posed by an IRS Revenue Agent pursuant to a summons seeking his 
testimony. The IRS had issued the summons in connection  with  its 
investigation of the tax liability of a corporation for which LaMotte served as 
Treasurer and two captive insurance subsidiaries for which he served as 
director. According to the Magistrate’s report and recommendation, “[t]he IRS 
consider[ed] [the corporation] to have been a participant in an ‘abusive captive 
insurance program[,]’” was investigating the tax liabilities of the captive 
insurance subsidiaries as well as the insured corporation, and was conducting 
a promoter investigation of the manager of the captives under § 6700, which 
establishes penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters. Although the First 
Circuit had not expressly adopted it, the court used the two-step approach set 
forth in United States v. Sharp, 920 F.2d 1167 (4th Cir. 1990). In the first step, 
the court found that the information sought by the IRS—all of which related 
to the corporation’s participation in the captive insurance transactions that the 
government had informed the court it considered abusive—was incriminating 
on its face. In the second step, the court determined that there was a sufficient 
possibility of criminal prosecution to trigger the need for constitutional 
protection. Accordingly, the court dismissed the government’s petition for 
enforcement of the summons. 
 
6. Who will be looking at the information your client 
provided  in  response  to  a  summons  and  asking  your  client  questions 
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during the summons interview? It might not be an IRS employee. T.D. 
9778, Participation of a Person Described in Section 6103(n) in a Summons 
Interview Under Section 7602(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 81 F.R. 
45409 (7/14/16). The Treasury Department and the IRS have finalized, with 
only one minor change, proposed and temporary regulations under § 6103(n) 
(T.D. 9669, Participation of a Person Described in Section 6103(n) in a 
Summons Interview Under Section 7602(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
79 F.R. 34625 (6/18/14)). Section 6103(n) and Reg. § 301.6103(n)–1(a) permit 
the disclosure of returns and return information to any person for purposes of 
tax administration to the extent necessary in connection with the acquisition 
of property or certain services (such as processing, storage and reproduction) 
related to returns or return information. The final regulations clarify that such 
persons with whom the IRS or Chief Counsel contracts for services 
may receive and review books, papers, records, or other data 
produced in compliance with [a] summons [issued by the IRS] 
and, in the presence and under the guidance of an IRS officer 
or employee, participate fully in the interview of the witness 
summoned by the IRS to provide testimony under oath. 
The final regulations state that full participation in an  interview  includes 
“being present during summons interviews; questioning the person providing 
testimony under oath; and asking a summoned person’s  representative  to 
clarify an objection or assertion of privilege.” The final regulations apply to 
summons interviews conducted on or after 7/14/16, and the temporary 
regulations, which set forth the same rule, apply to summons interviews 
conducted on or after 6/18/14. 
• Following the issuance of proposed and 
temporary regulations in 2014, the Tax Section of the State Bar of Texas 
submitted comments on the proposed regulations in which the Tax Section 
recommended that Treasury remove the provision that permits persons 
providing services to question a witness under oath or ask the witness’s 
representative to clarify an objection or assertion of privilege. Removing this 
provision, the Tax Section stated, would “result in a more orderly proceeding 
and a cleaner, more comprehensible transcript of the interview”  and  also 
“avoid the unsettled question of whether a private contractor has the legal 
authority to examine a witness.” 2014 TNT 180-24 (9/16/14). The preamble 
to the final regulations responds that § 7602(a) grants the IRS broad 
information gathering authority and that “[n]othing in section 7602(a) 
prohibits participation by a contractor in a summons interview, nor does it 
prescribe procedures that the IRS must follow during the summons interview.” 
 
 
2017] Developments in Federal Income Taxation: 2016 243 
 
C. Litigation Costs 
 
1. Calculating attorney’s fees where there are no 
attorney’s fees charged. Rev. Proc. 2016-17, 2016-11 I.R.B. 436 (2/29/16). 
This revenue procedure provides guidance regarding the recovery of 
administrative and litigation costs by individuals and organizations that 
provide pro bono representation to taxpayers. The hourly rate used to calculate 
an attorney fee award for pro bono representatives who charge hourly rates in 
their ordinary course of business will generally be limited to the lesser of the 
statutory hourly rate set forth in § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) or their hourly billing rate, 
unless    they    can    establish    that    a    special    factor,    as    described    in 
§ 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii), applies. The rate for individuals who provide pro bono 
representation but do not charge an hourly rate for representing taxpayers in 
the   ordinary   course   of   business   is   the   statutory   hourly   rate   under 
§ 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii). The rate for students authorized to practice before the IRS 
pursuant to Circular No. 230 or to practice before the United States Tax Court 
under the supervision of a practitioner through the United States Tax Court’s 
Clinical, Student Practice and Calendar Call Program, and by paralegals or 
other persons qualified to perform paralegal work who are assisting pro bono 
representatives is thirty-five percent of the statutory hourly rate provided for 
representatives under § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii). The revenue procedure is effective 
for all motions for costs under § 7430 filed on or after 2/29/16, but taxpayers 
can elect to follow it for motions for costs filed prior to 2/29/16 and pending 
before the court on that date. 
 
2. The § 7430 regulations catch up to 1997 and 1998 
amendments to the Code. T.D. 9756, Regulations Under IRC Section 7430 
Relating to Awards of Administrative Costs and Attorneys’ Fees, 81 FR 10479 
(3/1/16). The Treasury Department and IRS have promulgated amendments to 
the regulations under § 7430 relating to awards of administrative costs and 
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in an administrative or court proceeding. 
The amendments to the regulations reflect the 1997 and 1998 amendments to 
§ 7430 enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the IRS 
Restructuring  and  Reform  Act  of  1998.  Notable  provisions  include  Reg. 
§ 301.7430–5, which provides exclusive rules for determining whether the 
taxpayer was the prevailing party in an administrative proceeding, and Reg. 
§ 301.7430–5(g)(1), which provides that the net worth of married taxpayers 
filing jointly generally is determined jointly, but is determined separately if 
they “incur separate administrative or litigation costs, by retaining separate 
representation, and/or seeking individual administrative review or petitioning 
the court individually.” The regulations generally apply for costs incurred and 
services performed in which a petition was filed on or after 3/1/16, except that 
 
 
244 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 20:3 
 
the rules in Reg. § 301.7430–7 regarding qualified offers generally apply to 
qualified offers made in administrative court proceedings described in § 7430 
after 12/24/03. 
 
3. Which year is behind the valuation door?  Alterman 
Trust v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 226 (5/2/16). The taxpayer was a trust that 
had substantially prevailed on the merits in a prior proceeding (T.C. Memo. 
2015-231) in which the court held that the trust was not liable as a transferee 
for a corporation’s 2003 income tax liability. In this  proceeding,  the  trust 
sought reasonable administrative and litigation costs as a  prevailing  party 
under § 7430. The Tax Court (Judge Buch) held that the trust was precluded 
from being considered a prevailing party by § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), which 
provides that a person can be a prevailing party only if they meet the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Section 2412(d)(2)(B) requires 
that an individual have a net worth that does not exceed $2 million at the time 
the civil action is filed. The trust argued that its net worth should be determined 
as of the date it filed the Tax Court petition or on one of two alternative dates, 
on all of which it met the $2 million net worth requirement. The court rejected 
these arguments based on § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i)(II), which provides that, in the 
case of a trust, the net worth requirement “shall be determined as of the last 
day of the taxable year involved in the proceeding.” In a transferee liability 
proceeding, the court concluded, the taxable year involved in the proceeding 
is the taxable year stated in the notice of liability as the year to which the 
liability relates, the year 2003, and on the last day of 2003 the trust did not 
meet the net worth requirement. 
 
4. Attorneys, don’t count on asserting a claim for 
administrative costs under § 7430 to recover fees not paid by the client. 
Only a party to the underlying proceeding can be a “prevailing party” 
entitled to administrative costs. Greenberg v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. No. 
13 (11/9/16). The petitioner, an attorney, was owed fees for representing a 
client before the IRS. His client agreed that the attorney would receive any 
administrative fees awarded under § 7430. The petitioner first submitted to the 
IRS a letter requesting administrative costs on behalf of his client, but later 
submitted another letter requesting the award on his own behalf. After a 
conference with IRS Appeals, the IRS denied the request. In the Tax Court, 
the attorney originally argued that the client had assigned to him the right to 
pursue the award and that he therefore had the right to seek attorney’s fees on 
his own behalf. He later conceded that the Anti-Assignment Act bars the 
assignment of a legal suit against the U.S. government and argued instead that 
he was pursuing the claim as it related to his own rights and not on behalf of 
his former client. The Tax Court (Judge Pugh) held that it lacked jurisdiction 
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to review the IRS’s denial of the application for administrative costs. The court 
reviewed the statutory language and legislative history of § 7430 as well as 
judicial precedent interpreting it and concluded that, to be a “prevailing party” 
within the meaning of § 7430, a person must be a party to the underlying 
administrative proceeding. The attorney in this case was not a party to the 
underlying administrative proceeding and therefore was not the proper party 
to file a Tax Court petition. Accordingly, the court granted the government’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
D. Statutory Notice of Deficiency 
2016. 
There were no significant developments regarding this topic during 
E. Statute of Limitations 
1. Don’t expect a case explaining mitigation of the statute 
of limitations to be brief. Costello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-33 
(3/1/16). The taxpayers, a brother and sister, were the beneficiaries of a trust 
that received distributions from IRAs upon the death of the trust’s creator, the 
taxpayers’ father. The sister and another brother were the trustees of the trust 
after their father’s death. The trust reported the receipts as gross income and 
claimed an offsetting deduction for distributions of the amounts received on 
its 2001 return. The taxpayers reported the distribution from the trust as gross 
come on their 2001 return. Following an audit of the trust’s 2001 income tax 
return, the IRS determined that the distributions were taxable at the trust level, 
disallowed the related income distribution deduction, and determined a 
deficiency. The trustees agreed to the deficiency and as a result of these 
adjustments the beneficiaries received tax abatements. In January 2005, the 
taxpayers received refunds with respect to their personal returns and paid the 
trust’s deficiency out of their refunds. In November 2006, the sister, in her 
capacity as trustee, filed an amended Form 1041 on behalf of the trust claiming 
a refund, which was allowed by the IRS on August 8, 2008. The IRS sent each 
of the taxpayers deficiency notices, dated September 2, 2008, with respect to 
their 2001 tax year, adjusting their gross incomes to once again include the 
trust distributions. On August 11, 2009, the IRS issued a refund check to the 
trust. The taxpayer, as a trustee, endorsed and deposited the check on 
November 12, 2009. Because the IRS did not issue the 2001 notices of 
deficiency, dated September 2, 2008, within the period of limitations, which 
expired on April 15, 2005, an assessment for 2001 was barred unless the 
mitigation provisions of §§ 1311 through 1314 allowed the IRS’s adjustments 
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for the taxpayers’ 2001 tax returns in 2008. The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held 
that the mitigation provisions did apply and upheld the deficiency. The 
argument focused on whether certain conditions found in § 1311(b) applied to 
the facts. 
SEC. 1311(b). Conditions Necessary for Adjustment.— 
(1) Maintenance of an inconsistent position.— *** [A]n 
adjustment shall be made under this part only if— 
*** 
(B) in case the amount of the adjustment would be 
assessed and collected in the same manner as a 
deficiency under section 1314, there is adopted in the 
determination a position maintained by the  taxpayer 
with respect to whom the determination is made, 
and the position *** maintained by the taxpayer in the case 
described in subparagraph (B) is inconsistent with the 
erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, 
disallowance, recognition, or nonrecognition, as the case 
may be. 
*** 
(3) Existence of relationship.—In case the amount of the 
adjustment would be assessed and collected in the same 
manner as a deficiency *** , the adjustment shall not be 
made with respect to a related taxpayer unless he stands in 
such relationship to the taxpayer at the time the latter first 
maintains the inconsistent position in a *** claim for 
refund *** for the taxable year with respect to which the 
determination is made *** . 
The taxpayers argued that they filed the amended 2001 trust return merely to 
correct an error caused by the IRS examination and that the mitigation 
provisions “require them, as taxpayers, to have actively asserted a position 
inconsistent with the determination,” and that “they  did  not  maintain  any 
active inconsistent position and that they have not changed their positions 
since they originally filed their returns.” However, the court concluded that by 
signing Forms 4549 in January 2005 and accepting the refunds of March 21, 
2005, the taxpayers adopted a position that the tax on the distribution income 
should be paid at the entity (trust) level. Further, the taxpayer was still acting 
in her capacity as a trustee of the trust when she directed the filing of the refund 
claim in 2006 and when she received and deposited the refund check in 2009. 
In summary, the court held that (1) the IRS issued a determination regarding 
the trust’s refund claim, which satisfied § 1313(a)(3)(A); (2) because the IRS 
determination accepted the trust’s refund claim, the correlating inclusion of 
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taxable income had been erroneously excluded by the taxpayers as described 
in § 1312(5); (3) as of August 8, 2008 adjustments to taxpayers’ 2001 returns 
were barred by the statute of limitations; (4) the trust maintained a position 
adopted by the IRS determination and that position was inconsistent with the 
erroneous   exclusions   on   taxpayers’   2001   returns   as   modified;   and 
(5) taxpayers, as beneficiaries, were related to the trust in 2001, the year of the 
error, and in 2006 when the trust first maintained its inconsistent position. 
Thus, the IRS satisfied all requirements and conditions of the mitigation 
provisions, and the period of limitations for assessment was thereby extended 
up to one year from August 8, 2008, the date of the final determination. 
Therefore, the deficiency notices sent on September 2, 2008, were timely, and 
petitioners’ 2001 tax years were reopened for the limited purpose of correcting 
the § 1312(5) error. 
 
2. Veterans have extra time to claim refunds for taxes 
improperly withheld from amounts received for combat-related injuries. 
The Combat-Injured Veterans Tax Fairness Act of 2016 (2016 CIVTFA), Pub. 
L. No. 114-292, was signed by the President on 12/16/16. Section 104(a)(4) 
and (b) exclude from gross income amounts received as a pension, annuity, or 
similar allowance for a combat-related injury. In St. Clair v. United States, 778 
F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Va. 1991), the court held that a lump sum disability-related 
severance payment received by a veteran was excluded from the recipient’s 
gross income under § 104(a)(4). Despite these authorities, since 1991, the 
Department of Defense has withheld taxes from severance pay for wounded 
veterans. The 2016 CIVTFA directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that 
taxes are not withheld prospectively. In addition, the legislation directs the 
Secretary of Defense, within one year of the date of enactment, to identify all 
severance payments from which taxes were improperly withheld, notify each 
recipient of the improper withholding, and provide each recipient with 
instructions on filing amended returns to recover these amounts. The 
legislation extends the limitations period of § 6511(a) on filing claims for 
refund to the date that is one year after the required notification of improper 
withholding and eliminates the restriction of § 6511(b)(2) that would normally 
apply on the amount of tax recoverable. 
 
F. Liens and Collections 
 
1. Constructive receipt of a deficiency notice for 
someone who played two of the three monkeys. Onyango v. Commissioner, 
142 T.C. 425 (6/24/14). Section 6330(c)(2)(B) allows a taxpayer to contest the 
underlying tax liability in a CDP hearing only if he did not actually receive a 
deficiency notice or otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability. In 
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this case, on several occasions the Postal Service attempted unsuccessfully to 
deliver a deficiency notice that had been mailed to him at his legal residence 
by certified mail, return receipt requested. On at least two occasions the Postal 
Service left notices of attempted delivery of the certified mail which contained 
the notice of deficiency at the address of the taxpayer’s legal residence, and 
informed the taxpayer that it had certified mail to deliver to him and that he 
had to sign a receipt for that mail before the Postal Service would deliver it to 
him. The taxpayer declined to check on a regular basis his mailbox at his legal 
residence and to retrieve  on a regular basis any Postal Service mail items 
delivered there. After  several unsuccessful attempts to deliver the  certified 
mail, the Postal Service returned it to the IRS. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) 
held that a taxpayer who is reasonably able and had multiple opportunities to 
check his mail and intentionally fails to do so for the purpose of avoiding 
receipt of the deficiency notice cannot contend that for purposes of § 6330 he 
did not receive the deficiency notice. Accordingly, the taxpayer was not 
permitted to contest his underlying tax liability in the CDP hearing. 
 
a. Motions to vacate and for reconsideration 
denied. Onyango v. Commissioner, No. 019081-12 (U.S. Tax Court 9/8/14). 
In a subsequent order dated 9/8/14 (available at https://perma.cc/VM8W- 
V3VJ), Judge Chiechi denied the taxpayer’s motion to vacate and  sealed 
motion for reconsideration. 
 
b. Summarily affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.  
Onyango v. Commissioner, 638 Fed. Appx. 5 (D.C. Cir. 3/22/16). In a per 
curiam opinion, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Tax Court. The court concluded 
that the taxpayer had not shown that the Tax Court clearly erred in discrediting 
portions of his trial testimony and finding that he received a notice of 
deficiency within the meaning of § 6330(c)(2)(B). The court also concluded 
that the Tax Court’s denial of the taxpayer’s motion for reconsideration was 
not an abuse of discretion. “Appellant has not demonstrated that his medical 
records could not have been obtained prior to trial, and his failure to exercise 
reasonable diligence in attempting to obtain them does not render them ‘newly 
discovered  evidence.’” 
 
2. And the court says the IRS’s “boilerplate” assertion of 
frivolity wasn’t very funny. Ryskamp v. Commissioner, 797 F.3d 1142 (D.C. 
Cir. 8/14/15). The taxpayer owed unpaid income taxes for several years and 
did not respond to the IRS’s demand for payment. The taxpayer requested a 
§ 6330 CDP hearing, but the IRS denied him a CDP hearing based on its 
unexplained determination that all the reasons he gave for requesting a hearing 
were  frivolous  and  contended  that  its  frivolousness  determination  was  not 
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subject to judicial review. (Section 6330(g) provides that if any “portion of a 
request for a hearing” is frivolous or reflects the taxpayer’s desire to delay or 
impede the administration of the federal tax laws, the Appeals Office may treat 
such portion as if it were never submitted, and it “shall not be subject to any 
further administrative or judicial review.”) The Tax  Court held that it had 
jurisdiction to review whether the IRS correctly treated the taxpayer’s 
arguments as frivolous, and the D.C. Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 opinion by 
Judge Pillard, affirmed  the  jurisdictional issue, as  well as the Tax Court’s 
holding that the IRS’s “boilerplate letter” rejecting the taxpayer’s arguments 
as frivolous, but “in which there was no statement . . . as to why [his] reasons 
for the request . . . were illegitimate,”  was inadequate. 
Our reading of the statutory language  respects  subsection 
(g)’s limitation on administrative and judicial review. As we 
read it, subsection (g) precludes the tax court from reaching 
the merits of a purportedly frivolous position. ... Instead, the 
tax court’s review is limited to assessing whether the Service 
has adequately identified why it deems the taxpayer’s request, 
or portions thereof, to be frivolous, and whether that 
frivolousness assessment is facially plausible. ... That limited 
review provides a safeguard against the risk that the Service 
may have misconstrued or inadvertently overlooked a non- 
frivolous, i.e. plausible or potentially meritorious, request. ... 
The letter merely included a bullet point list of all of the 
possible reasons the Service could find a request to be 
frivolous and did not correlate them with any aspects of 
Ryskamp’s request. Such a list provides  the  taxpayer  with 
little guidance as to how to proceed. 
Nevertheless, after the Tax Court remanded, the Appeals Office had held a 
CDP hearing, and the Tax Court held that the IRS did not abuse its discretion 
in concluding in that CDP hearing that it could proceed with collection. That 
holding too was affirmed, so the taxpayer lost. 
• But perhaps the IRS needs to rethink its 
form letters. 
 
a. In light of Ryskamp, IRS Chief  Counsel 
attorneys are advised not to contest in the Tax Court and the D.C. Circuit 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review the IRS’s denial of CDP hearing 
requests as frivolous, but Counsel will advise the Department of Justice 
to continue to pursue the issue in other Circuits. Chief Counsel Notice CC- 
2016-008 (4/4/16) (available at https://perma.cc/LT7T-GDZS). This Chief 
Counsel Notice states that “Counsel continues to maintain the position that the 
Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to review a petition filed from the denial of a 
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hearing request as frivolous under section 6330(g).” Further, the Chief 
Counsel disagrees with the holding of Ryskamp that IRS “Appeals must 
articulate the bases of its denial under section 6330(g) by explaining why each 
argument of the taxpayer is not proper.” Nevertheless, because challenging in 
the Tax Court and the D.C. Circuit the Tax Court’s jurisdiction “would be a 
waste of Counsel’s resources,” the Chief Counsel Notice modifies the current 
litigating guidelines. Under the revised guidelines, if a taxpayer challenges in 
the Tax Court the denial of a CDP hearing as frivolous under § 6330(g), and 
if Chief Counsel attorneys determine that the CDP hearing request should not 
have been denied in its entirety because the taxpayer raised at least one 
legitimate issue, then they should not file a motion to dismiss, but instead 
should file a motion to remand the case to IRS Appeals for a hearing 
addressing the legitimate issues and the issuance of a notice of determination. 
If instead Chief Counsel attorneys determine that a CDP hearing was properly 
denied, then they should file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (in 
reliance on Buczek v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. 301 (2013)), a motion  to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary judgment, each 
of which should explain why the taxpayer’s arguments meet the criteria in 
§ 6702(b)(2)(A) so as to justify the IRS’s denial of the hearing. The Chief 
Counsel Notice adds that, in Tax Court cases that are appealed to Circuits other 
than the D.C. Circuit, Counsel will advise the Department of Justice to contest 
the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to review IRS denials of CDP hearing requests as 
frivolous pursuant to § 6330(g). 
 
3. Sometimes lack of Tax Court jurisdiction is a taxpayer 
victory. LG Kendrick, LLC v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 17 (1/21/16). The Tax 
Court (Judge Marvel) rejected the IRS’s argument, and held that  a 
supplemental notice of determination following a §§ 6320/6330 CDP hearing 
does not provide the basis for Tax Court jurisdiction to  review  the 
determination when the original notices of determination did not include a 
determination to sustain a collection activity for a particular period or liability 
and thus did not confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court. Because an invalid notice 
of determination does not provide a basis for Tax Court jurisdiction, the IRS 
can proceed with the collection action only if it subsequently issues a valid 
notice with attendant appeal rights. § 6330(c)(3); Smith v. Commissioner, 124 
T.C. 36, 44 (2005) (describing invalid notices of determination as “void and 
of no effect”). With respect to other notices of determination that were valid, 
the court had jurisdiction and upheld the IRS’s determinations. 
 
4. The IRS can trust the Postal Service where the Code 
doesn’t demand more. Bongam v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 52 (2/11/16). The 
IRS issued a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing, 
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which was sent by certified mail to the taxpayer’s last  known  address  in 
Bowie, Maryland. The taxpayer timely requested a CDP hearing, using an 
address in Washington, D.C. Following the CDP hearing, on 4/30/14 the IRS 
sent to the taxpayer by certified mail a Notice of Determination denying relief, 
which was mailed to the taxpayer at the Washington address, but which was 
returned to the IRS as undeliverable on 6/16/14. Without changing the date on 
the Notice, on 8/4/14 the IRS remailed it (including the envelope in which it 
had originally been posted) to the taxpayer by regular mail to the Maryland 
address. (The taxpayer never filed a change-of-address form with the IRS or 
otherwise indicated to the IRS that he wanted to have his last known address 
changed to the Washington address.) The taxpayer received the Notice on 
8/22/14, and petitioned the Tax Court within 30 days of both the date on which 
he actually received the Notice and the date on which the Notice was remailed 
to him. The IRS argued that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because the 
Notice originally sent to the taxpayer at the Washington, D.C. address was 
invalid because it had not been mailed to his “last known address.” The Tax 
Court (Judge Lauber) agreed that the Notice, as originally mailed to the 
taxpayer on 4/30/14, was invalid, because it was not sent to his “last known 
address” and it was not actually received by him. However, the Notice, as 
remailed on 8/4/14, was properly mailed and valid; thus the taxpayer’s 30-day 
period for petitioning the Tax Court did not start to run before that date, and 
he timely filed his petition. The court held that § 6330(d) does not require that 
the IRS send a Notice of Determination by certified mail to the taxpayer’s last 
known address or that the IRS deliver the Notice in any particular way—unlike 
§§ 6320(a) and 6330(a), which specify three permissible modes of notifying 
the taxpayer of liens and levies. Section 6330(d)(1) merely provides that the 
Tax Court will have jurisdiction if a taxpayer files a petition “within 30 days 
of a determination.” “This language does not limit the manner in which the 
IRS may notify the taxpayer that a determination has been made.” That the 
date appearing on the Notice did not match the date on which the Notice was 
successfully mailed to the taxpayer was irrelevant. Accordingly, the 30-day 
window prescribed by § 6330(d)(1) for filing a petition for redetermination 
was calculated by reference to the date of mailing of the Notice that was 
successfully sent to the taxpayer’s Maryland address by regular mail on 8/4/14. 
That the Notice was sent by regular mail was not relevant. 
 
5. State law, rather than federal common law, governs 
successor liability for employment taxes. WRK Rarities, LLC v.  United 
States, 165 F. Supp. 3d 631 (N.D. Ohio 2/29/16). William R. Kimpel was the 
sole owner and president of a corporation that operated a jewelry store known 
as Kimpel’s Jewelry and Gifts (KJG). The  corporation entered chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings, which were later dismissed when it failed to make 
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payments pursuant to the bankruptcy plan. KJG failed to pay federal 
employment taxes for the years 2007 through 2010. During 2010, Kimpel 
formed a new business organization, WRK Rarities, LLC d/b/a Kimpel’s Fine 
Diamonds (WRK), which operated a jewelry store at  the  same  address  at 
which KJG had been located since 1957 with identical terms for its lease and 
the same signage, furniture, fixtures and employees as KJG. Kimpel was the 
sole owner, president, and manager of day-to-day operations of WRK. The 
IRS attempted to levy on KJG’s bank accounts for the unpaid employment 
taxes but was unable to recover because those accounts had minimal assets. 
The IRS subsequently filed a notice of federal tax lien against WRK as 
“nominee and/or alter ego and/or fraudulent conveyee” of KJG and, pursuant 
to a writ of entry, seized the assets of WRK. WRK brought this action for 
wrongful levy pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7426. The government argued that the 
levy was not wrongful because “the IRS has the power to levy unpaid taxes on 
a successor corporation for the unpaid taxes of the predecessor corporation 
when the successor is merely the alter ego of the predecessor.” The court 
rejected the government’s argument that, in determining whether WRK was 
KJG’s alter ego for purposes of successor liability, the court should disregard 
state law and instead adopt federal common law. State law, the court reasoned, 
determines whether an interest in property exists—including property held by 
a third party if it is determined that the third party holds the property as a 
nominee or alter ego of the taxpayer—and federal law dictates the tax 
consequences. Noting that applying federal common law requires a conflict 
between a federal policy or interest and the use of state law that justifies the 
adoption of federal common law, the court concluded that Ohio law on alter 
ego liability should apply. Under Ohio law, the court stated, the purchaser of 
a corporation’s assets generally is not liable for the debts and obligations of 
the transferor corporation, but can be liable under certain exceptions, including 
when the purchaser is a mere continuation of the seller corporation. The court 
held that WRK was a mere continuation of KJG and could be held liable for 
KJG’s outstanding tax liability. 
 
6. A Notice of Determination of Worker Classification is 
“generally subject to deficiency procedures,” and therefore a pre- 
assessment conference with IRS Appeals does not preclude challenging 
the underlying tax liability in a CDP hearing. Hampton Software 
Development, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-38 (3/3/16). Section 
6330(c)(2)(B) permits a taxpayer to challenge the existence or amount of the 
taxpayer’s underlying tax liability in a CDP hearing only “if the person did not 
receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not 
otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.” In this case, the 
IRS determined on audit that the taxpayer should have classified a worker as 
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an employee and issued a 30-day letter, in response to which the taxpayer filed 
a protest and had a conference with an IRS Appeals Officer. The taxpayer and 
the IRS failed to reach a settlement, and the IRS then issued a Notice of 
Determination of Worker Classification (NDWC) in which it determined that 
the taxpayer owed employment taxes. The NDWC was returned to the IRS 
with a U.S. Postal Service label stamped “Return to Sender” and marked as 
“Unclaimed.” The taxpayer did not file a petition in the Tax Court in response 
to the NDWC. The IRS assessed the tax and subsequently issued a notice of 
levy, in response to which the taxpayer requested a CDP hearing. In the CDP 
hearing, the IRS Settlement Officer took the position that § 6330(c)(2)(B) 
precluded the taxpayer from challenging the underlying tax liability because 
the pre-assessment conference with IRS Appeals was an opportunity to dispute 
the liability within the meaning of the statute. Following the CDP hearing, the 
IRS issued a notice of determination upholding the collection action and the 
taxpayer filed a petition in the Tax Court. In response to the government’s 
motion for summary judgment, the court (Judge Paris) held that a NDWC is 
“generally subject to deficiency procedures,” and therefore, under the relevant 
regulation (Reg. § 301.6330–1(e)(3), Q&A E2), “an opportunity for a 
conference with IRS Appeals prior to the assessment of the tax is not a prior 
‘opportunity to dispute’ the underlying tax liability for purposes of section 
6330(c)(2)(B).” For such taxes, receipt of the notice of deficiency is the prior 
opportunity to dispute the tax liability. In contrast, the court explained, the 
same regulation provides that, for taxes not subject to deficiency procedures, 
a prior opportunity for a pre-assessment conference with IRS Appeals is an 
opportunity to dispute the underlying liability that precludes a later challenge 
of the liability in a CDP hearing. (The court previously had upheld the validity 
of this regulation in Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48 (2007).) Because a 
NDWC is subject to deficiency procedures, the court reasoned, the taxpayer 
was precluded from challenging the underlying tax liability only if it  had 
actually received the NDWC or had deliberately refused delivery of it. The 
court held that there was no dispute that the taxpayer had not actually received 
the NDWC, but that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the 
taxpayer had deliberately refused the NDWC. Accordingly, the court denied 
the  government’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  on  the  question  whether 
§ 6330(c)(2)(B) precluded the taxpayer from challenging the underlying tax 
liability in the CDP hearing. 
 
7. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the IRS is required 
to make a pre-assessment determination of a taxpayer’s liability as a 
responsible person under § 6672 when the taxpayer submits a protest, and 
its failure to do so might render the assessment invalid. Romano-Murphy 
v. Commissioner, 816 F.3d 707 (11th Cir. 3/7/16), vacating and remanding 
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T.C. Memo. 2012-330 (11/29/12). The taxpayer served as the chief operating 
officer of a healthcare staffing business. The IRS sent to her a Letter 1153 
(notice of proposed assessment) informing her that the IRS intended to hold 
her responsible for a penalty equal to more than $346,000 of the business’s 
unpaid employment taxes pursuant to § 6672(a). The taxpayer submitted a 
written protest and requested a conference with IRS Appeals. Due to an 
unexplained error, the IRS never forwarded the protest to IRS Appeals and the 
taxpayer was not provided with a pre-assessment conference or a final 
administrative determination as to her protest. Instead, the IRS assessed the 
tax and issued a notice of intent to levy and notice of federal tax lien, in 
response to which the taxpayer requested a collection due process hearing. 
During the CDP hearing, the IRS Appeals Office observed that the taxpayer 
had not had a pre-assessment opportunity to contest her liability and therefore 
conducted a post-assessment review of the issues the taxpayer had raised in 
her protest. Following this review, the IRS issued a notice of determination 
sustaining the proposed collection. The taxpayer sought review in the Tax 
Court, which sustained the IRS’s determination. The taxpayer moved to vacate 
on the ground that the IRS can collect a tax only after a valid assessment, and 
that the assessment in her case was invalid because the IRS had failed to give 
her a pre-assessment  hearing and determination when she  filed her  timely 
protest. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) concluded that, notwithstanding the 
IRS’s  failure  to  make  a  pre-assessment  determination  of  liability  under 
§ 6672(a) in response to the taxpayer’s protest, § 6672 did not prohibit the 
IRS’s assessment. The Tax Court accordingly denied the taxpayer’s motion to 
vacate. In an opinion by Judge Jordan, the Eleventh Circuit held that the IRS 
erred in failing to make a pre-assessment determination of the taxpayer’s 
liability under § 6672(a) in response to her protest. The Eleventh  Circuit 
vacated the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded for a determination whether 
the IRS’s error was harmless or instead rendered the assessment invalid (or 
required some lesser form of corrective action). In reaching its conclusion that 
the IRS was required to make a pre-assessment determination of liability in 
response to the taxpayer’s protest, the court relied on several sources of 
authority. The court first concluded that § 6672(b)(3)—which provides that, 
“if there is a timely protest of the proposed assessment,” the period of 
limitations on assessment shall not expire before “the date 30 days after the 
Secretary makes a final administrative determination with respect to such 
protest”—contemplates a pre-assessment determination of liability (and notice 
of such determination to the taxpayer) if a timely protest has been filed. The 
court therefore rejected the IRS’s argument “that it may simply ignore, 
disregard, or discard a taxpayer's timely protest to a § 6772(b) pre-assessment 
notice if it so chooses.” Assuming for the sake of argument that the language 
of the statute is ambiguous, the court reviewed the relevant regulations and 
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concluded that Reg. §§ 301.7430–3(d) and 301.6320–1(e)(4) “require the IRS 
to make a pre-assessment determination (though not necessarily through the 
provision of a hearing) about a taxpayer’s § 6672(a) liability when timely 
protest is made.” These regulations, the court concluded, are entitled to 
Chevron deference and are binding on the government as well as the taxpayer. 
Finally, the court regarded Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(iv) and relevant provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Manual as persuasive authority that supported its 
conclusion. 
8. Does the date on the notice or the date on the envelope 
control when the period for responding begins to run? Weiss v. 
Commissioner, 147 T.C. No. 6 (8/17/16). In this collection due process case 
the taxpayer sought review of the IRS’s determination to uphold a notice of 
intent to levy. Before the IRS may levy against a taxpayer’s property, it must 
provide written notice of the proposed levy and inform the taxpayer of his right 
to a CDP hearing. Section 6330(a)(2) requires that a levy notice must be sent 
or delivered to the taxpayer “not less than 30 days before the day of the first 
levy,” and § 6330(a)(3)(B) requires the notice to inform the taxpayer in simple 
and nontechnical terms of his right “to request a hearing during the 30-day 
period” specified in § 6330(a)(2). An IRS Revenue Officer attempted  to 
deliver to the taxpayer in person a Final Notice of Intent to Levy, but was 
deterred by a dog blocking the driveway. The Revenue Officer chose instead 
to mail the notice by certified mail two days later without generating a new 
notice. The taxpayer argued that the period of limitations on collection of these 
liabilities expired in July 2009 based on the contention that he intentionally 
filed his request for a CDP hearing one day late, and thus was entitled only to 
an “equivalent hearing” rather than to the CDP hearing that the IRS afforded 
him. If the taxpayer’s contentions were correct, the period of limitations on 
collection would not have been suspended during the CDP process, and his tax 
liabilities would appear to have been uncollectible. The Tax Court (Judge 
Lauber) held that when the date appearing on a levy notice is earlier than the 
date of mailing, the 30-day period prescribed by § 6330(a)(2) and (3)(B) is 
calculated by reference to the date of mailing. The statutory directive that levy 
and lien notices should be drafted “in simple and nontechnical terms” does not 
require invalidation of a levy notice when there is a mismatch between the 
letter date and the mailing date. On the facts of the case, the taxpayer’s request 
for a CDP hearing was timely because he mailed his Form 12153 to the IRS, 
and under §§ 7502 and 7503 it was deemed received by the IRS, within 30 
days of the IRS’s mailing of the levy notice, even though it was mailed more 
than 30 days after the date on the notice itself. Accordingly, the period of 
limitations on collection was suspended pursuant to § 6330(e)(1) when the 
taxpayer timely requested a CDP hearing. 
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9. The taxpayer may have been misled by a scam 
promising huge returns from African diamonds, but prevails in arguing 
that the IRS’s failure to consider a collection alternative in a CDP hearing 
was an abuse of discretion. Leslie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-171 
(9/14/16). In connection with divorce proceedings, the taxpayer entered into a 
marital separation agreement with her husband that entitled her to 10 percent 
of whatever fee her husband, an attorney, would receive from representing the 
University of California Regents as plaintiffs in a class action against Enron. 
Her former husband ultimately received a fee of more than $50 million, and 
the taxpayer became entitled to $5.5 million. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) 
held that the $5.5 million was taxable alimony rather than a nontaxable 
property settlement, but concluded that the taxpayer had not actually or 
constructively received this amount in 2009 (or any other years before the 
court). The court also concluded that the taxpayer was eligible for a $400,000 
theft loss deduction for a payment “to an internet scamster who claimed he 
would invest it for her in an African diamond scheme but who made off with 
the money,” and that she was subject to failure-to-file penalties for some years 
despite serious mental illness. The opinion is significant, however, for its 
holding on the IRS’s ability to raise new arguments to justify its rejection of 
collection alternatives in a CDP hearing. After the IRS filed a notice of federal 
tax lien and issued a final notice of intent to levy, the taxpayer requested a 
CDP hearing and, in that hearing, both sought to contest the underlying tax 
liability and requested an installment agreement. In the CDP hearing, the 
taxpayer submitted amended returns for two of the years involved and also 
submitted a complete Form 433-A complete with all  supporting 
documentation, except that she submitted information regarding life  and 
health insurance premiums for only three months rather than for six months as 
the settlement officer had requested. Although the settlement officer generated 
an allowable expense worksheet showing that the taxpayer could afford a 
monthly payment of $5,500, the IRS issued a notice of determination 
upholding the collection action. The notice of determination did not analyze 
collection alternatives. In the Tax Court, the IRS argued that the settlement 
officer acted within her discretion in denying collection alternatives because 
the taxpayer had failed to supply the requested additional information 
regarding health and life insurance premiums. The court applied the doctrine 
of Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.  194 
(1947), 318 U.S. 80 (1943), which it described as “an administrative law 
principle that says a court, in reviewing a determination which an 
‘administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety 
if such an action solely on the grounds invoked by the agency.’” The notice of 
determination did not cite the lack of health and life insurance information as 
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a reason to deny collection alternatives. Because the settlement officer had 
failed to consider collection alternatives despite having all information 
necessary to do so, the court held that the failure to consider collection 
alternatives was an abuse of discretion. The court remanded to the  IRS 
Appeals Office to hold a supplemental hearing. 
• This case illustrates that the Tax Court 
applies the Chenery doctrine in cases in which the IRS has issued a notice of 
determination following a CDP hearing. In contrast, the Tax Court (Judge 
Gustafson) recently held in Ax v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 153 (4/11/16) that 
neither the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (judicial 
review)) nor the Chenery doctrine bar the IRS from raising new grounds to 
support a notice of deficiency beyond those grounds originally stated in the 
notice. 
 
10. It’s going to cost more to submit that offer in 
compromise. REG-108934-16, User Fees for Offers in Compromise, 81 F.R. 
70654 (10/13/16). The Treasury Department and IRS have issued proposed 
regulations that would significantly increase the user fee for processing an 
offer in  compromise. Currently, the  general user fee  for an  offer in 
compromise is $186. However, no fee is charged for an offer in compromise 
based solely on doubt as to liability, or if the taxpayer is a low income taxpayer 
(defined as a taxpayer who has income at or below 250 percent of the federal 
poverty guidelines). Under the proposed regulations, the general fee for an 
offer in compromise would increase to $300, but no change would be made 
for offers in compromise based on doubt as to liability or those submitted by 
a low income taxpayer. The preamble to the proposed regulations provides a 
great amount of detail on how the increased user fee was determined, including 
the cost of the services provided. These regulations are proposed to be 
effective for offers in compromise submitted on or after 2/27/17. 
 
11. The fees for installment agreements are going up! T.D. 
9798, User Fees for Installment Agreements, 81 F.R. 86955 (12/2/16). The 
Treasury Department and the IRS have finalized without change proposed 
regulations (REG-108792-16, User Fees for Installment Agreements, 81 F.R. 
56543 (8/22/16)) that significantly increase the user fees for entering into an 
installment agreement. Prior to the effective date of these regulations: (1) the 
general user fee for an installment agreement is $120, which is reduced to $52 
for a direct debit installment agreement that permits the IRS to withdraw the 
installment payments from the taxpayer’s bank account; (2) the user fee is $43 
for a low income taxpayer, defined as a taxpayer who has income at or below 
250 percent of the federal poverty guidelines; and (3) the fee for restructuring 
or reinstating an installment agreement is $50. Under the final regulations, the 
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fee for low income taxpayers remains the same, but the general fee increases 
to $225, the direct debit fee increases to $107, and the fee for restructuring or 
reinstating an installment agreement increases to $89. In addition, the 
regulations establish two new user fees for online payment agreements. The 
general user fee for a taxpayer who sets up an installment agreement online is 
$149, and the fee for a direct debit online payment agreement is $31. These 
regulations apply to installment agreements entered into, restructured, or 
reinstated on or after 1/1/17. 
 
G. Innocent Spouse 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
H. Miscellaneous 
 
1. The D.C. Circuit found that registered (?) tax return 
preparers were entitled to be unqualified. The IRS had de gall to require 
character, competence, and continuing education for “independent” tax 
return preparers who only needed PTINs to continue preparing error- 
laden tax returns for their unsophisticated clientele. Loving v. IRS, 742 
F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2/11/14), aff’g 920 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. D.C. 2/1/13). The 
D.C. Circuit (Judge Kavanaugh) held that regulations issued in 2011 under 31 
U.S.C. § 330 that imposed new character, competence, and continuing 
education requirements on tax return preparers were “foreclose[d] and 
render[ed] unreasonable” by the statute, and thus failed at the Chevron step 1 
standard. They would have also failed at the Chevron step 2 standard because 
they were “unreasonable in light of the statute’s text, history, structure, and 
context.” 
• Judge  Kavanaugh’s  opinion  found  six 
problems with the 2011 regulations: (1) tax return preparers were not 
“representatives” because they are not “agents” and, thus, lack “legal authority 
to act on the taxpayer’s behalf”; (2) the preparation and filing of a tax return 
did not constitute “practice … before the Department of the Treasury” because 
that term implies “an investigation, adversarial hearing, or other adjudicative 
proceeding”; (3) the history of the statutory language originally enacted in 
1884 “indicated that  the statute contemplated representation in a contested 
proceeding”; (4) the regulation was inconsistent with the “broader statutory 
framework,” (?!) in which Congress had enacted a number of statutes 
specifically directed at tax-return preparers and imposing civil  penalties, 
which would not have been necessary if the IRS had authority to regulate tax- 
return preparers; (5) the statute would have been clearer had it granted power 
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“for the first time to regulate hundreds of thousands of individuals in the multi- 
billion dollar tax-preparation industry” [“the enacting Congress did not intend 
to grow such a large elephant in such a small mousehole”]; and (6) the IRS’s 
past approach showed that until 2011 it never maintained that it had authority 
to regulate tax return preparers. 
• Judge Kavanaugh concluded: “The IRS 
may not unilaterally expand its authority through such an expansive, atextual, 
and ahistorical reading of Section 330.” 
 
a. In light of the IRS loss in Loving v. IRS, a new, 
voluntary Annual Filing Season Program to give tax return preparers the 
ability to claim they hold “a valid Annual Filing Season Program Record 
of Completion” and that they have “complied with the IRS requirements 
for  receiving  the  Record  of  Completion.”  Rev.  Proc.  2014-42,  2014-29 
I.R.B. 192 (6/30/14). In order to encourage unenrolled tax return preparers, 
i.e., those who are not attorneys, CPAs or EAs, to complete continuing 
education courses in order to get a better understanding of federal tax law, the 
carrot of being able to claim superiority to the ordinary run-of-the-mill slob 
tax return preparers is offered. The requirements for this voluntary program 
include a six-hour refresher course, with a 100-question test at the end, plus 
other continuing education of two hours of ethics and ten hours of federal tax 
law topics. Holders of the Record of Completion may not use the terms 
“certified,” “enrolled,” or “licensed” to describe the designation. 
 
b. The AICPA’s challenge to the Annual Filing 
Season Program fails, but the court signals that others might successfully 
challenge it. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants vs. Internal 
Revenue Service, 118 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-5350 (D.D.C. 8/3/16). The AICPA 
challenged as unlawful the voluntary Annual Filing Season  Program 
established by the IRS in Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-29 I.R.B. 192 (6/30/14), 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the 
AICPA had standing to bring the challenge. American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants vs. Internal Revenue Service, 804 F.3d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 
10/30/15). In that opinion, the D.C. Circuit declined to address an issue raised 
by the IRS for the first time on appeal: that the AICPA’s grievance does not 
“fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory 
provision it invokes.” On remand, the District Court (Judge Boasberg) held 
that the AICPA failed the zone of interests test because its grievance (which 
the court characterized as the grievance of the AICPA’s members) is neither 
regulated nor protected by the relevant statute. Accordingly, the court granted 
the IRS’s motion to dismiss. The court characterized the grievance of the 
AICPA and its members as competitive injury from brand dilution, i.e., that 
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the AFS Program would dilute the credentials of the AICPA’s members by 
introducing a government-backed  credential  and  government-sponsored 
public listing. The relevant statute, the court concluded, is 31 U.S.C. § 330(a), 
which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate the practice of 
representatives of persons before the Treasury Department and to require that 
certain conditions be satisfied, such  as good character, before  admitting a 
person to practice. The AICPA is not a representative of persons within the 
zone of interests regulated  by the statute, the court concluded, because to 
satisfy this requirement the party must be regulated by the particular regulatory 
action being challenged. To demonstrate that it is in the zone of interests 
protected by the statute, the AICPA would have to demonstrate either that it 
is an intended beneficiary of the statute or that it is a “suitable challenger” to 
enforce the statute. The AICPA did not contend that it was an intended 
beneficiary of the statute, and the court concluded that the AICPA was not a 
suitable challenger. The court reasoned that the purpose of 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) 
is consumer protection, and that the AICPA’s interest in avoiding intensified 
competition as a result of the AFS Program was not congruent with  that 
purpose. “On the contrary, AICPA members’ competitive interests are on a 
collision course with Congress’s interest in safeguarding consumers.” 
• Although   it   dismissed   the   AICPA’s 
challenge, the court added: 
A final word. While AICPA does not have a cause of action 
under the APA to bring this suit, the Court has little reason to 
doubt that there may be other challengers who could satisfy 
the rather undemanding strictures of the zone-of-interests test. 
 
2. The Tenth Circuit stirs the previously muddied water 
on whether a late-filed return is a “return” that will permit tax debt to be 
discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th 
Cir. 12/29/14), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2889 (6/29/15). In an opinion by Judge 
McHugh, the Tenth Circuit held, with respect to taxpayers in two consolidated 
appeals, that a late return filed after the IRS had assessed tax for the year in 
question was not a “return” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) and, 
consequently, the taxpayers’ federal tax liabilities were not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. The facts in each appeal were substantially the same. The 
taxpayers failed to file returns for the years 2000 and 2001. The IRS issued 
notices of deficiency, which the taxpayers did not challenge, and assessed tax 
for those years. The taxpayers subsequently filed returns, based on which the 
IRS partially abated the tax liabilities. The taxpayers then received general 
discharge orders in chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings and filed adversary 
proceedings against the  IRS  seeking  a  determination  that their  income  tax 
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liabilities for 2000 and 2001 had been discharged. Section 523(a)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code excludes from discharge any debt for a tax or customs duty: 
(B) with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or 
notice, if required— 
(i) was not filed or given; or 
(ii) was filed or given after the date on which 
such return,  report,  or notice was last  due, 
under applicable law or under any extension, 
and after two years before the date of filing 
of the petition; 
An unnumbered paragraph at the end of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a), added by 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
provides that, for purposes of § 523(a): 
the term ‘return’ means a return that satisfies the requirements 
of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing 
requirements). Such term includes a return prepared under 
section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code … but does not 
include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the 
Internal Revenue Code …. 
The court examined a line of conflicting cases in which the courts had applied 
a four-factor test, commonly known as the Beard test (Beard v. Commissioner, 
793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986)), to determine whether a late-filed return 
constitutes a “return” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) and concluded that it 
did not need to resolve that issue. Instead, the court concluded that, unless it 
is prepared by the IRS with the assistance of the taxpayer under § 6020(a), a 
late return is not a “return” because it does not satisfy “the requirements of 
applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements)” 
within the meaning of the language added to the statute in 2005. 
• In  reaching  its  conclusion,  the  Tenth 
Circuit agreed with the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 
924 (5th Cir.  2012), in which the Fifth Circuit concluded that a late-filed 
Mississippi state tax return was not a “return” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a). 
• The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a) is contrary to the IRS’s interpretation, which the IRS made 
clear to the court during the appeal. The IRS’s interpretation, reflected in Chief 
Counsel Notice CC-2010-016 (9/2/10), is that “section 523(a) does not provide 
that every tax for which a return was filed late is nondischargeable.” However, 
according to the Chief Counsel Notice, a debt for tax assessed before the late 
return is filed (as in the situations before the Tenth Circuit in In re Mallo) “is 
not dischargeable because a debt assessed prior to the filing of a Form 1040 is 
a debt for which is return was not ‘filed’ within the meaning of section 
523(a)(1)(B)(i).” 
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a. The First Circuit aligns itself with  the  Fifth 
and Tenth Circuits and applies the same analysis to a late-filed 
Massachusetts state income tax return. In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2/18/15). In an opinion by Judge Kayatta, the First Circuit aligned itself with 
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits and concluded that a late-filed Massachusetts state 
income tax return was not a “return” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). 
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Thompson argued that the majority’s 
conclusion was inconsistent with both the language of and policy underlying 
the statute: “The majority, ignoring blatant textual ambiguities and judicial 
precedent, instead opts to create a per se restriction that is contrary to the goal 
of our bankruptcy system to provide, as the former President put it in 2005, 
‘fairness and compassion’ to ‘those who need it most.’” 
 
b. A Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in the Ninth 
Circuit disagrees with the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. The Ninth 
Circuit now might have an opportunity to weigh in. In re Martin, 542 B.R. 
479 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 12/17/15). In an opinion by Judge Kurtz, a Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel in the Ninth Circuit disagreed with what it called the “literal 
construction” by the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits of the definition of the term 
“return” in Bankruptcy Code § 523(a). The court emphasized that the meaning 
of the language in the unnumbered paragraph at the end of Bankruptcy Code 
§ 523(a), added by the Bankruptcy  Abuse  Prevention  and  Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, which provides that “the term ‘return’ means a return 
that satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including 
applicable filing requirements),” must be determined by taking into account 
the context of the surrounding words and also the context of the  larger 
statutory scheme. Taking this context into account, the court reasoned, leads 
to the conclusion that the statutory language does not dictate that a late-filed 
return automatically renders the taxpayer’s income tax liability non- 
dischargeable. “Why Congress would want to treat a taxpayer who files a tax 
return a month or a week or even a day late—possibly for reasons beyond his 
or her control—so much more harshly than a taxpayer who never files a tax 
return on his or her own behalf [and instead relies on the IRS to prepare it 
pursuant to § 6020(a)] is a mystery that literal construction adherents never 
adequately explain.” The court also rejected the IRS’s interpretation, reflected 
in Chief Counsel Notice CC-2010-016 (9/2/10) that, although not every tax 
for which a return is filed late is nondischargeable, a debt for tax assessed 
before the late return is filed (as in the situation before the court) is not 
dischargeable because the tax debt is established by the assessment and 
therefore arises before the return was filed. Instead, the court concluded that 
binding Ninth Circuit authority predating the 2005 amendments to Bankruptcy 
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Code § 523(a) requires applying the four-factor Beard test (Beard v. 
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), aff’d, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986)) to 
determine whether a late-filed return constitutes a “return” for purposes of 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a). The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court, which had 
held that the taxpayers’ late-filed returns were “returns” within the meaning of 
the statute, had relied on a version of the Beard test that did not reflect the 
correct legal standard. Accordingly, the court remanded to the Bankruptcy 
Court for further consideration. 
 
c. The Eleventh Circuit declines to decide 
whether a late-filed return always renders a tax debt nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy. In re Justice, 817 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 3/30/16). In an opinion by 
Judge Anderson, the Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt what it called the “one- 
day-late” rule embraced by the First, Fifth and Tenth Circuits because it 
concluded that doing so was unnecessary to reach the conclusion that the 
taxpayer’s federal income tax liability was nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 
The taxpayer filed his federal income tax returns for four tax years after the 
IRS had assessed tax for those years and between three and six years late. The 
court concluded that it need not adopt the approach of the First, Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits because, even if a late-filed return can sometimes qualify as a return 
for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a), a return must satisfy the four-factor 
Beard test (Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), aff’d, 793 F.2d 139 
(6th Cir. 1986)) in order to constitute a return for this purpose, and the 
taxpayer’s returns failed to satisfy this test. One of the four factors of the Beard 
test is that there must be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the 
requirements of the tax law. The Eleventh Circuit joined the majority of the 
other circuits in concluding that delinquency in filing a tax return is relevant 
to whether the taxpayer made such an honest and reasonable attempt. “Failure 
to file a timely return, at least without a legitimate excuse or explanation, 
evinces the lack of a reasonable effort to comply with the law.” The taxpayer 
in this case, the court stated, filed his returns many years late, did so only after 
the IRS had issued notices of deficiency and assessed his tax liability, and 
offered no justification for his late filing. Accordingly, the court held, he had 
not filed a “return” for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a) and his tax debt 
was therefore nondischargeable. 
 
d. The Ninth Circuit holds that a taxpayer’s tax 
debt cannot be discharged in bankruptcy without weighing in on the issue 
whether a late-filed return always renders a tax debt nondischargeable.  
In re Smith, 828 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 7/13/16). In an opinion by Judge Christen, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the tax liability of the taxpayer, who filed his federal 
income tax return seven years after it was due and three years after the IRS 
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had assessed the tax, was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The government 
did not assert the “one-day-late” rule embraced by the First, Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit looked to its prior decision in In re 
Hatton, 220 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000), issued prior to the 2005 amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Code on which the First, Fifth and Tenth Circuits relied. In 
In re Hatton, the Ninth Circuit had adopted the four-factor Beard test (Beard 
v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), aff’d, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986)) to 
determine whether the taxpayer had filed a  “return”  for  purposes  of 
Bankruptcy Code § 523(a). The fourth factor of the Beard test is that there 
must be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax 
law. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the taxpayer had not made such an 
attempt: 
Here, Smith failed to make a tax filing until seven years after 
his return was due and three years after the IRS went to the 
trouble of calculating a deficiency and issuing an assessment. 
Under these circumstances, Smith’s “belated acceptance of 
responsibility” was not a reasonable attempt to comply with 
the tax code. 
The court noted that other circuits similarly had held  that  post-assessment 
filings of returns were not honest and reasonable attempts to satisfy the 
requirements of the tax law, but refrained from deciding whether any post- 
assessment filing could be treated as such an honest and reasonable attempt. 
 
3. The Tax Court rejects the IRS’s first try at denying a 
whistleblower award to the guy who handed it $74 million from Wegelin 
& Company on a platter. Whistleblower 21276-13W v. Commissioner, 144 
T.C. 290 (6/2/15). The Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) held that the fact that a 
whistleblower supplied information to  other  federal  agencies,  including  an 
IRS operating division, before submitting the information  to  the 
Whistleblower Office on Form 211 did not, as a matter of law, render the 
whistleblower ineligible for an award under § 7623(b). At the time the 
whistleblower began cooperating with the IRS, FBI, and a United States 
Attorney’s office to obtain an indictment of a foreign business for assisting 
U.S. taxpayers to evade taxes, the whistleblower was unaware of any 
whistleblower award program. “The Targeted Business was indicted, with a 
subsequent superseding indictment, for conspiring with U.S. taxpayers  and 
others to hide more than $1.2 billion in secret accounts, and the income 
generated therefrom, from the IRS. The Targeted Business pleaded guilty, as 
[the whistleblower] predicted. As part of its guilty plea, the Targeted Business 
paid the United States approximately $74 million.” (Although  the  opinion 
refers to the “Targeted Business,” the facts recited in the opinion lead to the 
obvious conclusion that the “Targeted Business” was the Swiss bank Wegelin 
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& Company.) The court rejected the IRS’s argument that a whistleblower is 
ineligible for a § 7623(b) award if he or she provides the information to an 
operating division of the IRS before submitting the information, via a Form 
211, to the Whistleblower Office. Because it had rejected the claim as 
untimely, the Whistleblower Office did not conduct a review, investigation, or 
evaluation of the merits of petitioners’ claims for award. The court ordered 
that “the parties should have an opportunity to resolve these cases on the basis 
of our holding herein [and are required] to file a status report in accordance 
with an order to be issued.” 
 
a. The Tax Court rejects the IRS’s second (and 
presumably final) attempt to avoid paying the full amount due to the 
whistleblower in this case. Whistleblower 21276-13W v. Commissioner, 147 
T.C. No. 4 (8/3/16). Following the Tax Court’s prior order that the parties 
attempt to resolve their differences (144 T.C. 290 (6/2/15)), the IRS and the 
petitioners, a married couple, agreed that the petitioners are eligible for a 
whistleblower award of 24 percent of the collected proceeds (i.e., the proceeds 
eligible for an award), but disagreed as to the amount of the collected proceeds. 
The targeted taxpayer paid to the government approximately  $74  million, 
which consisted of tax restitution ($20 million), a criminal fine ($22 million), 
and civil forfeitures representing fees received from U.S. clients ($32 million). 
The parties agreed that the tax restitution payment constituted collected 
proceeds, but disagreed as to whether payments of the criminal fine and civil 
forfeitures constituted collected proceeds. Section 7623(b)(1) provides that a 
whistleblower award is: 
at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the 
collected proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to 
tax, and additional amounts) resulting from the action 
(including any related actions) or from any settlement in 
response to such action. 
The IRS argued that the plain language of § 7623 dictates that only proceeds 
assessed and collected under a provision of title 26 may be used to pay a 
whistleblower award because § 7623 relates solely to violations of federal tax 
laws, and therefore criminal fines and civil forfeitures (which are not assessed 
under   title   26)   are   not   “collected   proceeds”   within   the   meaning   of 
§ 7623(b)(1). The IRS also argued that, if forfeitures could be used for 
payment of the whistleblower award, an irreconcilable conflict would be 
created between the whistleblower statute in title 26 and the provisions of title 
42 regarding criminal fines and those of title 31 regarding civil forfeitures that 
specify the purposes for which moneys collected in this case under title 18 
may be used. In a very thorough opinion, the Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) held 
that § 7623(b)(1), which “is straightforward and written in expansive terms,” 
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does not limit “collected proceeds” to amounts assessed and collected under 
title 26. The court similarly rejected the IRS’s second argument, which the 
court characterized as arising “from a fundamental misinterpretation of the 
plain language of the statute.” According to the court, § 7623(b)(1) “does not 
refer to, or require, the availability of funds to be used in making an award.” 
 
4. A lesson on the timing of a bankruptcy petition: the 
extended due date of the return, rather than the original due date, 
determines whether the late-filing penalty is dischargeable. United States 
v. Wilson, 117 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-514 (N.D. Cal. 1/21/16). The taxpayer 
obtained an extension of time to file his 2008 federal income tax  return, 
pursuant to which the return was due on 10/15/09. He actually filed the return 
in February 2011. On 7/24/12, the taxpayer filed a chapter 7  bankruptcy 
petition. The taxpayer’s 2008 tax liability was satisfied with funds of the 
bankruptcy estate, but those funds apparently were not sufficient to satisfy the 
taxpayer’s failure-to-file or failure-to-pay penalties. The IRS subsequently 
collected those penalties by intercepting a California income tax refund 
payable to the taxpayer and levying on his Social Security benefits. The 
taxpayer commenced this adversary proceeding, in which he argued that the 
tax penalties had been discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B), which 
provides that a tax penalty is discharged only if it is “imposed with respect to 
a transaction or event that occurred before three years before the date of the 
filing of the petition” in bankruptcy. In the Bankruptcy Court, the government 
conceded that the failure-to-pay penalty had been discharged because the event 
with respect to which it was imposed (non-payment) had occurred on 4/15/09, 
the original due date of the return, which was more than three years before the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition on 7/24/12. But the government argued that 
the failure-to-file penalty had not been discharged. The Bankruptcy Court held 
in favor of the taxpayer, reasoning that the tax liability with respect to which 
the failure-to-file penalty was imposed had accrued on 4/15/09, the original 
due date of the return, and therefore, like the failure-to-pay penalty, had been 
discharged. The District Court (Judge Chhabria) reversed. According to the 
District Court, the “transaction or event” with respect to which the failure-to- 
file penalty was imposed was the taxpayer’s failure to file by the 10/15/09 
extended due date. Because this event occurred within the three-year period 
preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition on 7/24/12, the District Court 
reasoned, the failure-to-file penalty had not been discharged. 
• Had   the   taxpayer   waited   three   more 
months to file his bankruptcy petition, the failure-to-file penalty would have 
been discharged. 
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5. The IRS continues successfully to be stingy with 
whistleblower  awards.  Whistleblower  22716-13W  v.  Commissioner,  146 
T.C. 84 (3/14/16). A whistleblower’s cooperation with the Department  of 
Justice and the IRS Criminal Investigation Division led to a taxpayer agreeing, 
by  guilty  plea,  to  pay  an  FBAR  civil  penalty  substantially  in  excess  of 
$2,000,000 and a small amount of restitution, reflecting unpaid federal income 
tax on income derived from Swiss bank accounts. The petitioner sought a 
whistleblower award, which the IRS denied. Under § 7623(b)(5)(B), a 
whistleblower is entitled to a nondiscretionary award only “if the tax, 
penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute exceed 
$2,000,000.” The issue in this case was whether the FBAR civil penalties 
which are imposed and collected under 31 U.S.C. § 5321, rather than under 
the Internal Revenue Code, constitute “additional amounts” for purposes of 
ascertaining whether the $2,000,000 threshold has been met. The Tax Court 
(Judge  Lauber)  held  the  that  the  term  “additional  amounts”  as  used  in 
§ 7623(b)(5)(B) means only the civil penalties set forth in chapter 68, 
subchapter A, of the Internal Revenue Code, captioned “Additions to the Tax 
and Additional Amounts.” FBAR civil penalties are not “additional amounts” 
within the meaning of § 7623(b)(5)(B) and are not “assessed, collected, and 
paid in the same manner as taxes.” Thus, FBAR payments must be excluded 
in determining whether the $2,000,000 “amount in dispute” requirement has 
been satisfied. Accordingly the court upheld the IRS’s denial of any award. 
 
6. What should have been a slam dunk for the IRS 
turned into an embarrassing loss: an IRS revenue  agent  who  pleaded 
guilty to tax evasion established that there was no tax deficiency for the 
year in question. Senyszyn v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 136 (3/31/16). The 
taxpayer was an IRS revenue agent who became involved in the business 
affairs of a real estate developer. The developer brought a civil suit for fraud 
in which the developer asserted that the taxpayer had embezzled a total of $1 
million. In a subsequent federal criminal investigation, an IRS revenue agent 
determined  that,  during  2003,  the  taxpayer  had  taken  from  the  developer 
$252,726 more than he had returned. The taxpayer signed an agreement with 
the U.S. Attorney in which the taxpayer agreed to plead guilty and to stipulate 
at  sentencing  that  he  “‘knowingly  and  willfully  did  not  include  about 
$252,726.00 in additional taxable income that he acquired in 2003.’”  As 
agreed, the taxpayer pleaded guilty to the tax evasion charge. Based primarily 
on this omitted income, the IRS subsequently issued a notice of deficiency for 
2003 asserting a deficiency in federal income tax, a fraud penalty against the 
taxpayer, and an accuracy-related penalty against his spouse. At trial, the 
taxpayer successfully established that the IRS’s analysis of the funds he had 
received was inaccurate. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) found that, during 
 
 
268 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 20:3 
 
2003, the taxpayer had returned to the developer more funds than he had 
received from the developer. Accordingly, the court held, the evidence 
presented by the IRS did not support the asserted deficiency. The court also 
held that an amended return for 2003 filed by the taxpayers, on which the 
taxpayers reported an additional $252,726 of income, could not be treated as 
an admission that would support the deficiency because the return also 
reported an additional deduction of $476,005. The court also declined to apply 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel to uphold the deficiency. The use of 
collateral estoppel to uphold the deficiency in this case, the court reasoned, 
should be regarded as an offensive (rather than defensive) use of collateral 
estoppel because the taxpayer was a defendant in the prior criminal case. 
Under Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), trial courts have 
broad discretion in permitting the offensive use of collateral  estoppel,  and 
should not do so “when the purposes of the doctrine do not support its 
application.” The court concluded that the purposes of the doctrine— 
protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue and 
promoting judicial economy—“would not be served by upholding a deficiency 
unsupported by the evidence presented.” Although the taxpayer’s criminal 
conviction established the existence of an underpayment for 2003, the 
conviction did not establish its exact amount and therefore the court in this 
proceeding necessarily had to determine the amount of the deficiency. Because 
the taxpayers were not liable for a deficiency, the fraud and accuracy-related 
penalties based on the asserted deficiency were moot. 
 
7. Was Dad invited for Thanksgiving dinner even though 
he filed a Form SS-8 asking the IRS to determine his employment status 
in the family business? B G Painting, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 
2016-62 (4/5/16). The IRS notified the taxpayer’s president that one of the 
taxpayer’s workers had filed a Form SS-8 asking the IRS to determine his 
employment status. In the taxpayer’s response, the president informed the IRS 
that the worker was his father and provided other requested information. The 
IRS issued Letter 4991 to the worker and a Letter 4991-A to the taxpayer 
notifying them of its determination that the worker was an employee rather 
than an independent contractor. The taxpayer filed a petition in the Tax Court, 
and the IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Tax Court (Judge 
Dawson) granted the government’s motion to dismiss. 
Section 7436(a) confers jurisdiction on this Court only with 
regard to determinations that are made by the IRS in 
connection with an audit of a taxpayer. Other IRS 
determinations of employment status that are not made as part 
of a taxpayer audit, including those made in the context of 
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private letter rulings or Forms SS-8, are not subject to review 
by this Court under section 7436(a). 
The Letter 4991 issued by the IRS, the court explained, was not a notice of 
determination that would confer jurisdiction on the court. Further, under the 
first part of the four-part test established in American Airlines, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,   144   T.C.   24   (2015),   for   determining   jurisdiction   under 
§ 7436(a), the IRS must make an examination in connection with an audit. The 
court noted that it had previously held in Staffmore, LLC v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo. 2013-187, “that IRS review of information provided in a Form 
SS-8 submission is not considered an ‘audit’ or ‘examination.’” 
 
8. Taxpayers who need to pay their taxes in cash can now 
do so at the same time they purchase a Slurpee. IR 2016-56 (4/6/16) 
(available at https://perma.cc/R5DU-HC7J). The IRS announced that 
individuals can now make tax payments at 7-Eleven stores without the need 
of a bank account or credit card. To do so, taxpayers must go through an online 
process, print out a payment code, and bring the code to the store. There is a 
$1,000 payment limit per day and a $3.99 fee per payment. 
 
9. Only certain private delivery services provide the 
benefit of the “timely mailed is timely filed” rule. Notice 2016-30, 2016-18 
I.R.B. 676 (4/11/16) This notice (1) updates  the list  of designated private 
delivery services set forth in Notice 2015-38, 2015-21 I.R.B. 984 (5/6/15), for 
purposes of the “timely mailing treated as timely filing/paying” rule of § 7502, 
(2) provides rules for determining the postmark date for these services, and 
(3) provides the address for submitting documents to the IRS with respect to 
an application for designation as a designated private delivery service. These 
changes are effective 4/11/16. Notice 2015-38, 2015-21 I.R.B. 984 (5/6/15), 
is modified and superseded. 
 
10. Tax is still a little bit different from general 
administrative law in some respects. Ax v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 153 
(4/11/16). The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held that neither the 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (judicial review)) nor 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) 
bar the IRS from raising new grounds to support a notice of deficiency beyond 
those grounds originally stated in the notice. 
Petitioners’ proposal—that a deficiency case be confined to 
issues in the NOD—would be a radical innovation that not 
only is at odds with the statutes discussed above but that also 
would change longstanding practice. Under Rule 142(a)(1), 
“The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as 
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otherwise provided by statute or determined by the Court; and 
except that, in respect of any new matter *** pleaded in the 
answer, it shall be upon the respondent.” (Emphasis added.) 
The rules have so provided as to “new matter” since soon after 
deficiency litigation first began to be held in this Court’s 
predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).  This 
provision as to the burden of proof on “new matter” persisted 
when the BTA became the Tax Court of the United States in 
1942—and it was therefore in effect when Congress enacted 
the APA. The “new matter” provision persisted in 1969 after 
the Court was reconstituted as an Article I court to be known 
as the United States Tax Court. When Congress in 1998 
addressed tax litigation procedure by enacting section 7491 
(entitled “Burden of Proof”) to shift the burden of proof in 
some circumstances, the Tax Court rules then provided, as 
they had for decades and still do, that burden of proof on “new 
matter” was on the respondent. 
Furthermore, [t]he Supreme Court did not in Mayo Foundation Mayo for Med. 
& Educ.Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011), “impose a single 
one-size-fits-all paradigm for standard and scope of review for all types of 
cases involving disputes with agencies.” Because in § 6214(a) Congress has 
specifically authorized the Tax Court to “redetermine” a deficiency asserted 
by the IRS, neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor general 
administrative law principles bar the Tax Court, from considering issues and 
arguments not stated in the IRS’s notice of deficiency. 
 
11. A snowy day at the Tax Court. Guralnik v. 
Commissioner, 146 T.C. 230 (6/2/16). The taxpayer filed a petition in the Tax 
Court challenging the IRS’s notice of determination sustaining collection 
action. The taxpayer sent the petition on February 13, 2015 by Federal Express 
using a delivery method that did not qualify for the “timely mailed is timely 
filed” rule of § 7502(a). Although the petition should have been delivered on 
February 17, 2015, which was the deadline for filing the petition, all federal 
offices, including the Tax Court, were closed on that day because of a 
snowstorm. The petition was delivered to the court on the first day the court 
was open following the storm, February 18, 2015. The government moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the taxpayer did not file the petition 
within the 30-day period prescribed by § 6330(d). In a unanimous, reviewed 
opinion by Judge Lauber, the Tax Court denied the motion. The court looked 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(3)(A), which provides  that  if  the 
clerk’s office is inaccessible on the last day for filing, then the time for filing 
is extended to the first day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday on 
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which the clerk’s office is accessible. Although the Tax Court’s rules do not 
address this situation, Tax Court Rule 1(b) provides: 
Where in any instance there is no applicable rule of procedure, 
the Court or the Judge before whom the matter is pending may 
prescribe the procedure, giving particular weight to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that they are 
suitably adaptable to govern the matter at hand. 
The court held that, in the absence of a Tax Court Rule prescribing the 
procedure when the clerk’s office is inaccessible, the principles of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(3)(A) are “suitably adaptable to govern the matter 
at hand.” Accordingly, the taxpayer’s petition was timely. 
 
12. The IRS establishes a new fast-track mediation 
procedure for offer-in-compromise and trust fund recovery penalty cases 
in the Small Business/Self-Employed division. Rev. Proc. 2016-57, 2016-49 
I.R.B. 786 (11/18/16). This revenue procedure  establishes  a  fast-track 
mediation procedure, known as SB/SE Fast Track Mediation—Collection 
(FTMC), that replaces the fast-track mediation procedure set forth in Rev. 
Proc. 2003-41, 2003-1 C.B. 1047. The prior fast-track mediation procedure 
was available to taxpayers with cases in either examination or collection, but 
use of the program was infrequent, especially for cases in examination after 
the IRS in 2011 implemented a fast-track settlement program for examination 
cases in the Small Business/Self Employed Division. See Announcement 
2011-5, 2011-4 I.R.B. 430 (12/30/10). The new FTMC program preserves fast-
track mediation for cases in collection. According to the revenue 
procedure, “FTMC may be used only when all other collection issues are 
resolved but for the issue(s) for which FTMC is being requested. The issue(s) 
to be mediated must be fully developed with clearly defined positions by both 
parties so the unagreed issues can be resolved quickly (usually within 30 or 40 
calendar days).” The revenue procedure provides examples of when FTMC is 
and is not appropriate. For example, in OIC cases, FTMC is appropriate to 
determine issues such as the value of a taxpayer’s assets (including those held 
by third parties), and in trust fund recovery penalty cases for issues such as 
whether a person was required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over 
income, employment or excise taxes. A request for FTMC is made after an 
issue has been fully developed (and before collection has made a final 
determination regarding the issue) by submitting Form 13369, which must be 
signed by both the taxpayer (or authorized representative) and the Collection 
Group Manager. Written summaries of both the taxpayer’s and collection’s 
positions must accompany the form. The request is submitted to IRS Appeals 
and, if the request for FTMC is approved, the case is assigned to an Appeals 
employee who serves as a mediator. The Appeals mediator does not have 
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settlement authority and serves only as a facilitator. The revenue procedure 
notes that the prohibition on ex parte communications between Appeals and 
other IRS employees does not apply to communications arising in FTMC 
because Appeals personnel “are not acting in their traditional Appeals 
settlement role,” but provides that communications by either party with the 
Appeals mediator outside the mediation session are prohibited. The revenue 
procedure also provides that “[t]he parties to the mediation may not make a 
stenographic record, audio or video tape recording, or other transcript of the 
mediation session.” Following the mediation session, the Appeals mediator 
will prepare a brief written report. The revenue procedure is effective 
11/18/16. Rev. Proc. 2003-41, 2003-1 C.B. 1047, is obsoleted. 
 
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES 
 
A. Employment Taxes 
 
There  were  no  significant  developments  regarding  this  topic 
during 2016. 
 
B. Self-employment  Taxes 
 
1. Partners are self-employed, even if they are employees 
of a disregarded entity owned by the partnership. Self-Employment Tax 
Treatment of Partners in a Partnership That Owns a Disregarded Entity, T.D. 
9766, 81 F.R. 26693 (5/4/16). The Treasury and IRS have issued proposed and 
temporary amendments to the check-the-box regulations under § 7701 
clarifying that a partner in a partnership is considered self-employed even if 
the partner is an employee of a disregarded entity owned by the partnership. 
The existing regulations provide that (1) a single-member business entity that 
is not classified as a corporation under Reg. § 301.7701–2(b) is disregarded as 
an entity separate from its owner; (2) such a disregarded entity nevertheless is 
treated as a corporation for employment tax purposes, which means that the 
disregarded entity, rather than its owner, is considered to be the employer of 
the entity’s employees for employment taxes purposes; and (3) the rule that 
the disregarded entity is treated as a corporation for employment tax purposes 
does not apply for self-employment tax purposes. The existing regulations 
state that the owner of a disregarded entity that is treated as a sole 
proprietorship is subject to tax on self-employment income and provide an 
example in which the disregarded entity is subject to employment tax with 
respect to employees of the disregarded entity, but the individual owner is 
subject  to  self-employment  tax  on  the  net  earnings  from  self-employment 
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resulting   from   the   disregarded   entity’s   activities.   Reg.   §   301.7701– 
2(c)(2)(iv)(C)(2), –2(c)(2)(iv)(D), Ex. The IRS’s longstanding  position  has 
been that a partner is self-employed and that any remuneration the partner 
receives for services rendered to the partnership are not  wages  subject  to 
FICA, FUTA, and income tax withholding. Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 
256. Nevertheless, some taxpayers apparently have taken the position that, 
because the existing regulations do not include an example illustrating how 
the rules apply to a disregarded entity owned by a partnership, an individual 
partner in a partnership that owns a disregarded entity can be treated as an 
employee of the disregarded entity and therefore can participate in certain tax- 
favored employee benefit plans. The proposed and temporary amendments to 
the regulations clarify that a disregarded entity is not treated as a corporation 
for purposes of employing either its individual owner, who is treated as a sole 
proprietor, or employing an individual that is a partner in a partnership that 
owns the disregarded entity. Instead, the entity is disregarded as an entity 
separate from its owner for this purpose. 
• To allow adequate time for partnerships 
to make necessary payroll and benefit plan adjustments, the proposed and 
temporary amendments apply on the later of: (1) August 1, 2016, or (2) the 
first day of the latest-starting plan year following May 4, 2016, of an affected 
plan sponsored by a disregarded entity. An affected plan includes any qualified 
plan, health plan, or § 125 cafeteria plan if the plan benefits participants whose 
employment status is affected by these regulations. 
• The proposed  and  temporary 
amendments do not address the application of Rev. Rul. 69-184 in tiered 
partnership situations. The IRS has requested comments on this issue, as well 
as the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to permit partners to be 
employees of the partnership and the impact on employee benefit plans and on 
employment taxes if Rev. Rul. 69-184 were to be modified to permit partners 
in certain circumstances also to be employees. 
 
2. Advice for those wishing to minimize self-employment 
tax liability through the S corporation “Edwards/Gingrich loophole”— 
failure to have the S corporation contract with those making the payments 
can be fatal. Fleischer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-238 (12/29/16). 
The taxpayer, a financial consultant who developed investment portfolios, 
formed an S corporation of which he was the sole shareholder and the 
president, secretary, and treasurer. He entered into an employment agreement 
with the S corporation, pursuant to which he was paid an annual salary. In each 
of the years in question, the taxpayer included just under $35,000 in gross 
income as compensation for services and reported nonpassive income on 
Schedule E ranging from $11,924 to $147,642. The taxpayer did not report 
any self-employment tax due. The gross receipts of the S corporation were 
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largely attributable to a representative agreement into which the taxpayer 
entered with Linsco/Private Ledger Financial  Services (LPL) and a broker 
contract into which he entered with MassMutual Financial Group. The 
taxpayer entered into both contracts himself, i.e., the S corporation was not a 
party to either contract. In fact, the taxpayer entered into the contract with LPL 
before the S corporation came into existence. The IRS issued a notice of 
deficiency in which the IRS asserted that the taxpayer should have reported 
the gross receipts as self-employment income on Schedule C attached to his 
individual income tax returns for the years in issue. The Tax Court (Judge 
Paris) agreed with the government. The court framed the question as “who 
controls the earning of the income” and stated that two elements must be 
satisfied for a corporation (rather than its service-provider employee) to be the 
controller of the income: (1) the individual providing the services must be an 
employee of the corporation whom the corporation can direct and control in a 
meaningful sense, and (2) a contract or similar indicium recognizing the 
corporation’s controlling position must exist between the corporation and the 
person or entity using the services. In this case, the court reasoned, the second 
element was not satisfied because there was no contract or other indicium that 
the S corporation exhibited control over the taxpayer. The court rejected the 
taxpayer’s argument that it was impossible for LPL and MassMutual to enter 
into contracts with the S corporation because the corporation was not a 
registered entity under the securities laws and regulations. 
 
C. Excise Taxes 
 
1. In Steven Spielberg’s 1971 film entitled “Duel,” a 
large tanker truck terrorizes a car driven by Dennis Weaver. These 
proposed regulations address the excise tax implications. REG-103380, 
Excise Tax; Tractors, Trailers, Trucks, and Tires; Definition of Highway 
Vehicle, 81 F.R. 18544 (3/31/16). The Treasury and IRS have issued proposed 
amendments to regulations regarding: (1) the definition of a “highway 
vehicle” for purposes of various excise tax provisions (Prop. Reg. § 48.0–4); 
(2) the tax imposed by § 4051 on the retail sale of certain highway-type tractors 
and  chassis  and  bodies  for  highway-type  trailers  and  trucks  (Prop.  Reg. 
§§ 48.4051–0, –1, –2 and 48.4052–1); and (3) the tax imposed by § 4071 on 
the sale by a manufacturer of a taxable tire with a maximum rated load capacity 
greater  than  3,500  pounds  (among  other  proposed  regulations,  Prop.  Reg. 
§§ 48.4071–1, –2, –3 and 48.4072–1). The proposed regulations  update, 
restate and reorganize temporary regulations that were published in 1983 (T.D. 
7882, Floor Stocks Credits or Refunds and Consumer Credits or Refunds With 
Respect to Certain Tax-Repealed Articles; Excise Tax on Heavy Trucks; 48 
F.R.  14361  (4/4/83))  and  have  been  periodically  amended.  The  proposed 
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regulations are  necessary to reflect  statutory changes  and address  relevant 
court decisions. The proposed regulations change the result in Horton Homes, 
Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2004), which held that so-called 
“toters,” which are tractor units designed specifically to tow manufactured 
homes, are  not tractors  subject to the  excise tax imposed  by §  4051. The 
proposed regulations will apply on and after the date final regulations are 
published in the Federal Register. 
 
XII. TAX  LEGISLATION 
 
A. Enacted 
 
1. Congress enacts a big break for small employers that 
offer health reimbursement arrangements. The 21st Century Cures Act 
(“Cures Act”), Pub. L. No. 114-255, was signed by the President on 12/13/16. 
Among other changes, the Cures Act made several modifications to the rules 
related to health reimbursement arrangements. These include (1) exempting 
health reimbursement arrangements that meet the definition of  a  Qualified 
Small  Employer  Health  Reimbursement  Arrangement  (QSEHRA)  from  the 
§ 4980D excise tax; (2) imposing new reporting requirements related to 
QSEHRAs; (3) requiring the inclusion in an employee’s gross income of 
payments or reimbursements under a QSEHRA for employees that do not have 
minimum essential coverage; (4) limiting or potentially eliminating the § 36B 
premium tax credit for employees covered by a QSEHRA; and (5) requiring 
that the employer’s cost for a QSEHRA be taken into account in determining 
the applicability of the Cadillac Tax. These changes generally are effective for 
years beginning after 12/31/16. 
 
2. Veterans have extra time to claim refunds for taxes 
improperly withheld from amounts received for combat-related injuries. 
The Combat-Injured Veterans Tax Fairness Act of 2016 (2016 CIVTFA), Pub. 
L. No. 114-292, was signed by the President on 12/16/16. Section 104(a)(4) 
and (b) exclude from gross income amounts received as a pension, annuity, or 
similar allowance for a combat-related injury. In St. Clair v. United States, 778 
F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Va. 1991), the court held that a lump sum disability-related 
severance payment received by a veteran was excluded from the recipient’s 
gross income under § 104(a)(4). Despite these authorities, since 1991, the 
Department of Defense has withheld taxes from severance pay for wounded 
veterans. The 2016 CIVTFA directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that 
taxes are not withheld prospectively. In addition, the legislation directs the 
Secretary of Defense, within one year of the date of enactment, to identify all 
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severance payments from which taxes were improperly withheld, notify each 
recipient of the improper withholding, and provide each recipient with 
instructions on filing amended returns to recover these amounts. The 
legislation extends the limitations period of § 6511(a) on filing claims for 
refund to the date that is one year after the required notification of improper 
withholding and eliminates the restriction of § 6511(b)(2) that would normally 
apply on the amount of tax recoverable. 
